Victims and victors: Reflections on the Kosovo war

Review of International Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 335-358

  Freedman, Lawrence ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034401257     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210500003351     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. This article is based on the E.H. Carr Lecture delivered at the University of Aberystwyth on 29 April 1999. As this lecture was delivered in the middle of the events it was seeking to describe, I have by necessity updated it. I trust those who heard the original version will agree that this process has not led to a major shift in my position.
2. For a recent, sympathetic assessment of Carr see Michael Cox, 'Will the real E.H. Carr please stand up?', International Affairs, 75:3 (July 1999), pp. 643-53 and his forthcoming edited volume, E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
3. For a recent, sympathetic assessment of Carr see Michael Cox, 'Will the real E.H. Carr please stand up?', International Affairs, 75:3 (July 1999), pp. 643-53 and his forthcoming edited volume, E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
4. Adam Roberts, 'NATO's "Humanitarian War" over Kosovo', Survival, 41:3 (Autumn 1999), p. 120.
5. The argument that the Falklands was about democratic principles, in the context of the debate about democracy and belligerence, is developed in Lawrence Freedman, 'How Did the Democratic Process Affect Britain's Decision to Reoccupy the Falkland Islands', in Miriam Fendius Elman (ed.), Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 235-66.
6. These issues were ventilated in an excellent debate between Robert Skidelsky and Michael Ignatieff, 'Is Military Intervention over Kosovo Justified?', Prospect (June 1999), pp. 16-21.
7. John Mueller, 'Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers', Foreign Policy, 102 (Spring 1996). See also his work on the Gulf War, which also suggests that support was dependent on keeping casualties down. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Edward Luttwak has described casualty intolerance as a secular trend rather than a conditional response. See his 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare' and 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', in Foreign Affairs, 74:3 (May-June 1995), pp. 109-22 and 75:4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44.
8. John Mueller, 'Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers', Foreign Policy, 102 (Spring 1996). See also his work on the Gulf War, which also suggests that support was dependent on keeping casualties down. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Edward Luttwak has described casualty intolerance as a secular trend rather than a conditional response. See his 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare' and 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', in Foreign Affairs, 74:3 (May-June 1995), pp. 109-22 and 75:4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44.
9. John Mueller, 'Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers', Foreign Policy, 102 (Spring 1996). See also his work on the Gulf War, which also suggests that support was dependent on keeping casualties down. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Edward Luttwak has described casualty intolerance as a secular trend rather than a conditional response. See his 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare' and 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', in Foreign Affairs, 74:3 (May-June 1995), pp. 109-22 and 75:4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44.
10. John Mueller, 'Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers', Foreign Policy, 102 (Spring 1996). See also his work on the Gulf War, which also suggests that support was dependent on keeping casualties down. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Edward Luttwak has described casualty intolerance as a secular trend rather than a conditional response. See his 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare' and 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', in Foreign Affairs, 74:3 (May-June 1995), pp. 109-22 and 75:4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44.
11. He notes that in neither the Lebanon nor the Somali case did sudden, unexpected casualties cause the public to withdraw support, and that in the case of Somalia support was already declining when the US Rangers got killed. James Burk, 'Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis', Political Science Quarterly, 114:1 (1999), pp. 53-78. See also Deborah D. Avant, 'Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?' Security Studies, 6 (Winter 1996-7), pp. 51-90.
12. He notes that in neither the Lebanon nor the Somali case did sudden, unexpected casualties cause the public to withdraw support, and that in the case of Somalia support was already declining when the US Rangers got killed. James Burk, 'Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis', Political Science Quarterly, 114:1 (1999), pp. 53-78. See also Deborah D. Avant, 'Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?' Security Studies, 6 (Winter 1996-7), pp. 51-90.
13. Walter Goodman, cited in Miles Hudson, and John Stanier, War and the Media, revised edn. (Stroud: Sutton, 1999), p. 256.
14. Times, 18 August 1992, cited in Martin Bell, In Harm's Way (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), p. 137. It should be noted that his successor, Robin Cook, accepted that an awareness of tragedy brought with it a responsibility for a response. The fact that we are witnesses in our sitting-rooms to these events requires us to take responsibility for our reactions to such breaches of human rights'. Times, 18 July 1997, cited in Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, p. 317.
15. Times, 18 August 1992, cited in Martin Bell, In Harm's Way (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), p. 137. It should be noted that his successor, Robin Cook, accepted that an awareness of tragedy brought with it a responsibility for a response. The fact that we are witnesses in our sitting-rooms to these events requires us to take responsibility for our reactions to such breaches of human rights'. Times, 18 July 1997, cited in Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, p. 317.
16. Times, 18 August 1992, cited in Martin Bell, In Harm's Way (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), p. 137. It should be noted that his successor, Robin Cook, accepted that an awareness of tragedy brought with it a responsibility for a response. The fact that we are witnesses in our sitting-rooms to these events requires us to take responsibility for our reactions to such breaches of human rights'. Times, 18 July 1997, cited in Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, p. 317.
