Cheap talk and reputation in repeated pretrial negotiation

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 787-802

  Kim, Jeong Yoo ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030361640     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555882     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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