Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on U.S. global strategy

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 116, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 343-365

  Deng, Yong ^a  

^a UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035465644     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/798020     Document Type: Review

References (134)

1. Gao Jindian, ed., Guoji Zhanluexue Gailun [Introduction to International Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1995), 7-9.
2. Francois Heisbourg, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the U.S. Abroad," Survival 41 (Winter 1999-2000): 5-19.
3. See, for example, Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security 21 (Spring 1997): 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24 (Summer 1999): 5-41.
4. See, for example, Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security 21 (Spring 1997): 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24 (Summer 1999): 5-41.
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 78 (July/August 1999): 22-35; Richard Haass, "What to Do with American Primacy," Foreign Affairs 78 (September/October 1999): 37-49.
6. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 78 (July/August 1999): 22-35; Richard Haass, "What to Do with American Primacy," Foreign Affairs 78 (September/October 1999): 37-49.
7. See, for example, David Wilkinson, "Unipolarity Without Hegemony," International Studies Review 1 (Summer 1999): 141-172.
8. 6 For the classic formulation, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), esp. chap. 6.
9. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
10. Even Kenneth Waltz, while insisting balance of power will occur "tomorrow," has to concede that full-scale balancing is not happening "today." And he admits his inability to say when that "tomorrow" will be. See Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25 (Summer 2000): 5-41.
11. Michael Pillsbury attributes the conception of multipolarity to Deng Xiaoping's top security adviser Huan Xiang, who put forth this characterization in 1986. See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000), 9-12.
12. "1993: China Established Advantageous Position in the Current World," Liaowang [Outlook] 52 (1993): 33.
13. Jin Canrong, "The U.S. Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations: The Chinese Perspective" (paper presented at the conference, "New Generation, New Voices: Debating China's International Future," sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, San Francisco, 13-15 August 1999); Zhang Yebai, "An Overview of Studies on Sino-American Relations in the 1990s" in Zi Zhongyun and Tao Wenzhao, eds., Jiaqi Lijie De Xin Qiaoliang [Building a New Bridge of Understanding] (Hefei: Anhui University Press, 1996), 196-98.
14. Jin Canrong, "The U.S. Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations: The Chinese Perspective" (paper presented at the conference, "New Generation, New Voices: Debating China's International Future," sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, San Francisco, 13-15 August 1999); Zhang Yebai, "An Overview of Studies on Sino-American Relations in the 1990s" in Zi Zhongyun and Tao Wenzhao, eds., Jiaqi Lijie De Xin Qiaoliang [Building a New Bridge of Understanding] (Hefei: Anhui University Press, 1996), 196-98.
15. Wang Jisi, "Building a Constructive Relationship" in Morton Abramowitz, Funabashi Yoichi, and Wang Jisi, China-Japan-U.S.: Managing the Trilateral Relationship (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), 22.
16. Pillsbury, China Debates, 14.
17. Ibid., chap. 2.
18. Yao Youzhi, "U.S. Strategic Orientation in the 21st Century as Viewed from the Kosovo War," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (Beijing), 20 May 1999, 11-14 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS)-China, 5 August 1999, 2; Zhao Yiping, "World Security and U.S. Global Strategy," Guangming Ribao, 16 February 2000 in FBIS, 23 February 2000.
19. Yao Youzhi, "U.S. Strategic Orientation in the 21st Century as Viewed from the Kosovo War," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (Beijing), 20 May 1999, 11-14 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS)-China, 5 August 1999, 2; Zhao Yiping, "World Security and U.S. Global Strategy," Guangming Ribao, 16 February 2000 in FBIS, 23 February 2000.
20. Xu Hongzhi and Huang Qing, "Advancing Toward Multipolarization Amid Turbulence," Renmin ribao, 16 December 1999, 7 in FBIS-China, 16 January 2000, 2.
