Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 53-78

  Burk, James ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347259828     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2657991     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. On the issue of support for deployment, see Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); and Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). The key source on the relation between accumulation of casualties and trends in support for war is John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1973).
2. On the issue of support for deployment, see Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); and Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). The key source on the relation between accumulation of casualties and trends in support for war is John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1973).
3. On the issue of support for deployment, see Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); and Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). The key source on the relation between accumulation of casualties and trends in support for war is John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1973).
4. This is the fifth element of the so-called Weinberger doctrine. See Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 442.
5. See, for example, Donald C. F. Daniel, "The United States" in Trevor Findlay, ed., Challenges for the New Peacekeepers (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996), 94-95; and Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia" in James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism 1991-1994 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 94-124, esp. 118.
6. See, for example, Donald C. F. Daniel, "The United States" in Trevor Findlay, ed., Challenges for the New Peacekeepers (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996), 94-95; and Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia" in James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism 1991-1994 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 94-124, esp. 118.
7. John E. Mueller, "Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers," Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996): 31.
8. General John Shalikashvili, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced this concern in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as reported by Williams Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War," Navy Times (2 October 1995), on-line edition. He is not the only one to have done so. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994); Eric V. Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996); Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22 (Winter 1992-93): 2-20; and A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter 1995): 50-63.
9. General John Shalikashvili, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced this concern in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as reported by Williams Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War," Navy Times (2 October 1995), on-line edition. He is not the only one to have done so. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994); Eric V. Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996); Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22 (Winter 1992-93): 2-20; and A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter 1995): 50-63.
10. General John Shalikashvili, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced this concern in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as reported by Williams Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War," Navy Times (2 October 1995), on-line edition. He is not the only one to have done so. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994); Eric V. Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996); Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22 (Winter 1992-93): 2-20; and A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter 1995): 50-63.
11. General John Shalikashvili, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced this concern in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as reported by Williams Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War," Navy Times (2 October 1995), on-line edition. He is not the only one to have done so. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994); Eric V. Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996); Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22 (Winter 1992-93): 2-20; and A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter 1995): 50-63.
12. General John Shalikashvili, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced this concern in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as reported by Williams Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War," Navy Times (2 October 1995), on-line edition. He is not the only one to have done so. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994); Eric V. Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996); Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22 (Winter 1992-93): 2-20; and A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter 1995): 50-63.
13. In the current debate over civil-military relations, this question has also been raised the other way around by Deborah D. Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?" Security Studies 6 (Winter 1996/97): 51-90. Wondering about the influence of military leaders over foreign policy, she asks: "Are civilian decisions [to employ force] hamstrung by a reluctant military?" Her answer is "not quite" (52). Her analysis and mine, while oriented differently, are not unrelated. We both argue that the decision to use force rests with civilian elites and is substantially affected by whether elites are unified or divided in their outlooks.
14. See Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994): 23-28; "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 109-122; "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs 75 (July/August 1996): 33-44.
15. See Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994): 23-28; "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 109-122; "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs 75 (July/August 1996): 33-44.
16. See Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994): 23-28; "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 109-122; "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs 75 (July/August 1996): 33-44.
17. On this, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Ketter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
18. On this, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Ketter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
19. On this, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Ketter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
20. On this, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Ketter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
21. On this, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Ketter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
22. Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 228-229.
23. For the original analysis, see Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, 60. Analysis of the Persian Gulf War is found in John E. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 77. See also Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention, 17.
24. For the original analysis, see Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, 60. Analysis of the Persian Gulf War is found in John E. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 77. See also Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention, 17.
25. For the original analysis, see Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, 60. Analysis of the Persian Gulf War is found in John E. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 77. See also Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention, 17.
26. See Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"; Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine"; Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War"; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992.
27. See Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"; Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine"; Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War"; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992.
28. See Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"; Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine"; Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War"; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992.
29. See Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"; Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine"; Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War"; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992.
30. I focus on the argument of Luttwak, because it is the most fully developed one I know. For references to his argument see above note 7. But the central hypothesis is repeated uncritically in other places. For instance, Bacevich, "The Use of Force," 60, writes: "An enterprise that yesterday seemed expedient is today not worth the blood of a single American soldier. In the case of Somalia, such thinking led the United States to abandon its commitment altogether." And Daniel Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 62 writes: "Sooner or later public opinion makes itself felt, sometimes directly as in the public pressure that . . . persuaded President Reagan to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon after a number of Marines had been killed by a terrorist bomb."
31. I focus on the argument of Luttwak, because it is the most fully developed one I know. For references to his argument see above note 7. But the central hypothesis is repeated uncritically in other places. For instance, Bacevich, "The Use of Force," 60, writes: "An enterprise that yesterday seemed expedient is today not worth the blood of a single American soldier. In the case of Somalia, such thinking led the United States to abandon its commitment altogether." And Daniel Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 62 writes: "Sooner or later public opinion makes itself felt, sometimes directly as in the public pressure that . . . persuaded President Reagan to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon after a number of Marines had been killed by a terrorist bomb."
32. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" 27.
33. Ibid.
34. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," 43.
35. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," 115.
36. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" 25.
