To mobilize or not to mobilize: Catch-22s in international crises

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 621-640

  Brams, Steven J ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; POLITICAL THEORY;

EID: 0033381863     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00139     Document Type: Article

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