17. Times, 18 August 1992, cited in Martin Bell, In Harm's Way (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), p. 137. It should be noted that his successor, Robin Cook, accepted that an awareness of tragedy brought with it a responsibility for a response. The fact that we are witnesses in our sitting-rooms to these events requires us to take responsibility for our reactions to such breaches of human rights'. Times, 18 July 1997, cited in Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, p. 317.
18. See Nik Gowing, Real-time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions? Working Paper (Cambridge, MA: John F Kennedy School of Government, 1994), and a shorter version in Nik Gowing, 'Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does It Make or Break Government Policy?', Bosnia by Television, James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.) (London: British Film Institute, 1996).
19. See Nik Gowing, Real-time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions? Working Paper (Cambridge, MA: John F Kennedy School of Government, 1994), and a shorter version in Nik Gowing, 'Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does It Make or Break Government Policy?', Bosnia by Television, James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.) (London: British Film Institute, 1996).
20. Piers Robinson, 'The CNN Effect', Review of International Studies, 25:2 (April 1999), pp. 301-10. The original CNN effect, it might be noted, referred to the ubiquity of the channel (so that all sides were using the same information source) as much as to the particulars of its effects. The term itself originated during the Gulf War and was naturally promoted by CNN's owner, Ted Turner. See T. Allen, F. Berry and N. Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf (Atlanta: Turner Broadcasting, 1991).
21. Piers Robinson, 'The CNN Effect', Review of International Studies, 25:2 (April 1999), pp. 301-10. The original CNN effect, it might be noted, referred to the ubiquity of the channel (so that all sides were using the same information source) as much as to the particulars of its effects. The term itself originated during the Gulf War and was naturally promoted by CNN's owner, Ted Turner. See T. Allen, F. Berry and N. Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf (Atlanta: Turner Broadcasting, 1991).
22. Peter Jennings of ABC Television has observed: 'Political leadership trumps good television every time'. In Philip Seib, Headline Diplomacy (London: Praeger, 1997), p. 135.
23. A vicious campaign had been waged against the Iraqi Kurds by Saddam Hussein in 1988, culminating in the chemical attack on the city of Halabjah. The explanation for the failure of this to elicit a response may be the absence of the Western media but also the fact that Western policy at the time involved a form of constructive engagement with Iraq.
24. Alastair Campbell, 'Communications Lessons for NATO, the Military and the Media', RUSI Journal (August 1999).
25. See the insightful article by Jean Seaton, 'Serbia, "ethnic" war and the media', Political Quarterly, 70.3 (July-September 1999), in which she observes that the 'media and public opinion are the territory in which the battle for intervention is fought', p. 261.
26. It has been argued that the war-time campaign has been mythologized, by overstating the quality of the German divisions that were held down while understating the extent to which much of the fighting was fratricidal. Certainly no great bravery was exhibited by Serb units during the Croatian and Bosnian wars, where they normally relied upon long-distant firepower to achieve their objectives against opponents who were less well-equipped, and with the aim of terrorizing people out of their homes. Their performance in the more equal battles of 1995 was not impressive.
27. Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
28. International Herald Tribune, 7 October 1998.
29. Tony Blair, 'Doctrine of International Community', Chicago, 22 April 1999, http://www.number-10/public/info/index.html
30. Again we should not exaggerate the novelty. Associated Press photographer Malcolm Browne's photograph of a Buddhist monk's self-immolation in Saigon in May 1963, a carefully staged event, helped to convince the Kennedy Administration of President Diem's political ineptitude, and sent in motion the political struggle that concluded with a coup and assassination. See Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987).
31. James Gow and James Tilsey, 'The Strategic Imperative for Media Management', Bosnia by Television, James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.) (London: British Film Institute, 1996), p. 107.
32. See Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing' (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), ch. 11.
33. Gow and Tilsey, 'Strategic Imperative', pp. 109-110. For an analysis of the same episode, as part of a general critique on the loss of journalistic objectivity during the conflict, see John Burns, 'The Media as Impartial Observers or Protagonists', in Bosnia by Television, pp. 96-7.
34. Gow and Tilsey, 'Strategic Imperative', pp. 109-110. For an analysis of the same episode, as part of a general critique on the loss of journalistic objectivity during the conflict, see John Burns, 'The Media as Impartial Observers or Protagonists', in Bosnia by Television, pp. 96-7.
35. This is reflected in the memoir of General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: The Harvill Press, 1998). For a critique see Michael Williams, 'Perceptions of the War in Bosnia', International Affairs, 75:2 (April 1999), pp. 377-82.
