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Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 106-120

Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms

Author keywords

Bargaining set; Implementation; Simple mechanism

Indexed keywords


EID: 0001481681     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0730     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)

References (20)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.