Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets

Information Economics and Policy

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 451-470

  Sibley, David S ^a   Weisman, Dennis L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Discrimination; L51; L96; Regulation; Telecommunications; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000932557     PISSN: 01676245     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6245(98)00012-2     Document Type: Article

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