The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo

International Affairs

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 211-251

  Weller, Marc ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0005437887     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00069     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Opinion No. 2 of the Badinter Arbitration Commission.
2. These developments are chronicled in Helsinki Watch, Belgrade, Kosovo, Law and Politics (1998), passim.
3. e.g. E.CN.4, 1992/S1/9, 28 August 1993, para 32; A/48/92, 26 February 1993, paras 153-171, E/CN.4/ 1994/47, 1 November 1993, paras 188-205; A.49.641, 4 November 1994, paras 182-5; E/CN.4/1996/63, 14 March 1996, paras 119-80; E/CN.4/1998/9, 10 September 1997, passim;A/53/322, 11 September 1998, paras 82-96.
4. See e.g. UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/7, 23 February 1993; Resolution 1994/76, 9 March 1994; Resolution 1998/79, 22 April 1998, paras 16-29; General Assembly Resolution 49/204, 23 December 1994; Resolution 50/190, 22 December 1995; Resolution 51/111, 12 December 1996; Resolution 52/139, 1 December 1997, etc.
5. See Richard Caplan, 'International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo', International Affairs 74: 4, 1998, pp. 745, 753.
6. Statement by the NATO Secretary-General on Exercise 'Determined Falcon', 13 June 1998.
7. Statement by the NATO Secretary-General following Decision on the ACTORD, 3 October 1998: 'Just a few moments ago, the North Atlantic Council decided to issue activation orders - ACTORDs - for both limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Yugoslavia, execution of which will beign in approximately 96 hours.'
8. Caplan, 'International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo', p. 749.
9. Letter from the Rt Hon. Lord Carrington, Chairman, Conference on Yugoslavia, to Dr I. Rugova, 17 August 1992.The invitation read:'If you are planning to be in London at the time of the Conference (from 26-28 August) then I am pleased to inform you that it will be possible for you and your delegation to have access to the Question Elizabeth II Conference Centre for meetings, for example with me, Secretary Vance, and other participants. As it will not, for practical and other reasons, be possible to grant your delegation access to the Conference chamber itself, the organizers will set up a "salle d'écoute" to which the formal conference proceedings will be relayed live.'
10. There was an attempt to achieve at least an agreement on the restoration of the education system in Kosovo in the Geneva talks. See Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia, S/25490, 30 March 1993. However, there was no progress and an agreement, to this day unimplemented, was in the end achieved through the mediation of an NGO in September 1996. An attempt to activate the agreement as a result of discussions between FRY President Milosevic and Dr Ibrahim Rugova on 23 March 1999 also failed.
11. Resolution 1160 (1998), 31 March 1998.
12. FRY press release, 'Serbian government proposes calling of a referendum', 2 April 1998.
13. See the 'Statement on fundamental principles for a settlement of the Kosovo question issued by the government of the Republic of Kosovo', 3 November 1998.
14. Press release by the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 November 1998.The eleven-point statement of 13 October can be found in Helsinki Watch, Belgrade, 'International community and Kosovo', 1998, p. 33.
15. Joint proposal of the agreement on the political framework of self-governance in Kosovo and Metohija, Belgrade, 20 November 1998.
16. See the report of the EU forensic experts team on the Racak incident, 17 March 1999.
17. On the developments of December/January, see e.g. Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council, S/ 1999/99, 30 January 1999.
18. Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, joint statement on Kosovo, Moscow, 26 January 1999.
19. State Department press release, 'Albright looks forward to January 29 neeting in London', 27 January 1999.
20. NATO press release (99), 11, 28 January 1999.
21. Statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Brussels, 28 January 1999.
22. Chairman's conclusions of the ministerial Contact Group in London, 29 January 1999.
23. UN Security Council Presidential Statement, 29 January 1999.
24. Statement by Prime MinisterTony Blair in the House of Commons, 23 March 1999. However, in subsequent press briefings the ceiling for the Interior Ministry Police was claimed to be only 4,500. While it may be understood why Richard Holbrooke came to informal and unpublished arrangements in his discussions with President Milosevic in early October, it is odd that NATO apparently concluded a formal agreement of 25 October on troop ceilings and future FRY conduct by way of a secret agreement. This in itself may have contributed to a feeling of a lack of accountability on the part of the FRY.
25. Resolution 1160 (1998), 31 March 1998, paras 19, 20; Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998, paras 16, 17.
26. In fact, a system of five revolving badges per delegation was adopted, to permit the delegations to obtain the benefit of different experts on different days, depending on the subjects to be discussed.
27. A rumour circulated by 'spin doctors' to the effect that the FRY/Serb delegation had requested a piano to help it pass the time was not well founded. Instead, it appears that such a request had been made by a distinguished Russian official connected with the negotiations. It is true, however, that the Kosovo delegation felt on occasion discomforted by the singing of Serb patriotic songs late at night.
28. By way of compensation, Hashim Thaci was subsequently also permitted to leave the chateau to consult with his political authorities at home.
29. The exception being the idea of joint authority (see below) which the negotiators appeared to deem impractical.
30. One exception to which the negotiators pointed frequently was the introduction of a technical commission to deal with economic claims.
31. There had been one briefing on military implementation before the text of the security annex had been made available. That briefing left the KLA and its supporters in something of a state of shock and was evidently not designed to reassure the military elements of the Kosovo delegation on whose consent the entire process would, in the end, depend.
32. Jeffrey Smith, 'Kosovar rebel upset western strategy', International Herald Tribune, 25 February 1999, p. 6.
33. Co-chairmen's conclusions, 23 February 1999.
34. Press Statement by Dr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of Nato, Press Release 1999/040, 23 March 1999.
35. The use of force by NATO was thus, at least according to this initial statement, not necessarily directed towards achieving an acceptance of the Rambouillet package in its entirety. Instead, the Secretary-General referred to the more flexible requirement that a 'viable political settlement must be guaranteed by an international military presence'.
36. Prime Minister's Statement on Kosovo, 23 March 1999.
37. A proposal to entitle Chapter I 'Interim constitution' was not adopted. However, given the overall tide of the agreement, the specific reference to the interim period in this preambular provision, and the concluding provisions, this was not seen by the Kosovo delegation as a significant setback.
38. Federal functions were still expressly and, in the view of Kosovo, exhaustively listed: territorial integrity, maintaining a common market within the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, monetary policy, defence, foreign policy, customs services, federal taxation, federal elections and other areas specified in this agreement.
39. See also Article VIII (5) of Chapter 1, and the important reference contained therein to Article II (5) (b) of Chapter 1.
40. On the national communities and their institutions, see the section which follows.
41. A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the legislation challenged adversely affects the community's fundamental rights as set forth in Article VII, or the principle of fair treatment.
42. This formulation actually represented a slight retreat from the final Hill draft, put forward on 27 January, which had referred to a 'procedure' for considering such additional steps to be determined taking into account the parties' roles in and compliance with this agreement.