Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 42-58

  Andersson, Fredrik ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036116632     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/323931     Document Type: Review

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