Repeated Implementation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 308-317

  Kalai, Ehud ^a   Ledyard, John O ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040682367     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2459     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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