Response to Randall Stone heresy or scientific progress?

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 245-254

  Brams, Steven J ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035297744     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045002005     Document Type: Article

References (40)

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