Inconsistencies in extensive games: Common knowledge is not the issue

Erkenntnis

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 103-114

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a   Lindén, Johan ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038802033     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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