All-pay auctions with variable rewards

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 417-430

  Kaplan, Todd ^a   Luski, Israel ^b   Sela, Aner ^b   Wettstein, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036955658     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00184     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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