The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 627-644

  Barut, Yasar ^a   Kovenock, Dan ^b  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

All pay auctions; C72; Contests; D44; D72; Multiple prizes; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012605506     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00029-9     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Amann E., Leininger W. Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals. Journal of Economics. 61:1995;273-279.
2. Amann E., Leininger W. Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: the two-player case. Games and Economic Behavior. 14:1996;1-18.
3. Baye M., Kovenock D., de Vries C. Rigging the lobbying process: an application of the all-pay auction. American Economic Review. 83:1993;289-294.
4. Baye M., Kovenock D., de Vries C. The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory. 8:1996;291-305.
5. Baye, M., Kovenock, D., de Vries, C., 1997. Fee allocation of lawyer services in litigation. Mimeo, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
6. Berry S. Rent-seeking with multiple winners. Public Choice. 77:1993;437-443.
7. Bulow, J., Klemperer, P., 1996. The generalized war of attrition. Mimeo, Nuffield College, Oxford University.
8. Clark D., Riis C. A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest. Public Choice. 87:1996;177-184.
9. Clark D., Riis C. Competition over more than one prize. American Economic Review. 88:1998;276-289.
10. Dasgupta, P., 1986. The theory of technological competition. In: Stiglitz, J.E., Mathewson, G.F. (Eds.), New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 519-547.
11. Ellingsen T. Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly. American Economic Review. 81:1991;648-657.
12. Frank, R., Cook, P., 1995. The Winner Take All Society. Free Press.
13. Glazer A., Hassin R. Optimal contests. Economic Inquiry. 26:1988;133-143.
14. Gradstein M., Nitzan S. Advantageous multiple rent seeking. Mathematical and Computer Modelling. 12:1989;511-518.
15. Harstad R. Privately informed seekers of an uncertain rent. Public Choice. 83:1995;81-93.
16. Hillman A., Riley J. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics. 1:1989;17-40.
17. Hillman A., Samet D. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice. 54:1987;63-82.
18. Krishna V., Morgan J. An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction. Journal of Economic Theory. 72:1997;343-362.
19. Singh, N., Wittman, D., 1995. Contests. Mimeo, University of California at Santa Cruz.