21. Wei Ming, "Jiang Zemin's Pragmatic Diplomacy," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 October 1999, 16-19, in FBIS-China, 20 November 1999, 2. This Hong Kong source on the Chinese leadership's rethinking is validated by my own discussions with over a dozen Chinese scholars and think-tankers based in Beijing and Shanghai that took place in San Francisco, August 1999 and Seattle, July 2000.
22. Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong, Song Qiang, et al., Quanqiuhua Yinying Xia De Zhongguo Zhilu [China's Road Under the Shadow of Globalization] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1999), 20. The author, Wang Xiaodong, was an editor of the influential Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], a journal with backing from high-ranking Chinese civilian and military officials. First appearing in 1993, it became a major forum for nationalist views and bold strategic analyses. For more information, see Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s," China Quarterly 152 (December 1997): 725-45.
23. Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong, Song Qiang, et al., Quanqiuhua Yinying Xia De Zhongguo Zhilu [China's Road Under the Shadow of Globalization] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1999), 20. The author, Wang Xiaodong, was an editor of the influential Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], a journal with backing from high-ranking Chinese civilian and military officials. First appearing in 1993, it became a major forum for nationalist views and bold strategic analyses. For more information, see Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s," China Quarterly 152 (December 1997): 725-45.
24. Xiao Feng, "Views on Some Hot-Spot Issues in International Situation" in Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 20 December 1999, 1-5 in FBIS-China, 12 February 2000.
25. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Michael Mastanduno argues that the United States has "followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective - the preservation of the United States' preeminent global position." Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment," 51.
26. Stephen M. Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 79 (March/April 2000): 63-79.
27. See, for example, Ashton B. Carter, "Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs," Survival 41 (Winter 1999/2000): 101-123; Nye, "Redefining the National Interest."
28. See, for example, Ashton B. Carter, "Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs," Survival 41 (Winter 1999/2000): 101-123; Nye, "Redefining the National Interest."
29. See Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97): 5-53.
30. Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," International Security 23 (Winter 1998/99): 79-113.
31. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions." For the isolationist strand of thinking, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security 21 (Spring 1997): 5-48; Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security 22 (Summer 1997): 86-124.
32. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions." For the isolationist strand of thinking, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security 21 (Spring 1997): 5-48; Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security 22 (Summer 1997): 86-124.
33. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions." For the isolationist strand of thinking, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security 21 (Spring 1997): 5-48; Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security 22 (Summer 1997): 86-124.
34. Jin Canrong, "The U.S. Global Strategy."
35. Editorial, "Hegemonism Can Hardly Last Long After All," Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) (Internet version-WWW), 10 February 2000, A2 in FBIS-China, 10 February 2000. These figures on the U.S. defense budget were reported by the Chinese news media.
36. Wang Jincun, "New Changes in International Situations as Viewed from NATO's Aggressive War against Yugoslavia," Qian Xian (Beijing), 5 July 1999, 21-23 in FBIS-China, 9 August 1999, 2.
37. Shi Yukun, "An Analysis of New Interventionism: Interviews with Researchers of the Academy of Military Sciences," Zhong guo junshi kexue, 20 May 1999 in FBIS-China, 2 August 1999; Peng Guangqian and Shen Fangwu, "'Humanitarian Intervention' Is Inhumane," Zhongguo Guofang Bao, 29 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 29 May 2000.
38. Shi Yukun, "An Analysis of New Interventionism: Interviews with Researchers of the Academy of Military Sciences," Zhong guo junshi kexue, 20 May 1999 in FBIS-China, 2 August 1999; Peng Guangqian and Shen Fangwu, "'Humanitarian Intervention' Is Inhumane," Zhongguo Guofang Bao, 29 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 29 May 2000.
39. Fang Ning, et al., China's Road; Wang Xiaodong, "On Liberalism and Hegemony," Jianchuan Zhishi (Internet version), 14 June 1999 in FBIS-China, 17 July 1999. American realist theorists seem to share this view with their Chinese counterparts. For example, Kenneth Waltz asks, "Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics?" His answer is: no. See his "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 915.