36. This is reflected in the memoir of General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: The Harvill Press, 1998). For a critique see Michael Williams, 'Perceptions of the War in Bosnia', International Affairs, 75:2 (April 1999), pp. 377-82.
37. The classic example of this was the Christian Science Monitor picture of January 1994 showing Mostar bridge destroyed and with the caption blaming Bosnian Serbs rather than Croats. Burns, 'Media as Impartial Observer', p. 98.
38. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Short History of Ethnic Cleansing', Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (1992), who gives it a context in Balkans history.
39. From 1961 to 1998 it shrank - from over a quarter to under ten per cent. This was where the Serbian orthodox church originated and where the famous battle of Kosovo of 1389, where it is claimed that the Ottoman empire defeated the mediaeval Serbs, was fought. Recent historiography throws doubt on the mythology surrounding this battle.
40. The Serbs 36.2 per cent and the Albanians 9.1 per cent (1991 census, Statistical Bulletin, no. 1934, Federal Institute of Belgrade, 1992), cited in International Commission on the Balkans, Unfinished Peace (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 176. The Albanian Kosovar birth-rate was 3 per cent, one of the highest in Europe.
41. The Serbs 36.2 per cent and the Albanians 9.1 per cent (1991 census, Statistical Bulletin, no. 1934, Federal Institute of Belgrade, 1992), cited in International Commission on the Balkans, Unfinished Peace (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 176. The Albanian Kosovar birth-rate was 3 per cent, one of the highest in Europe.
42. Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, revised edn. (London: Penguin Books, 1997).
43. In 1981 there had been large demonstrations in Kosovo demanding Republic status.
44. It was also about the same size as the other autonomous province of Vojvodina. This has a significant Hungarian minority but Serbs are a safe majority. A more relevant area is Sandjak, a region of up to 250,000 people, two-thirds of whom are Muslim, which straddles Serbia and Montenegro, potentially links Kosovo and Bosnia, and is a strategic passage to the Adriatic. It has demanded greater autonomy (although not independence).
45. Richard Caplan, 'International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo', International Affairs, 74:4 (October 1998), pp. 745-61, p. 748. In 1943 the architects of the Yugoslav federation had distinguished between nations having their principle homeland within Yugoslavia and those from without - i.e. Albanians. On the history of Kosovo and its rule by Serbia see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998).
46. Richard Caplan, 'International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo', International Affairs, 74:4 (October 1998), pp. 745-61, p. 748. In 1943 the architects of the Yugoslav federation had distinguished between nations having their principle homeland within Yugoslavia and those from without - i.e. Albanians. On the history of Kosovo and its rule by Serbia see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998).
47. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998).
48. International Commission on the Balkans, p. 116.
49. Tim Judah, 'Kosovo's Road to War', Survival, 41:2 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-18, p. 12.
50. More accurately Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UCK).
51. Chris Hedges, 'Kosovo's Next Masters', Foreign Affairs, 78:3 (1999), for a detailed description of the development and unruly character of the KLA. The immediate cause of the differences within the Kosovar community was the accord Rugova signed with Milosovic in the summer of 1996 (which Milosevic failed to implement), opposed by Adem Demaci's Albanian Parliamentary Party (PKK). Sophie Clément, 'Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia' (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1997), pp. 34-5.
52. Chris Hedges, 'Kosovo's Next Masters', Foreign Affairs, 78:3 (1999), for a detailed description of the development and unruly character of the KLA. The immediate cause of the differences within the Kosovar community was the accord Rugova signed with Milosovic in the summer of 1996 (which Milosevic failed to implement), opposed by Adem Demaci's Albanian Parliamentary Party (PKK). Sophie Clément, 'Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia' (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1997), pp. 34-5.
53. Caplan, 'International Diplomacy', pp. 753-4.
54. In December 1992, during the dying days of his administration, President Bush had written to Milosovic threatening military action if Serb forces caused conflict in Kosovo: 'In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia proper'. This position was reaffirmed almost immediately by President Clinton but by 1998 it was presumed to have lapsed.
55. Secretary of Defense William Cohen later explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee why he had not asked for troops in the fall of 1998: 'At that time you may recall there was great discontent up here on Capitol Hill. If I had come to you at that time and requested authorization to put a ground force in - US, unilaterally, acting alone - I can imagine the nature of the questions I would have received. You'd say, "Well, no. 1, where are our allies? And no. 2, who's going to appropriate the money? No. 3, how long do you intend to be there? How many? How long? How much? And what's the exit strategy?" '. Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, 'The Road to War: A Special Report', New York Times, 18 April 1999.
56. Caplan, 'International Diplomacy', pp. 754-5.
57. In the United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright believed that it was vital to prepare to use force while National Security Advisor Sandy Berger was opposed.
58. UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998).
59. Sciolino and Bronner, 'The Road to War'. In public Clinton claimed that Milosovic had agreed to what the Kosovars had been demanding since stripped of their autonomy a decade earlier -'internationally supervised democratic elections in Kosovo, substantial self-government and a local police'. The Application instruction (ACTORD) was effective from 13 October 1998, with simultaneous approval and preparatory exercises. The decision by NATO of 27 October 1998 was to maintain the ACTORD with execution dependent on a further NATO council decision.
60. As a result of this he was declared persona non grata, accused by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister of 'insulting the dignity and usurping the authority of the competent State organs of the FRY'. On the incident see OSCE, 'Walker: "KVM is Making a Difference" ', OSCE Newsletter, January 1999, pp. 1-3. Walker asked for Judge Louise Arbour, head of the Hague Tribunal, to investigate but she was turned back at the border when she tried to enter from Macedonia.
61. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Booth, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (London: Penguin, 1996).
62. At this point Clinton discussed with Prime Minister Tony Blair the options of either bombing in reprisal for further atrocities or else to try a further diplomatic approach in order to get agreement from Milosovic to allow in NATO ground forces as peacekeepers. One report of a conversation between Blair and Clinton has the Prime Minister observing that ground troops could not be used to fight a war, but only be employed as part of a political strategy. The President said 'I completely agree with you on that. If we sent in a ground force without some sort of agreement beforehand, sooner or later they're sitting ducks for either side who is willing to provoke something'. Sciolino and Bronner, 'The Road to War'.
63. Later he changed his story. Now it was that there had been a firefight with terrorists who had later rearranged the bodies.
64. The 82 page document had provisions for a constitution, an ethnically representative legislature and an independent police force. As this allowed for autonomy but not independence the Serbs said they would sign up. The sticking point was the insistence on a multinational NAT0-led military force that would disarm the KLA and oversee the withdrawal of all but 1,500 Serbian border police from the province within a year. After three years an international meeting would be convened to discuss a final settlement taking into account 'the will of the people' and the 'opinions of relevant authorities'. It is regularly but incorrectly asserted that Rambouillet allowed for a referendum which would have given Kosovo independence after three years. For a recent egregious example see Michael Mandelbaum, 'A Perfect Failure', Foreign Affairs, 78:5 (September/October 1999), p. 4. For a full account see Marc Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference', International Affairs, 75:2 (April 1999), pp. 211-51.
65. The 82 page document had provisions for a constitution, an ethnically representative legislature and an independent police force. As this allowed for autonomy but not independence the Serbs said they would sign up. The sticking point was the insistence on a multinational NAT0-led military force that would disarm the KLA and oversee the withdrawal of all but 1,500 Serbian border police from the province within a year. After three years an international meeting would be convened to discuss a final settlement taking into account 'the will of the people' and the 'opinions of relevant authorities'. It is regularly but incorrectly asserted that Rambouillet allowed for a referendum which would have given Kosovo independence after three years. For a recent egregious example see Michael Mandelbaum, 'A Perfect Failure', Foreign Affairs, 78:5 (September/October 1999), p. 4. For a full account see Marc Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference', International Affairs, 75:2 (April 1999), pp. 211-51.
66. Sciolino and Bronner, 'The Road to War'.
67. Fron Nazi, 'KLA Fights to Block Partition', Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 17 April 1999. Available: http://www.iwpr.net/balkans/news/.
68. According to Hibbert, the idea of driving out the entire Albanian population has been around since 1912-13. On encouraging Albanians to leave, Reginald Hibbert, 'Raising the Stakes', World Today, 55:5 (1999), pp. 6-7. The horseshoe strategy is described on http://www. fas.org/man/dod-101 /ops/docs99/op-horseshoe.htm
69. Fernando del Mundo, 'Kosovo Diary', Refugees Magazine, 114 (1999); del Mundo worked for UNHCR in Kosovo. One difficulty is that it took time to get OSCE monitors in position. By the start of December there were only 500 in place, though this had doubled by the end of January. The delays were put down to practical difficulties including accommodation.
70. Ground Dispositions of VJ and MUP strength in Kosovo, maps used in Jamie Shea and General Wesley Clark, Press Conference (Brussels: NATO HQ, 13 April 1999).
71. Peter Finn, 'Serbs Seen Preparing Big Military Push', International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1999.
72. 'On the Edge of the Knife', The Economist, 20 March 1999.
73. United Nations, 'Secretary-General Gravely Concerned at Escalation of Violence in Kosovo', Press Release SG/SM/6936, 22 March 1999.
74. For a thorough, grim depiction of the campaign against the Kosovo Albanians, also noting some NATO bombing incidents, see Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, advance unedited report, Geneva, 7 September 1999. Out of 273 refugees interviewed, only one reportedly left his village out of fear of NATO bombs, while all the others described how they were compelled, either by direct violence or by intimidation, to leave their homes. Mrs Robinson's succinct, weekly briefings about what was known about the situation in Kosovo based on the testimony of refugees gave the lie to those who alleged that the atrocity stories were NATO propaganda concoctions and that the refugees only left because of the bombings. Mrs Robinson was by no means uncritical of the NATO bombing campaign.
