Domestic political accountability and the escalation and settlement of international disputes

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 46, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 754-790

  Huth, Paul K ^a   Allee, Todd L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036445658     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002200202237928     Document Type: Article

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