40. Fang Ning, et al., China's Road; Wang Xiaodong, "On Liberalism and Hegemony," Jianchuan Zhishi (Internet version), 14 June 1999 in FBIS-China, 17 July 1999. American realist theorists seem to share this view with their Chinese counterparts. For example, Kenneth Waltz asks, "Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics?" His answer is: no. See his "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 915.
41. Fang Ning, et al., China's Road; Wang Xiaodong, "On Liberalism and Hegemony," Jianchuan Zhishi (Internet version), 14 June 1999 in FBIS-China, 17 July 1999. American realist theorists seem to share this view with their Chinese counterparts. For example, Kenneth Waltz asks, "Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics?" His answer is: no. See his "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 915.
42. Qian Ton, Li Mingjiang, "Sha Zukang Says ABM Treaty is Cornerstone for Global Strategic Balance and Stability," Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 8 June 2000 in FBIS-China, 8 June 2000; Zheng Yuan, "Egoism and Overbearing Attitude," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] (overseas edition), 7 July 2000, 7; "U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Threatens Global Security - Sha Zukang on Ways China Should Handle It, Stressing Needs to Ensure the Effectiveness of Retaliatory Capacity" in Wen Wei Po, (Hong Kong) 11 July 2000, A5 in FBIS-China, 11 July 2000.
43. Qian Ton, Li Mingjiang, "Sha Zukang Says ABM Treaty is Cornerstone for Global Strategic Balance and Stability," Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 8 June 2000 in FBIS-China, 8 June 2000; Zheng Yuan, "Egoism and Overbearing Attitude," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] (overseas edition), 7 July 2000, 7; "U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Threatens Global Security - Sha Zukang on Ways China Should Handle It, Stressing Needs to Ensure the Effectiveness of Retaliatory Capacity" in Wen Wei Po, (Hong Kong) 11 July 2000, A5 in FBIS-China, 11 July 2000.
44. Qian Ton, Li Mingjiang, "Sha Zukang Says ABM Treaty is Cornerstone for Global Strategic Balance and Stability," Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 8 June 2000 in FBIS-China, 8 June 2000; Zheng Yuan, "Egoism and Overbearing Attitude," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] (overseas edition), 7 July 2000, 7; "U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Threatens Global Security - Sha Zukang on Ways China Should Handle It, Stressing Needs to Ensure the Effectiveness of Retaliatory Capacity" in Wen Wei Po, (Hong Kong) 11 July 2000, A5 in FBIS-China, 11 July 2000.
45. Pillsbury, China Debates, 45.
46. Wang Yizhou, "A Warning Issued at the end of the Century," Shijie Zhishi (Beijing) 16 May 1999, 7-10 in FBIS-China, 23 June 1999; Wang Yizhou, "Warning at the End of the Century: Hegemonism Characterized by 'Human Rights Exceeding Sovereignty,'" Liaowang, no. 21, 24 May 1999, 3-6 in FBIS-China, 14 June 1999. Wang is vice-director, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. His earlier writings presumably represented the most respectable, albeit nascent liberal voice in the first half of the 1990s. His retreat from an earlier liberal orientation is illustrative of the collateral damage of the Kosovo war on China's overall liberal strain of international thinking. For a discussion of liberal-oriented ideas in China, see Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations," China Quarterly 154 (June 1998): 308-29.
47. Wang Yizhou, "A Warning Issued at the end of the Century," Shijie Zhishi (Beijing) 16 May 1999, 7-10 in FBIS-China, 23 June 1999; Wang Yizhou, "Warning at the End of the Century: Hegemonism Characterized by 'Human Rights Exceeding Sovereignty,'" Liaowang, no. 21, 24 May 1999, 3-6 in FBIS-China, 14 June 1999. Wang is vice-director, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. His earlier writings presumably represented the most respectable, albeit nascent liberal voice in the first half of the 1990s. His retreat from an earlier liberal orientation is illustrative of the collateral damage of the Kosovo war on China's overall liberal strain of international thinking. For a discussion of liberal-oriented ideas in China, see Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations," China Quarterly 154 (June 1998): 308-29.
