Game theory and emotions

Rationality and Society

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 91-124

  Brams, Steven J ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b AAAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium; Frustration; Path analysis; Theory of moves; Threats

Indexed keywords

EID: 21444448165     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/104346397009001004     Document Type: Article

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