Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: An econometric investigation

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 225-247

  Blume, Andreas ^a   Dejong, Douglas V ^b   Neumann, George R ^b   Savin, N E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036095779     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.647     Document Type: Review

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