Divided they stand: Lessons about partition from Iraq and Lebanon

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-29

  Byman, Daniel L ^a  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8344230865     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429332     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. Discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). For an excellent discussion of the relationship between secession and international forces, see Donald Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33, nos. 1-2 (1992): 118-30.
2. Discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). For an excellent discussion of the relationship between secession and international forces, see Donald Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33, nos. 1-2 (1992): 118-30.
3. Discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). For an excellent discussion of the relationship between secession and international forces, see Donald Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33, nos. 1-2 (1992): 118-30.
4. Discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). For an excellent discussion of the relationship between secession and international forces, see Donald Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33, nos. 1-2 (1992): 118-30.
5. Discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996). For an excellent discussion of the relationship between secession and international forces, see Donald Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33, nos. 1-2 (1992): 118-30.
6. In recent years analysts have made the case that Bosnia, Iraq, and other victims of civil strife should be partitioned, arguing that preserving these states today will only lead to further conflict in the future. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera argue that Bosnia should be partitioned ("When Peace Means War," New Republic, 18 December 1995, 16-18, 21. On policy grounds, I make a similar argument for Iraq ( "Let Iraq Collapse," The National Interest, no. 45 fall 1996]: 48-60). Jeffrey Herbst, while not endorsing partition as such, makes a persuasive argument for experimenting with new forms of sovereignty ( Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21, no. 3 [winter 1996/97]: 120-44).
7. In recent years analysts have made the case that Bosnia, Iraq, and other victims of civil strife should be partitioned, arguing that preserving these states today will only lead to further conflict in the future. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera argue that Bosnia should be partitioned ("When Peace Means War," New Republic, 18 December 1995, 16-18, 21. On policy grounds, I make a similar argument for Iraq ( "Let Iraq Collapse," The National Interest, no. 45 fall 1996]: 48-60). Jeffrey Herbst, while not endorsing partition as such, makes a persuasive argument for experimenting with new forms of sovereignty ( Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21, no. 3 [winter 1996/97]: 120-44).
8. In recent years analysts have made the case that Bosnia, Iraq, and other victims of civil strife should be partitioned, arguing that preserving these states today will only lead to further conflict in the future. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera argue that Bosnia should be partitioned ("When Peace Means War," New Republic, 18 December 1995, 16-18, 21. On policy grounds, I make a similar argument for Iraq ( "Let Iraq Collapse," The National Interest, no. 45 fall 1996]: 48-60). Jeffrey Herbst, while not endorsing partition as such, makes a persuasive argument for experimenting with new forms of sovereignty ( Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21, no. 3 [winter 1996/97]: 120-44).
9. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
10. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
11. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
12. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
13. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
14. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
15. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
16. Because of this problem, some scholars even go so far as to claim that partition is almost always the best solution after a bloody conflict (Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 [spring 1996]: 136-75; and Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can't," Security Studies 6, no. 1 [autumn 1996]: 62-100). Conor Cruise O'Brien implicitly makes an argument for partition in his eloquent analysis of how nationalism can lead to recurring conflict ("The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 [November/December 1993]: 142-49). Michael Lind goes so far as to argue that democracy never works where a state is highly divided along linguistic and cultural lines ( "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 [May/June 1994]: 95). For works that note the importance of physical security on ethnic conflict, see Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 27-47. Other authors that endorse Posen's point include James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414; Barbara F. Walter, The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75.
17. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
18. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
19. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
20. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
21. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
22. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
23. For works which note the need to restore communal cooperation and rebuild political structures, see I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 267-73; Rothchild and Lake, "Containing Fear"; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3-20; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993); Harvey Waterman, "Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars," in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 292-302; Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 451-76; and Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 491-510.
24. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
25. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
26. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
27. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
28. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
29. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
30. Works which address both legal and practical problems with partition, include Hurst Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination," Virginia Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1993): 1-69; Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 21-35; and Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede," Journal of International Affairs, 45, no. 2 (winter 1992): 347-65. Robert Schaeffer argues strongly that partition tends to lead to interstate war. Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). Other works discussing divided states and the problems they face include Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For a work assessing the moral dimensions of secession, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
31. Iraq and Lebanon were chosen more to illustrate important issues and problems related to the issues of partition and preservation than for strict methodological reasons. Thus, a proper "structured focused comparison" on these issues is not presented here. This essay is intended more to use case studies to build and refine theories rather than to test them rigorously. Alexander George and Timothy McKeown detail a more rigorous approach in "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2, 21-58.