75. Steven Erlanger, 'Serbs Set Ceiling for Kosovo Albanian Population', International Herald Tribune, 26 April 1999. Serb officials indicated that they would accept back refugees who could prove that they were Yugoslav citizens. However the Serbs had taken all identity papers from fleeing Albanians.
76. See, for example, Yugoslav Army Command Releases Statement on Troop Withdrawal, 0015 GMT, 990511: 'Since actions in Kosovo and Metohija against the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army have been completed, the Supreme Command has ordered return from Kosovo and Metohija of part of the army and police units'.
77. On Deliberate Force see Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force: The UN and the NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995 (Lancaster University: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999); Col. Robert C. Owen, 'The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2', Airpower Journal (Fall 1997).
78. On Deliberate Force see Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force: The UN and the NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995 (Lancaster University: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999); Col. Robert C. Owen, 'The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2', Airpower Journal (Fall 1997).
79. Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OHCHR/99/04/22/A, 22 April 1999.
80. This idea was in International Herald Tribune, 24 March 1999, referring to the West's strategy of 'halting the Kosovo war with neither side victorious' as the 'war-making equivalent of the "Goldilocks" economy'.
81. Claims that the Apaches were withheld purely out of a concern with casualties have been challenged by the US Army who point to operational limitations, and few obvious advantages over the A10 'Warthogs' which arrived in mid-May. However it is clear that there were severe disagreements over the levels of acceptable risk. Dana Priest, 'Risk and Restraint: Why the Apaches Never Flew in Kosovo', Washington Post, 29 December 1999.
82. US officials spoke of an 'anti-Powell doctrine', stressing differences with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, who argued (as he had done in the Gulf) the limits of air power to win wars by itself. New York Times, 23 May 1999.
83. Estimates of the numbers required went up to 150,000 troops, but that was for a full-scale invasion, including Serbia proper.
84. The air campaign had been planned in three phases. Phase One, which began on 24 March 1999, involved limited air operations against designated militarily significant targets, including the integrated air-defence system in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Almost immediately, on 27 March, authorization was given to move to Phase Two, extending attacks to the security forces infrastructure and military in Kosovo and reinforcement forces (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations, material and ammunition depots, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks). Phase Three, never authorized, would have extended the air operations against a broad range of particularly important targets of military importance north of the 44th parallel in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
85. In their report on the damage to Serb forces, NATO commanders claimed that there had been an extensive Serb effort to minimize losses, including the removal of damaged equipment from the battlefield. Decoys were used - some nine mock tanks had been hit. One source suggested expensive PGMs had been used up on 500 decoys. David A. Fulghum, 'Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 July 1999, p. 68. There were a number of indications that NATO operations had been compromised by insecure communications and espionage. Compared with media allegations that barely 13 tanks had been hit, NATO claimed a final tally of 110 tanks, 210 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 449 artillery and mortars. This was compared with starting estimates of 350 tanks, 430-450 armoured personnel carriers, and about 750 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery, suggesting that two-thirds of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo survived intact. It was also claimed that the necessity to stay in hiding at times of NATO air strikes impeded Serb operations-at least on those days when the weather was clear enough to allow NATO aircraft to operate. General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (NATO HQ: Brussels, 16 September 1999). There was still scepticism that these figures were too high and Clark himself later reduced numbers of confirmed kills to those eventually contained in the Pentagon's official report of 93 tanks, 153 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 389 artillery and mortars. Report to Congress, KosovolOperation Allied Force: After-Action Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000). On the implications of the saga see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority', Parameters (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. In Serbia NATO damaged or destroyed 24 bridges, 12 railway stations, 36 factories, seven airports, 16 fuel plants and storage depots, 17 television transmitters and several electrical facilities, according to a Yugoslav government report. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy', Washington Post, 21 September 1999. For an analysis of the relationship between the air and ground wars see IISS, Air-power over Kosovo: A historic victory?' Strategic Comments, 5:7 (September 1999).
