Game theory: Pitfalls and opportunities in applying it to international relations

International Studies Perspectives

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 221-232

  Brams, Steven J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Game theory; Iran hostage crisis; Theory of moves

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007072541     PISSN: 15283577     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1528-3577.00023     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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