48. Wang Yizhou, "A Warning Issued at the end of the Century," Shijie Zhishi (Beijing) 16 May 1999, 7-10 in FBIS-China, 23 June 1999; Wang Yizhou, "Warning at the End of the Century: Hegemonism Characterized by 'Human Rights Exceeding Sovereignty,'" Liaowang, no. 21, 24 May 1999, 3-6 in FBIS-China, 14 June 1999. Wang is vice-director, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. His earlier writings presumably represented the most respectable, albeit nascent liberal voice in the first half of the 1990s. His retreat from an earlier liberal orientation is illustrative of the collateral damage of the Kosovo war on China's overall liberal strain of international thinking. For a discussion of liberal-oriented ideas in China, see Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations," China Quarterly 154 (June 1998): 308-29.
49. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions."
50. Fang Ning, et al., China's Road, 6; Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., Yaomo Hua Yu Meiti Hongzha [Demonization and Media Bombardment] (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 1999), 82-4.
51. Fang Ning, et al., China's Road, 6; Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., Yaomo Hua Yu Meiti Hongzha [Demonization and Media Bombardment] (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 1999), 82-4.
52. Economist, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621; James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
53. Economist, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621; James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
54. Economist, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621; James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
55. Economist, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621; James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
56. Economist, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621; James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
57. Economist, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621; James Mann, About Face (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
58. Chinese perception on this may be correct. Yoichi Funabashi has shown that the revision of U.S.- Japan security treaty in 1995-1996 clearly had China in mind. See his Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
59. Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security 23 (Spring 1999): 49-80.
60. Shi Yukun, "An Analysis of Neo-interventionism"; Xu Xingci, "Theater Missile Defense Causes Trouble in East Asia," Xiandai Bingqi, 2 February 2000, 10-12 in FBIS-China, 17 April 2000.
61. Shi Yukun, "An Analysis of Neo-interventionism"; Xu Xingci, "Theater Missile Defense Causes Trouble in East Asia," Xiandai Bingqi, 2 February 2000, 10-12 in FBIS-China, 17 April 2000.
62. Thomas Christensen has argued against the inclusion of Taiwan under TMD for the "wrong" message that it would send to both Taipei and Beijing. See his "Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security," Orbis 44 (Winter 2000): 79-90.
63. Qingguo Jia, "Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese Perceptions of the Engagement Policy Debate in the U.S.," Journal of Contemporary China 10 (June 2001): 321-330. See also, Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., eds., Yaomohua Zhongguo de Beihou [Behind the Demonization of China] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1996); Li Xiguang, et al., Demonization and Media.
64. Qingguo Jia, "Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese Perceptions of the Engagement Policy Debate in the U.S.," Journal of Contemporary China 10 (June 2001): 321-330. See also, Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., eds., Yaomohua Zhongguo de Beihou [Behind the Demonization of China] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1996); Li Xiguang, et al., Demonization and Media.
65. Qingguo Jia, "Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese Perceptions of the Engagement Policy Debate in the U.S.," Journal of Contemporary China 10 (June 2001): 321-330. See also, Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., eds., Yaomohua Zhongguo de Beihou [Behind the Demonization of China] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1996); Li Xiguang, et al., Demonization and Media.
66. This is a common view with little dissent in Chinese writings. See, for example, Li Jiaquan, "Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of Clinton's Visit to China," Taisheng [Taiwan Voices], August 1998, 10-11; Su Ge, "Sino-American Summits and the 'strategic Partnership,'" Shijie Zhengzhi Yu Jingji [World Politics and Economics], August 1998, 20-23; Wang Haihan, "Thoughts on Present Developments and Prospects of Sino-American Relations," Guoji Guancha [International Survey] 4 (1998), 7-11; Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions" in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States (New York: Routledge, 1999), 143.