86. In their report on the damage to Serb forces, NATO commanders claimed that there had been an extensive Serb effort to minimize losses, including the removal of damaged equipment from the battlefield. Decoys were used - some nine mock tanks had been hit. One source suggested expensive PGMs had been used up on 500 decoys. David A. Fulghum, 'Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 July 1999, p. 68. There were a number of indications that NATO operations had been compromised by insecure communications and espionage. Compared with media allegations that barely 13 tanks had been hit, NATO claimed a final tally of 110 tanks, 210 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 449 artillery and mortars. This was compared with starting estimates of 350 tanks, 430-450 armoured personnel carriers, and about 750 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery, suggesting that two-thirds of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo survived intact. It was also claimed that the necessity to stay in hiding at times of NATO air strikes impeded Serb operations-at least on those days when the weather was clear enough to allow NATO aircraft to operate. General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (NATO HQ: Brussels, 16 September 1999). There was still scepticism that these figures were too high and Clark himself later reduced numbers of confirmed kills to those eventually contained in the Pentagon's official report of 93 tanks, 153 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 389 artillery and mortars. Report to Congress, KosovolOperation Allied Force: After-Action Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000). On the implications of the saga see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority', Parameters (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. In Serbia NATO damaged or destroyed 24 bridges, 12 railway stations, 36 factories, seven airports, 16 fuel plants and storage depots, 17 television transmitters and several electrical facilities, according to a Yugoslav government report. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy', Washington Post, 21 September 1999. For an analysis of the relationship between the air and ground wars see IISS, Air-power over Kosovo: A historic victory?' Strategic Comments, 5:7 (September 1999).
87. In their report on the damage to Serb forces, NATO commanders claimed that there had been an extensive Serb effort to minimize losses, including the removal of damaged equipment from the battlefield. Decoys were used - some nine mock tanks had been hit. One source suggested expensive PGMs had been used up on 500 decoys. David A. Fulghum, 'Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 July 1999, p. 68. There were a number of indications that NATO operations had been compromised by insecure communications and espionage. Compared with media allegations that barely 13 tanks had been hit, NATO claimed a final tally of 110 tanks, 210 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 449 artillery and mortars. This was compared with starting estimates of 350 tanks, 430-450 armoured personnel carriers, and about 750 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery, suggesting that two-thirds of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo survived intact. It was also claimed that the necessity to stay in hiding at times of NATO air strikes impeded Serb operations-at least on those days when the weather was clear enough to allow NATO aircraft to operate. General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (NATO HQ: Brussels, 16 September 1999). There was still scepticism that these figures were too high and Clark himself later reduced numbers of confirmed kills to those eventually contained in the Pentagon's official report of 93 tanks, 153 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 389 artillery and mortars. Report to Congress, KosovolOperation Allied Force: After-Action Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000). On the implications of the saga see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority', Parameters (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. In Serbia NATO damaged or destroyed 24 bridges, 12 railway stations, 36 factories, seven airports, 16 fuel plants and storage depots, 17 television transmitters and several electrical facilities, according to a Yugoslav government report. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy', Washington Post, 21 September 1999. For an analysis of the relationship between the air and ground wars see IISS, Air-power over Kosovo: A historic victory?' Strategic Comments, 5:7 (September 1999).
88. In their report on the damage to Serb forces, NATO commanders claimed that there had been an extensive Serb effort to minimize losses, including the removal of damaged equipment from the battlefield. Decoys were used - some nine mock tanks had been hit. One source suggested expensive PGMs had been used up on 500 decoys. David A. Fulghum, 'Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 July 1999, p. 68. There were a number of indications that NATO operations had been compromised by insecure communications and espionage. Compared with media allegations that barely 13 tanks had been hit, NATO claimed a final tally of 110 tanks, 210 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 449 artillery and mortars. This was compared with starting estimates of 350 tanks, 430-450 armoured personnel carriers, and about 750 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery, suggesting that two-thirds of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo survived intact. It was also claimed that the necessity to stay in hiding at times of NATO air strikes impeded Serb operations-at least on those days when the weather was clear enough to allow NATO aircraft to operate. General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (NATO HQ: Brussels, 16 September 1999). There was still scepticism that these figures were too high and Clark himself later reduced numbers of confirmed kills to those eventually contained in the Pentagon's official report of 93 tanks, 153 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 389 artillery and mortars. Report to Congress, KosovolOperation Allied Force: After-Action Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000). On the implications of the saga see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority', Parameters (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. In Serbia NATO damaged or destroyed 24 bridges, 12 railway stations, 36 factories, seven airports, 16 fuel plants and storage depots, 17 television transmitters and several electrical facilities, according to a Yugoslav government report. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy', Washington Post, 21 September 1999. For an analysis of the relationship between the air and ground wars see IISS, Air-power over Kosovo: A historic victory?' Strategic Comments, 5:7 (September 1999).