37. Ibid., 23-24; Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," 115.
38. Ibid., 23-24; Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," 115.
39. See S. P. MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1992), 12-13.
40. Ibid., 95.
41. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" To support this claim he draws attention to Soviet conduct of its war with Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was no democracy and yet, he asserts, authorities adopted "inordinately prudent tactics" in order "to avoid casualties at all costs" (24). Moreover, they "never allowed its population to see any television images of the war;" nevertheless, "the reaction of Soviet society to the casualties of the Afghan war was essentially identical to the American reaction to the Vietnam war" (25).
42. Winter, Sites of Memory; see Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Fussell, Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
43. Winter, Sites of Memory; see Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Fussell, Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
44. Winter, Sites of Memory; see Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Fussell, Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
45. I am grateful to Ben M. Crouch for suggesting this possibility.
46. Mueller, Policy and Opinion, 62; and Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism, 181-186.
47. Mueller, Policy and Opinion, 62; and Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism, 181-186.
48. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988) 7-9.
49. See Russett, Controlling the Sword, 87-118; also Page, Who Deliberates?; and Zaller, The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion.
50. See Russett, Controlling the Sword, 87-118; also Page, Who Deliberates?; and Zaller, The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion.
51. See Russett, Controlling the Sword, 87-118; also Page, Who Deliberates?; and Zaller, The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion.
52. As Benjamin I. Page observed in Who Deliberates? 107: "Research has indicated that experts' views, as presented in the media, have a significant impact on public opinion: when experts speak in favor of a policy proposal, public opinion tends to move toward supporting that proposal."
53. Ibid., 267.
54. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism; see also Ralph B. Levering, "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 383-393.
55. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism; see also Ralph B. Levering, "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 383-393.
56. Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996), xv.
57. Unless otherwise noted, facts about these two cases are drawn from Facts on File Yearbook (New York: Facts on File, 1983-1985, 1993-1995); Keesing's Record of World Events (London: Longman, 1982-1984, 1992-1994).
58. Unless otherwise noted, facts about these two cases are drawn from Facts on File Yearbook (New York: Facts on File, 1983-1985, 1993-1995); Keesing's Record of World Events (London: Longman, 1982-1984, 1992-1994).
59. I collected all public opinion poll data on deposit with the Roper Center that mentioned either "Lebanon" in the years 1982 through 1984 or "Somalia" in the years 1992 through 1994. I conducted this search on line, accessing the Roper Center through CompuServe, and downloading the results. The Roper Center has public opinion poll data back through 1960 available for such on-line searches. I also searched for items before and after the years of focal interest. A few items were found, but there were virtually no items of any relevance to the present research. There were substantially more poll items reported for Lebanon (n=671) than for Somalia (n=267). Many of the items relating to Lebanon dealt with public reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon begun in June 1992, an important topic beyond the scope of this article. Otherwise, almost all of the items for both Lebanon and Somalia related directly or indirectly to the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping. Unfortunately, very few questions were asked repeatedly over the course of either operation, so trend data are not as numerous as we would like.
60. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, 44-53.
61. See Ronald Ingelhart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism; Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment; and Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public.
62. See Ronald Ingelhart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism; Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment; and Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public.
63. See Ronald Ingelhart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism; Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment; and Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public.
64. See Ronald Ingelhart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism; Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment; and Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public.
65. See Louis Fischer, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); and John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
66. See Louis Fischer, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); and John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
67. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 151-152.
68. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1993), 107-110.
69. Fischer, Presidential War Power, 141.
70. "Time for Retaliation," Wall Street Journal, 25 October 1983, 28.
71. "America Held Hostage," New York Times, 24 October 1983.
72. This argument is elaborated in Larson, Casualties and Consensus, 96-97.
73. The facts in this and the next several paragraphs come from the account of Harry Johnson and Ted Dague, "Congress and Somalia" in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 191-204. Both were participants in the events. Johnston is a member of Congress (D-FL). He is the senior member of the House International Relations Committee and formerly chaired the Subcommittee on Africa. Dague is a foreign affairs analyst for the Congressional Research Service and served as a professional staff member for the subcommittee on Africa when Johnston was its chair.
74. Ibid., 199.
75. "Bloody Sunday in Somalia," New York Times, 15 June 1993; and "Drawing the Line in Somalia," New York Times, 20 June 1993.
76. "Bloody Sunday in Somalia," New York Times, 15 June 1993; and "Drawing the Line in Somalia," New York Times, 20 June 1993.
77. "Somali Awakening," Wall Street Journal, 14 June 1993.
78. Based on my own analysis of abstracts held in the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.
79. Eric Victor Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate School Dissertation Series, 1995), 272-296.
80. Daniels, "The United States," 94-95. * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Pontignano Seminar on Public Opinion, Democracy and Defence Policy, Siena, Italy, 7-10 October 1996, funded in part by the United States Information Agency, and at the biennial meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, in Baltimore, October 1995. I am grateful for comments received from the conference participants and from Christopher Dandeker, Robert Goldich, Maria Bina Palmisano, Richard Wells.