32. I use the term "communal" in this essay to encompass ethnic, religious, tribal, and linguistic groups. A communal group is a group of people bound together by a belief of common heritage and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, perceived kinship ties, language, and history. Examples of communal groups are Turks (a similar language, perceptions of a shared history) and Jews (belief in common ancestry reinforced by a common religion and history). Large tribal groups that perceive themselves as having a common identity fall under this category as well.
33. "Lebanon survey: Putting back the pieces," Economist, 24 February 1996, S3.
34. More than any other factor, the back and forth conflict between the PLO and Israel undermined the Lebanese government and led Lebanon's communal groups to arm and mobilize to defend themselves. In 1968 the PLO launched rockets and mortars from Lebanon against Israel. In response, the Israelis began launching raids on guerrilla bases in the area. After the murder of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Israel began to preempt Palestinian military action, striking Lebanon regularly. In 1973 Israeli commandos even struck targets in the heart of Beirut. In response, Lebanese groups suffering from the strikes - particularly the Shi'a - called for the government to defend them. When the government failed to do this, they formed their own militias. Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 67.
35. "Lebanon Survey: Outside Influence," Economist, 24 February 1996, S4. The coming of peace to Lebanon coincides with the final Syrian defeat in 1990 of General Aoun, a Christian nationalist who called for driving all foreign forces out of Lebanon.
36. The Taif agreement was negotiated in 1989 but was not implemented until after the Syrian army crushed the forces of General Aoun in 1990.
37. "Lebanon: Hizbullah in politics," Economist, 7 September 1996, 38.
38. Roughly 60-65 percent of Iraq's population is Shi'a and 15-20 percent is Kurdish (The World Factbook 1995 [Central Intelligence Agency: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995]).
39. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Iraqi Kurds (New York: St Martin's, 1996), 326-40. The Baath ideology emphasized state control over the economy and national unity. When the Baath first came to power, almost the entire leadership consisted of Sunni Arabs from the triangle between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian border. Amazia Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq, 1968-1986: The changing features of a collective profile," International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, no. 4 (November 1989): 447.
40. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Iraqi Kurds (New York: St Martin's, 1996), 326-40. The Baath ideology emphasized state control over the economy and national unity. When the Baath first came to power, almost the entire leadership consisted of Sunni Arabs from the triangle between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian border. Amazia Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq, 1968-1986: The changing features of a collective profile," International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, no. 4 (November 1989): 447.
41. The government settled Arabs in the place of the Kurds it deported. The opposition umbrella group the Iraqi National Congress claimed that Iraq "has embarked on a massive campaign of Arabization" (United Press International, 16 January 1997).
42. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 357-63. For a comprehensive description, see Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1993).
43. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 357-63. For a comprehensive description, see Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1993).
44. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 373. In March 1991, after the U.S.-led coalition defeated Iraq's military in Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish communities rose in rebellion against the Baath regime. The United States refused to aid the rebellions directly or to provide them with arms. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 448-49.
45. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 373. In March 1991, after the U.S.-led coalition defeated Iraq's military in Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish communities rose in rebellion against the Baath regime. The United States refused to aid the rebellions directly or to provide them with arms. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 448-49.
46. Fearful that the Kurds would prove a thorn in their side, the Baath damped down particularly hard on potential leaders. The Barzani clan, which had produced anti-Arab Kurdish leaders since the 1930s, had been relocated to southern Iraq in 1975, but in 1980 soldiers arrested up to 8,000 Barzani males, paraded them through the streets of Baghdad, and executed them.
47. Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 276-79.
48. Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), 282-88. Kanan Makiya's books present eloquent portraits of the chilling nature of the Baath regime. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: London, 1993); and Republic of Fear: Saddam's Iraq (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1991). The latter book is written under the pseudonym Samir Khalil.
49. Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), 282-88. Kanan Makiya's books present eloquent portraits of the chilling nature of the Baath regime. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: London, 1993); and Republic of Fear: Saddam's Iraq (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1991). The latter book is written under the pseudonym Samir Khalil.
50. Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), 282-88. Kanan Makiya's books present eloquent portraits of the chilling nature of the Baath regime. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: London, 1993); and Republic of Fear: Saddam's Iraq (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1991). The latter book is written under the pseudonym Samir Khalil.
51. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 331. Both Iran and the United States hoped that Iraq would remain weakened by a continuing Kurdish insurgency. As part of this effort, the Central Intelligence Agency provided $16 million to the Kurds in the 1970s. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 233. After Desert Storm, the United States spent tens of millions on a futile effort to overthrow Saddam. The operation failed in part because the administration tried to walk a fine line between overthrowing Saddam and preserving Iraq's integrity. See Jim Hoagland, "How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed," Washington Post, 26 June 1997, A21, A28-29.
52. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 331. Both Iran and the United States hoped that Iraq would remain weakened by a continuing Kurdish insurgency. As part of this effort, the Central Intelligence Agency provided $16 million to the Kurds in the 1970s. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 233. After Desert Storm, the United States spent tens of millions on a futile effort to overthrow Saddam. The operation failed in part because the administration tried to walk a fine line between overthrowing Saddam and preserving Iraq's integrity. See Jim Hoagland, "How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed," Washington Post, 26 June 1997, A21, A28-29.
53. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 331. Both Iran and the United States hoped that Iraq would remain weakened by a continuing Kurdish insurgency. As part of this effort, the Central Intelligence Agency provided $16 million to the Kurds in the 1970s. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 233. After Desert Storm, the United States spent tens of millions on a futile effort to overthrow Saddam. The operation failed in part because the administration tried to walk a fine line between overthrowing Saddam and preserving Iraq's integrity. See Jim Hoagland, "How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed," Washington Post, 26 June 1997, A21, A28-29.
54. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 139.
55. Statebuilding depends on communal identities being malleable. In Nigeria, for example, the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of élites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Donald Horowitz is the leading proponent of the view that electoral systems can be constructed in ways that might reduce ethnic conflict ( Ethnic Groups in Conflict [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985], 291-440; and "Making Moderation Pay").
56. Statebuilding depends on communal identities being malleable. In Nigeria, for example, the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of élites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Donald Horowitz is the leading proponent of the view that electoral systems can be constructed in ways that might reduce ethnic conflict ( Ethnic Groups in Conflict [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985], 291-440; and "Making Moderation Pay").
57. Statebuilding depends on communal identities being malleable. In Nigeria, for example, the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of élites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Donald Horowitz is the leading proponent of the view that electoral systems can be constructed in ways that might reduce ethnic conflict ( Ethnic Groups in Conflict [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985], 291-440; and "Making Moderation Pay").
58. Statebuilding depends on communal identities being malleable. In Nigeria, for example, the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of élites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Donald Horowitz is the leading proponent of the view that electoral systems can be constructed in ways that might reduce ethnic conflict ( Ethnic Groups in Conflict [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985], 291-440; and "Making Moderation Pay").
59. Statebuilding depends on communal identities being malleable. In Nigeria, for example, the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of élites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Donald Horowitz is the leading proponent of the view that electoral systems can be constructed in ways that might reduce ethnic conflict ( Ethnic Groups in Conflict [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985], 291-440; and "Making Moderation Pay").
60. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," passim.
61. Increasing attacks on Israel by the Palestinians led to harsh Israeli responses, which highlighted the Lebanese government's weakness and raised the threat felt by groups in Lebanon. In 1968 Israeli forces raided the Beirut airport and killed several Palestinian leaders. Between 1968 and 1974, Israeli violations of Lebanese territory averaged 1.4 incidents a day. By 1974 Israel was regularly patrolling Lebanon and bombing PLO camps, with the government of Lebanon powerless to stop it (Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival, 61-67).
62. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 139.
63. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 262-85.
64. Within Lebanon there are over sixteen communities, including Armenian Catholic, Assyrian and Chaldean Catholic, Greek Catholic, Maronite Catholic, Roman Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Protestant, Bahai, Jew, Alawite, Druze, Shi'a, and Sunni groups. AU these communities claim the ultimate loyalty of their members. Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers (New York: St Martin's, 1992), 5.
65. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 150.
66. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 18.