89. In their report on the damage to Serb forces, NATO commanders claimed that there had been an extensive Serb effort to minimize losses, including the removal of damaged equipment from the battlefield. Decoys were used - some nine mock tanks had been hit. One source suggested expensive PGMs had been used up on 500 decoys. David A. Fulghum, 'Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 July 1999, p. 68. There were a number of indications that NATO operations had been compromised by insecure communications and espionage. Compared with media allegations that barely 13 tanks had been hit, NATO claimed a final tally of 110 tanks, 210 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 449 artillery and mortars. This was compared with starting estimates of 350 tanks, 430-450 armoured personnel carriers, and about 750 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery, suggesting that two-thirds of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo survived intact. It was also claimed that the necessity to stay in hiding at times of NATO air strikes impeded Serb operations-at least on those days when the weather was clear enough to allow NATO aircraft to operate. General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (NATO HQ: Brussels, 16 September 1999). There was still scepticism that these figures were too high and Clark himself later reduced numbers of confirmed kills to those eventually contained in the Pentagon's official report of 93 tanks, 153 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 389 artillery and mortars. Report to Congress, KosovolOperation Allied Force: After-Action Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000). On the implications of the saga see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority', Parameters (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. In Serbia NATO damaged or destroyed 24 bridges, 12 railway stations, 36 factories, seven airports, 16 fuel plants and storage depots, 17 television transmitters and several electrical facilities, according to a Yugoslav government report. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy', Washington Post, 21 September 1999. For an analysis of the relationship between the air and ground wars see IISS, Air-power over Kosovo: A historic victory?' Strategic Comments, 5:7 (September 1999).
90. In their report on the damage to Serb forces, NATO commanders claimed that there had been an extensive Serb effort to minimize losses, including the removal of damaged equipment from the battlefield. Decoys were used - some nine mock tanks had been hit. One source suggested expensive PGMs had been used up on 500 decoys. David A. Fulghum, 'Pentagon Dissecting Kosovo Combat Data', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 July 1999, p. 68. There were a number of indications that NATO operations had been compromised by insecure communications and espionage. Compared with media allegations that barely 13 tanks had been hit, NATO claimed a final tally of 110 tanks, 210 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 449 artillery and mortars. This was compared with starting estimates of 350 tanks, 430-450 armoured personnel carriers, and about 750 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery, suggesting that two-thirds of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo survived intact. It was also claimed that the necessity to stay in hiding at times of NATO air strikes impeded Serb operations-at least on those days when the weather was clear enough to allow NATO aircraft to operate. General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team, Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment (NATO HQ: Brussels, 16 September 1999). There was still scepticism that these figures were too high and Clark himself later reduced numbers of confirmed kills to those eventually contained in the Pentagon's official report of 93 tanks, 153 armoured fighting vehicles or APCs, and about 389 artillery and mortars. Report to Congress, KosovolOperation Allied Force: After-Action Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2000). On the implications of the saga see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority', Parameters (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. In Serbia NATO damaged or destroyed 24 bridges, 12 railway stations, 36 factories, seven airports, 16 fuel plants and storage depots, 17 television transmitters and several electrical facilities, according to a Yugoslav government report. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy', Washington Post, 21 September 1999. For an analysis of the relationship between the air and ground wars see IISS, Air-power over Kosovo: A historic victory?' Strategic Comments, 5:7 (September 1999).
91. In particular an attack on 7 June using cluster bombs against Serb forces near Mount Pastirik was reported to have caused up to 800 casualties. It now seems that those numbers were exaggerated. Time Ripley, 'Kosovo: A Bomb Damage Assessment', Jane's Intelligence Review (September 1999).
92. The five demands were: (1) Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; (2) Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces; (3) Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; (4) Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and (5) Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
93. Then Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon spoke of NATO having planned 'a graduated series of possible air strikes which could, at the very high end, involve a very considerable number of airplanes. The goal of the options is to reduce or degrade the Serbian military's ability to continue striking the Kosovar Albanians', International Herald Tribune, 3-4 October 1998.
94. Duncan Lennox, ' "Fox": The Results', in Janes Defence Weekly, 13 January 1999.
95. This was the first internet war, with masses of material posted every day on numerous sites.
96. Sixteen people died when Radio Television Serbia was hit during a NATO raid on 23 April. The case is an important one because these were main casualties in Belgrade itself, where few civilians were killed during the air campaign. None of those killed were journalists, although this is how they were immediately described. There is evidence that the RTS employees were told to stay at their posts, despite NATO's prior warnings that TV stations could be hit, and that warning sirens had been sounded. Employees in other TV facilities abandoned their offices before they were hit. Vlado Mares, 'Sacrificed For Serbia?', IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, no. 88, 29 October 1999.
