Regulation and access pricing with asymmetric information

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 109-134

  De Fraja, Gianni ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Access; Competition in regulated markets; Network; Regulation

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; METHODOLOGY; MONOPOLY; PRICE DETERMINATION;

EID: 0032986392     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00107-4     Document Type: Article

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