67. This is a common view with little dissent in Chinese writings. See, for example, Li Jiaquan, "Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of Clinton's Visit to China," Taisheng [Taiwan Voices], August 1998, 10-11; Su Ge, "Sino-American Summits and the 'strategic Partnership,'" Shijie Zhengzhi Yu Jingji [World Politics and Economics], August 1998, 20-23; Wang Haihan, "Thoughts on Present Developments and Prospects of Sino-American Relations," Guoji Guancha [International Survey] 4 (1998), 7-11; Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions" in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States (New York: Routledge, 1999), 143.
68. This is a common view with little dissent in Chinese writings. See, for example, Li Jiaquan, "Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of Clinton's Visit to China," Taisheng [Taiwan Voices], August 1998, 10-11; Su Ge, "Sino-American Summits and the 'strategic Partnership,'" Shijie Zhengzhi Yu Jingji [World Politics and Economics], August 1998, 20-23; Wang Haihan, "Thoughts on Present Developments and Prospects of Sino-American Relations," Guoji Guancha [International Survey] 4 (1998), 7-11; Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions" in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States (New York: Routledge, 1999), 143.
69. This is a common view with little dissent in Chinese writings. See, for example, Li Jiaquan, "Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of Clinton's Visit to China," Taisheng [Taiwan Voices], August 1998, 10-11; Su Ge, "Sino-American Summits and the 'strategic Partnership,'" Shijie Zhengzhi Yu Jingji [World Politics and Economics], August 1998, 20-23; Wang Haihan, "Thoughts on Present Developments and Prospects of Sino-American Relations," Guoji Guancha [International Survey] 4 (1998), 7-11; Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions" in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States (New York: Routledge, 1999), 143.
70. Yang Yusheng, Zhongguoren De Meiguo Guan: Yige Lishi De Kaocha [Chinese Views on America: A Historical Perspective] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1996), 301-302. For a comprehensive discussion of the negative turn in the 1990s in Chinese popular perceptions of America from a largely positive image in the 1980s, see Ming Zhang, "Public Images of the United States" in Yong Deng and Feiling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), chap. 7.
71. Yang Yusheng, Zhongguoren De Meiguo Guan: Yige Lishi De Kaocha [Chinese Views on America: A Historical Perspective] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1996), 301-302. For a comprehensive discussion of the negative turn in the 1990s in Chinese popular perceptions of America from a largely positive image in the 1980s, see Ming Zhang, "Public Images of the United States" in Yong Deng and Feiling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), chap. 7.
72. Philip C. Saunders, "China's America Watchers: Changing Attitudes Towards the United States," China Quarterly 161 (March 2000): 41-65.
73. Fang Ning, et al., China's Road, 94.
74. Gao Jindian, Introduction to International Strategy, 321-23.
75. Chu Shulong, "Bilateral and Regional Strategic and Security Relationship between China and the United States after the Cold War," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 20 May 2000, No. 5, 7-14 in FBIS-China, 1 June 2000.
76. Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options - China's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy toward the United States," Zhanlue yu Guanli, 1 June 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 June 2000.
77. See Huangpu Pinglun, "Sino-U.S. Relations: Today and Tomorrow," Liaowang, 8 May 2000, 54-55 in FBIS-China, 15 May 2000.
78. Ibid.; Yan Xuetong, "China's Strategic Security Environment," Shijie Zhishi, 1 February 2000, No. 3, 8-9, 10 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; "Post-Cold War Continuity," Zhanlue yu Guanli, 1 June 2000, 58-66 in FBIS-China, 23 June 2000. After carefully reviewing Chinese military analysts' assessment of China's security environment, David Shambaugh also concludes that there is rising "strategic competition" between China and the United States. See his "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," International Security 24 (Winter 1999/2000): 52-79.
