A reexamination of yardstick competition

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 33-60

  Sobel, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033423589     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864099567578     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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