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Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 323-348

Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games

Author keywords

Axioms; Payoff matrix; Pure strategies; Rational players

Indexed keywords


EID: 0007128577     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00034-7     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

References (19)
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    • Marschak, T.1    Selten, R.2
  • 8
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  • 14
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    • Stevens, C.M.1
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    • Long-term behavior in the theory of moves
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  • 17
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    • Final-offer arbitration
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    • (1986) Management Science , vol.32 , pp. 1551-1561
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  • 18
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  • 19
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    • Zagare, F.C.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.