79. Ibid.; Yan Xuetong, "China's Strategic Security Environment," Shijie Zhishi, 1 February 2000, No. 3, 8-9, 10 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; "Post-Cold War Continuity," Zhanlue yu Guanli, 1 June 2000, 58-66 in FBIS-China, 23 June 2000. After carefully reviewing Chinese military analysts' assessment of China's security environment, David Shambaugh also concludes that there is rising "strategic competition" between China and the United States. See his "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," International Security 24 (Winter 1999/2000): 52-79.
80. Ibid.; Yan Xuetong, "China's Strategic Security Environment," Shijie Zhishi, 1 February 2000, No. 3, 8-9, 10 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; "Post-Cold War Continuity," Zhanlue yu Guanli, 1 June 2000, 58-66 in FBIS-China, 23 June 2000. After carefully reviewing Chinese military analysts' assessment of China's security environment, David Shambaugh also concludes that there is rising "strategic competition" between China and the United States. See his "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," International Security 24 (Winter 1999/2000): 52-79.
81. Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options."
82. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, "Evaluating Theories," and "Structural Realism." See also Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." For a summary of realist views on why balance of power recurs, see Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 5.
83. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, "Evaluating Theories," and "Structural Realism." See also Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." For a summary of realist views on why balance of power recurs, see Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 5.
84. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, "Evaluating Theories," and "Structural Realism." See also Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." For a summary of realist views on why balance of power recurs, see Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 5.
85. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, "Evaluating Theories," and "Structural Realism." See also Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." For a summary of realist views on why balance of power recurs, see Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 5.
86. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 916.
87. For a critique of structural realism and review of literature along this line, see John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 899-912.
88. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 915.
89. See Wang Yizhou, "Rethinking the Kosovo Crisis," Renmin Ribao (Internet version-WWW), 23 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 March 2000; Li Bin, "China's Security Environment in the Early 2000s," Beijing Review (Internet version-WWW), No. 2, 10 January 2000 in FBIS-China, 13 January 2000. Western scholars have similarly argued that since the cold war, power is determined by material and ideational factors. For a vision of post-cold war international power redistribution based on values, see John Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91. In the context of Chinese foreign policy, see Alastair lain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
90. See Wang Yizhou, "Rethinking the Kosovo Crisis," Renmin Ribao (Internet version-WWW), 23 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 March 2000; Li Bin, "China's Security Environment in the Early 2000s," Beijing Review (Internet version-WWW), No. 2, 10 January 2000 in FBIS-China, 13 January 2000. Western scholars have similarly argued that since the cold war, power is determined by material and ideational factors. For a vision of post-cold war international power redistribution based on values, see John Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91. In the context of Chinese foreign policy, see Alastair lain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
91. See Wang Yizhou, "Rethinking the Kosovo Crisis," Renmin Ribao (Internet version-WWW), 23 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 March 2000; Li Bin, "China's Security Environment in the Early 2000s," Beijing Review (Internet version-WWW), No. 2, 10 January 2000 in FBIS-China, 13 January 2000. Western scholars have similarly argued that since the cold war, power is determined by material and ideational factors. For a vision of post-cold war international power redistribution based on values, see John Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91. In the context of Chinese foreign policy, see Alastair lain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
92. See Wang Yizhou, "Rethinking the Kosovo Crisis," Renmin Ribao (Internet version-WWW), 23 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 March 2000; Li Bin, "China's Security Environment in the Early 2000s," Beijing Review (Internet version-WWW), No. 2, 10 January 2000 in FBIS-China, 13 January 2000. Western scholars have similarly argued that since the cold war, power is determined by material and ideational factors. For a vision of post-cold war international power redistribution based on values, see John Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91. In the context of Chinese foreign policy, see Alastair lain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
93. Jin Junhui, "Overcome Obstructions and Constantly Push Forward Sino-U.S. Relations," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu No. 3 (July 1999), 26-29, 30 in FBIS-China, 5 August 1999, 5.