67. In Lebanon, the two largest Shi'a cantons are far away from each other. The two Sunni cantons are heavily urban and laden with Palestinian refugees, and the more important Sunni canton is surrounded by hostile Shi'as, Maronites, and Druze. All groups have brethren dispersed into other enclaves. For example, Christians in Zahle are surrounded by Sunnis and Shi'as in the south and north respectively; the Druze enclave south of Beirut surrounds a Christian enclave and is in turn surrounded by Sunnis and Shi'as; Sunnis around Sidon are surrounded by Druze and Shi'as. Leonard Binder, "Introduction," in Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the SKa (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), viii. Kurds are almost exclusively found in the northern part of Iraq. Most Kurdish migration, unlike that of the Shi'a, has been to urban areas within the Kurdish region. Shi'a are concentrated in the south, though many have migrated to urban centers, particularly Baghdad. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 285. Iraq's demographic breakdown is not without its complications. Population cleavages often do not run along natural borders, Baghdad is split between Shi'a and Sunnis, and Kirkuk, where much of Iraq's oil wealth is located, is disputed between Kurds and the Sunni Arab government
68. In Lebanon, the two largest Shi'a cantons are far away from each other. The two Sunni cantons are heavily urban and laden with Palestinian refugees, and the more important Sunni canton is surrounded by hostile Shi'as, Maronites, and Druze. All groups have brethren dispersed into other enclaves. For example, Christians in Zahle are surrounded by Sunnis and Shi'as in the south and north respectively; the Druze enclave south of Beirut surrounds a Christian enclave and is in turn surrounded by Sunnis and Shi'as; Sunnis around Sidon are surrounded by Druze and Shi'as. Leonard Binder, "Introduction," in Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the SKa (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), viii. Kurds are almost exclusively found in the northern part of Iraq. Most Kurdish migration, unlike that of the Shi'a, has been to urban areas within the Kurdish region. Shi'a are concentrated in the south, though many have migrated to urban centers, particularly Baghdad. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 285. Iraq's demographic breakdown is not without its complications. Population cleavages often do not run along natural borders, Baghdad is split between Shi'a and Sunnis, and Kirkuk, where much of Iraq's oil wealth is located, is disputed between Kurds and the Sunni Arab government
69. Helena Cobban, "The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon," The Muslim World Today, Occasional Paper no. 2, American Institution for Islamic Affairs (1985), 1.
70. Kaufmann notes that peace requires minorities small enough that the host does not fear them and neighboring ethnicities do not seek to redeem them. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 163. Van Evera argues that unattained nationalisms are more troublesome when the movement "has the strength to reach plausibly for statehood" and that without such strength their nationalism will be "deterred by the power of the central state" ( Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 16).
71. Kaufmann notes that peace requires minorities small enough that the host does not fear them and neighboring ethnicities do not seek to redeem them. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 163. Van Evera argues that unattained nationalisms are more troublesome when the movement "has the strength to reach plausibly for statehood" and that without such strength their nationalism will be "deterred by the power of the central state" ( Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 16).
72. Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 314.
73. Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 16; and Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 313.
74. Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, 16; and Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 313.
75. I would like to thank Taylor Seybolt for suggesting this comparison.
76. The best description of this competition remains Robert H. Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," Comparative Political Studies 6 (January 1974): 457-84.
77. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 153-54.
78. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Anderson, Imagined Communities.
79. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Anderson, Imagined Communities.
80. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor,
81. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Anderson, Imagined Communities.
82. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Anderson, Imagined Communities.
83. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Anderson, Imagined Communities.
84. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism is defined as the identification of individuals with a group that shares a perceived common history and culture and that believes it must have its own state to survive. This definition is drawn primarily from the definitions of Barry Posen in "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 81; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," 6. The literature on nationalism is as vast as it is disorienting. In addition to the works cited above, other important recent works include E. J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Anderson, Imagined Communities.
85. Although Iraqi Shi'a are Arabs, most suspect Arab nationalism is a tool of Sunni hegemony. As Fouad Ajami argues, "Deep down many Christian Arabs no doubt knew that Arab nationalism was at its core 'covert Islam' and covert Sunni Islam to be more precise" (Fouad Ajarni, The Arab Predicament [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992]), 246.
86. Before the British Mandate began, in the Shi'a areas in the nineteenth century the religious leadership was slowly using Islam to unify the tribes - a process of state formation aborted by the British. Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq, 5. At various times in Kurdish history, Iraqi Kurdish groups have had local government and institutions that functioned as an embryonic state. In recent years, the safe haven secured by the United States has served as a means of developing communal institutions and services that are part and parcel of statebuilding.
