Strategic pricing of grid access under partial price-caps - electricity distribution in England and Wales

Energy Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 187-207

  Riechmann, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Electricity industry; Network access; Price cap regulation

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS; ELECTRIC RATES; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MARKETING; SALES;

NETWORK ACCESS; PRICE CAP REGULATION; STRATEGIC PRICING;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY; ENERGY MARKET; PRICING POLICY;

UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 0034176979     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0140-9883(99)00038-9     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Armstrong, M., Vickers, J., 1997. Multiproduct Price Regulation Under Asymmetric Information. University of Southampton, Department of Economics, Mimeo.
2. Armstrong M., Vickers J. The access pricing problem with deregulation: a note. J. Ind. Econ. 44(1):1998;115-121.
3. Armstrong M., Doyle C., Vickers J. The access pricing problem: a synthesis. J. Ind. Econ. 44(2):1996;131-150.
4. Baumol W.J. Some subtle pricing issues in railroad regulation. Int. J. Transport Econ. 10:1983;341-355.
5. Baumol W.J., Sidak G. The pricing of inputs sold to competitors. Yale J. Regul. 11:1994;171-202.
6. Braeutigam R.R., Panzar J.C. Diversification incentives under 'price-based' and 'cost-based' regulation. RAND J. Econ. 20(3):1989;373-391.
7. Brunekreeft, G., 1997. Local vs. Global Price Cap: A Comparison of Foreclosure Incentives. Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik. Discussion Paper No. 36, University of Freiburg.
8. Burns, P., Weyman-Jones, T., 1994. Regulatory Incentives, Privatisation and Productivity Growth in UK Electricity Distribution. CRI Discussion Paper 7. Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, London.
9. Burns P., Weyman-Jones T. Cost functions and cost efficiency in electricity distribution: a stochastic frontier approach. Bull. Econ. Res. 48(1):1996;41-64.
10. Burns P., Weyman-Jones T. Periodic regulatory review in UK electricity markets; developments within a deregulated system. Zaccour G. Deregulation of Electric Utilities. 1998;75-99 Kluwer, Boston.
11. Cowan S. Price-cap regulation and inefficiency in relative pricing. J. Regul. Econ. 12:1997;53-70.
12. Crew M.A., Kleindorfer P.R. Price caps and revenue caps: incentives and disincentives for efficiency. Crew M.A. Pricing and Regulatory Innovations under Increasing Competition. 1996;39-52 Kluwer Academic, Boston.
13. De Fraja G. Regulation and access pricing with asymmetric information. Eur. Econ. Rev. 43:1999;109-134.
14. Economides N. The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist. Int. J. Ind. Org. 16:1998;271-284.
15. Economides N., White L.J. Access and interconnection pricing: how efficient is the 'efficient component pricing rule? Antitrust Bull. Fall. 1995:1995;557-577.
16. Faulhaber G.F. Cross-subsidization: pricing in public enterprises. Am. Econ. Rev. 65(5):1976;966-977.
17. Green, R., McDaniel, T., 1998. Competition in Electricity Supply: will '1998' be worth it?, POWER Working Papers PWP-057, University of California Energy Institute, Berkeley CA.
18. Laffont J.-J., Tirole J. Access pricing and competition. Eur. Econ. Rev. 38:1994;1673-1710.
19. Laffont J.-J., Tirole J. Creating competition through interconnection: theory and practice. J. Regu. Econ. 10:1996;227-256.
20. Larson A.C., Lehman D.E. Essentiality, efficiency, and the efficient component-pricing rule. J. Regul. Econ. 12(1):1997;71-80.
21. Market Line, 1996. Sales and Marketing Strategies in UK Industrial Electricity. Market Line International, London.
22. MMC, 1996. National Power plc and Southern Electric plc - A Report on the Proposed Merger. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, HMSO, London.
23. Neu W. Allocative inefficiency properties of price-cap regulation. J. Regul. Econ. 5(2):1993;159-182.
24. Offer, 1993. Electricity Distribution: Price Control, Reliability and Customer Service - Consultation Paper. Office of Electricity Regulation, Birmingham, October 1993.
25. Offer, 1994. Distribution Price Control: Proposals. Office of Electricity Regulation, Birmingham, August 1994.
26. Reiffen D. A regulated firm's incentive to discriminate: a reevaluation and extension of Weisman's result. J. Regul. Econ. 14(1):1998;79-86.
27. Riechmann, C., 1999. Wettbewerb im Endverbrauchermarkt für Strom - Das Beispiel von England und Wales, Schriften des Energiewirtschaftlichen Instituts 53, R. Oldenbourg, Munich.
28. Sappington D. Strategic firm behaviour under a dynamic regulatory adjustment process. Bell J. Econ. 11:1980;360-372.
29. Sibley D.E., Weisman D.L. The competitive incentives of vertically integrated local exchange carriers: an economic and policy analysis. J. Pol. Anal. Manage. (Winter). 17:1998;74-93.
30. Sibley D.E., Weisman D.L. Raising rival's costs: the entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets. Information Econ. Pol. 10(4):1998;451-470.
31. Sweeney G. Welfare implications of fully distributed cost pricing applied to partially regulated firms. Bell J. Econ. 13:1982;525-533.
32. Tirole J. The Theory of Industrial Organization. 1988;MIT Press, Cambridge.
33. Vogelsang I., Finsinger J. A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms. Bell J. Econ. 10:1979;157-171.
34. Weisman D.L. The incentive to discriminate by a vertically-integrated regulated firm: a reply. J. Regul. Econ. 14(1):1998;87-91.
35. Weisman D.L., Zhang M. Opportunities vs. incentives to discriminate in the telecommunications industry. Telecommun. Pol. 21(4):1997;309-316.
36. Willig, R.D., 1979. The theory of network access pricing, H. M. Trebing (Hrsg.): Issues in Public Utility Regulation, Michigan State University Public Utilities Papers.