Yardstick competition and investment incentives

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 105-126

  Dalen, Dag Morten ^a  

^a Found Res in Econ and Bus Admin   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032375714     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864098567353     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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