97. Civilians were killed by aberrant strikes from mid-April on, including in passenger trains and buses caught on bridges. The worst single day in this regard was 7 May when a marketplace and hospital in Nis was struck, killing at least 15 people, and then later the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was hit, killing three Chinese citizens and injuring more than 20 others. Although at the time this was claimed as a tragic accident and attributed to old CIA maps, there have been allegations that the embassy was deliberately targeted because it was serving as a communications centre for the Yugoslav Army. There are no reliable figures on Yugoslav casualties, but it is likely that as many civilians as military personnel were killed. NATO tends to doubt Yugoslav figures of 600 soldiers and special police killed. Independent sources in Yugoslavia put civilian casualties at between 500 to 1,000. Dana Priest, 'The Battle Inside Headquarters: France Balked at NATO Targets', Washington Post, 20 September 1999. In a substantial report, Human Rights Watch put the civilian death toll at 500, questioning nine incidents in particular as directed against illegitimate, non-military targets (in which it includes Radio and TV stations as well as a number of bridges and Belgrade's heating plant) as well as the use of cluster bombs. It accepted evidence that on occasions (such as the Kosovo village of Korisa on 13 May where 87 died), Yugoslav forces used internally displaced civilians as human shields. In another incident, after 19 prisoners were killed by NATO bombs at Dubrava prison in Kosovo, at least 76 further prisoners were summarily executed by guards and their deaths blamed on NATO by Belgrade. In Serbia itself it put the civilian death toll at around 200. www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/2000/nato.
98. The US State Department published the 30-page report Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo in May 1999 to demonstrate the extent of the humanitarian crime and the fact that it had been picking up pace prior to NATO bombing. In November a number of anti-war groups and journalists seized on apparent evidence that NATO had exaggerated dramatically the Albanian numbers killed for propaganda purposes. On 17 October Stratfor, an American research group (www.stratfor.com) published a report that was widely circulated on the net claiming that contrary to NATO claims of 10,000 ethnic Albanians dead, 'four months into an international investigation, bodies numbering only in the hundreds have been exhumed'. However, in a speech to the UN Security Council, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Carla del Ponte, stated that investigators had reports of 11,334 dead from eyewitnesses and had identified 529 grave sites. Of these they had investigated only 195 of the sites, from which they had exhumed 2,108 bodies - half the 4,256 their information had led them to expect there. This was presented as confirmation that 'only' 2,000 were killed, yet in addition to the sites not yet investigated del Ponte also reported extensive evidence of tampering with grave sites and the burning of bodies. Ian Williams, 'The Kosovo Numbers Game', IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, no. 92, 12 November 1999. Philip Shenon, 'State Dept. Now Estimates Serbian Drive Killed 10,000', New York Times, 10 December 1999.
99. The US State Department published the 30-page report Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo in May 1999 to demonstrate the extent of the humanitarian crime and the fact that it had been picking up pace prior to NATO bombing. In November a number of anti-war groups and journalists seized on apparent evidence that NATO had exaggerated dramatically the Albanian numbers killed for propaganda purposes. On 17 October Stratfor, an American research group (www.stratfor.com) published a report that was widely circulated on the net claiming that contrary to NATO claims of 10,000 ethnic Albanians dead, 'four months into an international investigation, bodies numbering only in the hundreds have been exhumed'. However, in a speech to the UN Security Council, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Carla del Ponte, stated that investigators had reports of 11,334 dead from eyewitnesses and had identified 529 grave sites. Of these they had investigated only 195 of the sites, from which they had exhumed 2,108 bodies - half the 4,256 their information had led them to expect there. This was presented as confirmation that 'only' 2,000 were killed, yet in addition to the sites not yet investigated del Ponte also reported extensive evidence of tampering with grave sites and the burning of bodies. Ian Williams, 'The Kosovo Numbers Game', IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, no. 92, 12 November 1999. Philip Shenon, 'State Dept. Now Estimates Serbian Drive Killed 10,000', New York Times, 10 December 1999.
100. The US State Department published the 30-page report Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo in May 1999 to demonstrate the extent of the humanitarian crime and the fact that it had been picking up pace prior to NATO bombing. In November a number of anti-war groups and journalists seized on apparent evidence that NATO had exaggerated dramatically the Albanian numbers killed for propaganda purposes. On 17 October Stratfor, an American research group (www.stratfor.com) published a report that was widely circulated on the net claiming that contrary to NATO claims of 10,000 ethnic Albanians dead, 'four months into an international investigation, bodies numbering only in the hundreds have been exhumed'. However, in a speech to the UN Security Council, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Carla del Ponte, stated that investigators had reports of 11,334 dead from eyewitnesses and had identified 529 grave sites. Of these they had investigated only 195 of the sites, from which they had exhumed 2,108 bodies - half the 4,256 their information had led them to expect there. This was presented as confirmation that 'only' 2,000 were killed, yet in addition to the sites not yet investigated del Ponte also reported extensive evidence of tampering with grave sites and the burning of bodies. Ian Williams, 'The Kosovo Numbers Game', IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, no. 92, 12 November 1999. Philip Shenon, 'State Dept. Now Estimates Serbian Drive Killed 10,000', New York Times, 10 December 1999.
101. As of 14 August, 280 murders had been confirmed by KFOR in Kosovo since 15 June. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, Geneva: advance unedited report (7 September 1999).