94. The Information Office of China's State Council, "China's National Defense in 2000," Beijing Xinhua in English, 16 October 2000 in FBIS-China, 16 October 2000.
95. Yan, "Post-Cold War Continuity," 6.
96. Renmin Ribao [People's Daily, overseas edition], 19 July 2000.
97. Deng Xiaoping personally intervened to rein in hardliners' advocacy of an aggressive nationalist foreign policy in the aftermath of Tiananmen. See Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 295-316. For an interpretation of Deng Xiaoping's lie-low strategy, see Wang Taiping, ed., Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Shixiang Yanjiu Lunwenji [An Anthology of Papers on Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomacy] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1996).
98. Deng Xiaoping personally intervened to rein in hardliners' advocacy of an aggressive nationalist foreign policy in the aftermath of Tiananmen. See Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 295-316. For an interpretation of Deng Xiaoping's lie-low strategy, see Wang Taiping, ed., Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Shixiang Yanjiu Lunwenji [An Anthology of Papers on Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomacy] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1996).
99. Johnston, "International Structures," 60-65; Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World."
100. Johnston, "International Structures," 60-65; Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World."
101. Johnston, "International Structures," 60-65; Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World."
102. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
103. According to conventional, realist understanding, "edging away" from the hegemon is an important part of balancing. The quoted term is Kenneth Waltz's and is discussed thoroughly in Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment."
104. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fengxi [Analysis of China'sNational Interests] (Tianjin: People's Press, 1996), 158.
105. For Beijing's calculations, see Suisheng Zhao, Across the Strait. For Beijing's surprise at U.S. response, see Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 370-73.
106. For Beijing's calculations, see Suisheng Zhao, Across the Strait. For Beijing's surprise at U.S. response, see Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 370-73.
107. Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 929.
108. The Information Office of China's State Council, "China's National Defense in 2000."
109. For discussions of Beijing's challenge in balancing these conflictual domestic agenda, see Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Minxin Pei, "Will China Become Another Indonesia?" Foreign Policy 116 (Fall 1999): 94-109.
110. For discussions of Beijing's challenge in balancing these conflictual domestic agenda, see Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Minxin Pei, "Will China Become Another Indonesia?" Foreign Policy 116 (Fall 1999): 94-109.
111. Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security 23 (Spring 1999): 81-118.
112. For Beijing's fear of nuclear blackmail by the superpowers during the cold war, see John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 70-74; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). For Beijing's fear in the context of the latest U.S. missile defense, see Michael McDevitt, "Beijing's Bind," Washington Quarterly 23 (Summer 2000): 177-86.
113. For Beijing's fear of nuclear blackmail by the superpowers during the cold war, see John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 70-74; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). For Beijing's fear in the context of the latest U.S. missile defense, see Michael McDevitt, "Beijing's Bind," Washington Quarterly 23 (Summer 2000): 177-86.
114. For Beijing's fear of nuclear blackmail by the superpowers during the cold war, see John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 70-74; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). For Beijing's fear in the context of the latest U.S. missile defense, see Michael McDevitt, "Beijing's Bind," Washington Quarterly 23 (Summer 2000): 177-86.
115. Lu Ren, "Can China Be Dragged Down into Collapse by $60 Billion?" Jiefangjun Bao (Internet version-WWW), 28 June 2000, 9 in FBIS-China, 28 June 2000. Some Chinese analysts argue that the downfall of the former Soviet Union was due to the U.S. "strategic misdirection," by which Moscow was "tricked" into an arms race that ultimately bankrupted its economy. Similarly, in order to find an excuse to attack Iraq, the United States "lured Sadam into invading Kuwait" by signaling to Iraq that its invasion would not incur U.S. intervention. See Pillsbury, China Debates, xlv, xlvi.
