Deductive reasoning in extensive games

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 487, 2003, Pages 305-325

  Asheim, Geir B ^a   Dufwenberg, Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MODELING;

EID: 0037985368     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00121     Document Type: Article

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