Political economy and political correctness

Public Choice

Volumn 96, Issue 3-4, 1998, Pages 219-239

  Hillman, Arye L ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032360599     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005080224368     Document Type: Article

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