116. Lu Ren, "Can China Be Dragged Down into Collapse by $60 Billion?" Jiefangjun Bao (Internet version-WWW), 28 June 2000, 9 in FBIS-China, 28 June 2000. Some Chinese analysts argue that the downfall of the former Soviet Union was due to the U.S. "strategic misdirection," by which Moscow was "tricked" into an arms race that ultimately bankrupted its economy. Similarly, in order to find an excuse to attack Iraq, the United States "lured Sadam into invading Kuwait" by signaling to Iraq that its invasion would not incur U.S. intervention. See Pillsbury, China Debates, xlv, xlvi.
117. Xiao Feng, "Views on Some Hot-Spot Issues"; Yang Chenxu, "It Is Possible to Keep the Peaceful Environment for the Next Ten Years," Liaowang, 22 May 2000, no. 21, 22, 23 in FBIS-China, 31 May 2000.
118. Xiao Feng, "Views on Some Hot-Spot Issues"; Yang Chenxu, "It Is Possible to Keep the Peaceful Environment for the Next Ten Years," Liaowang, 22 May 2000, no. 21, 22, 23 in FBIS-China, 31 May 2000.
119. Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options," 11.
120. Yao Youzhi, "U.S. Strategic Orientation."
121. Niu Jun, "China and the United States - A Very Particular Bilateral Relationship" in Shijie Zhishi, 1 February 2000, 30-32 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning express similar views in their China's Road; Shan Min, "What Is the United States Intending to Do with Its China Security Strategy," Liaowang, 30 April 2001, no. 18, 31 in FBIS-China, 30 April 2001.
122. Niu Jun, "China and the United States - A Very Particular Bilateral Relationship" in Shijie Zhishi, 1 February 2000, 30-32 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning express similar views in their China's Road; Shan Min, "What Is the United States Intending to Do with Its China Security Strategy," Liaowang, 30 April 2001, no. 18, 31 in FBIS-China, 30 April 2001.
123. Niu Jun, "China and the United States - A Very Particular Bilateral Relationship" in Shijie Zhishi, 1 February 2000, 30-32 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning express similar views in their China's Road; Shan Min, "What Is the United States Intending to Do with Its China Security Strategy," Liaowang, 30 April 2001, no. 18, 31 in FBIS-China, 30 April 2001.
124. He Fang, "Revisiting the Theory on the Era of Peace and Development," Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], June 2000, 3-9.
125. For a sampling of these views, see Zhang Ming, "War without Rules," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, 16-18; Fang Ning et al., China's Road; Staff Reporter, "Unrestricted War," Liaowang, 13 March 2000, No. 11, 55-56 in FBIS-China, 22 March 2000.
126. For a sampling of these views, see Zhang Ming, "War without Rules," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, 16-18; Fang Ning et al., China's Road; Staff Reporter, "Unrestricted War," Liaowang, 13 March 2000, No. 11, 55-56 in FBIS-China, 22 March 2000.
127. For a sampling of these views, see Zhang Ming, "War without Rules," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, 16-18; Fang Ning et al., China's Road; Staff Reporter, "Unrestricted War," Liaowang, 13 March 2000, No. 11, 55-56 in FBIS-China, 22 March 2000.
128. For Waltz's latest restatement of these propositions, see his "Structural Realism."
129. nd ed.], The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1961), chap. 13. The quotes are from 214, 219.
130. Ibid., 218.
131. In this light China's opposition to the U.S. missile defense can be better understood. One leading Chinese arms control expert contended, China's minimum nuclear deterrent arsenal means that "Even if the United States says the system is not aimed at China, the capability is aimed at China." Quoted in Erik Eckholm, "What America Calls A Defense China Calls an Offense," New York Times, 2 July 2000.
132. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 40.
133. On "negative strategic cooperation," see Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options"; Yan Xuetong, "Post-Cold War Continuity."
134. On "negative strategic cooperation," see Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options"; Yan Xuetong, "Post-Cold War Continuity."