87. For arguments on the importance of perceiving a shared history, see Anderson, Imagined Communities; and E. J. Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
88. For arguments on the importance of perceiving a shared history, see Anderson, Imagined Communities; and E. J. Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
89. Not all forms of nationalism depend on a common territory. Anthony Smith distinguishes between two variants of national identity (National Identity [Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1993]). The Western, "civic" model is predominantly a territorial conception. As Smith notes, "nations must possess compact, well-defined territories" (9). This stands in contrast to the "ethnic" conception of the nation, which emphasizes birth and native culture. Based on Smith's division, the lack of a common territory removes one possible form of national mobilization, thus weakening - though hardly eliminating - the nationalist propensity in general.
90. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism (New York: Noonday, 1995), 199.
91. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 156.
92. See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 291-440, for a more complete description of these arguments.
93. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 628-52.
94. Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 334.
95. Although the president remains a Maronite, power is now concentrated in the prime minister's position.
96. Judith P. Harik, "Shaykb al-'Aql and the Druze of Mount Lebanon: Conflict and Accommodation," Middle East Studies 30, no. 3 (July 1994): 461.
97. Nabih Berri, the head of Amal, also is threatened by traditional Shi'a élites, who resent his upstart aspirations. "Lebanon: Hizbullah in politics," Economist, 7 September 1996, 38.
98. For an interesting general argument along these lines, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
99. See Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 335-37.
100. The one brief period of communal calm occurred during the postwar monarchy, from 1945 to 1958. This government, however, was imposed on Iraq by the British. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 88. The most comprehensive description of ethnic and social relations in this period is in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq.
101. The one brief period of communal calm occurred during the postwar monarchy, from 1945 to 1958. This government, however, was imposed on Iraq by the British. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 88. The most comprehensive description of ethnic and social relations in this period is in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq.
102. Liora Lukitz suggests that no regime, including the British, successfully resolved this question of an integrated national identity. Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank Cass, 1995).
103. Kurds took maximalist positions even before the Anfal slaughters, and their culture glorifies conflict. Dana Adams Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little, Brown 1964), 43.
104. Senior Kurdish official, interview by author, December, 1996.
105. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 291-332.
106. Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 71-72.
107. Damascus's true goals in Lebanon are difficult to discern, but Syrian-dominated hegemony appears to be Damascus's chief ambition. Asad repeatedly has tried to stop fighting in Lebanon and prevent the country's partition. Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 270. Equally important, he has tried to prevent any other regional power (that is, Israel, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia) from gaining influence there and has been willing to sacrifice Lebanon's stability to do so. To these ends, Asad has allied with non-Arabs and Christians, despite his pan-Arab rhetoric. Today, when no outside power except Israel retains influence in Lebanon, and Israel's influence is limited to the SLA-dominated border area, a Syrian-dominated and peaceful Lebanon is a very real possibility.
108. Dilip Hiro argues that Asad considers Hizballah an instrument to pressure Israeli troops stationed in Lebanon and to put pressure on Israel during the peace negotiations. Hiro, Lebanon, 211 and 217.
109. Israel's original motive for invading Lebanon in the 1978 Litani operations came from concerns about PLO guerrilla activity originating in Lebanon. Jerusalem also worried about the level of Syrian influence in Lebanon even though for many years during the Lebanese civil war Israel tacitly accepted a degree of Syrian dominance. For a superb assessment of Lebanese-Israeli relations up to and including the 1982 Israeli invasion, see Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Since this time, however, Israel has repeatedly indicated its desire to avoid another conflict in Lebanon. Its concern today is not Syrian hegemony, but rather the unwillingness of Damascus to crack down on Hizballah as it has on other militias.
110. Tehran has organized Islamist Shi'as under the banner of the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It seeks to extend its influence among its coreligionists and undermine Baghdad. For works on Iran's foreign policy, see Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder: Westview, 1991); and Sandra Mackey, The Iranians (New York: Penguin, 1996), 301-55.
111. Tehran has organized Islamist Shi'as under the banner of the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It seeks to extend its influence among its coreligionists and undermine Baghdad. For works on Iran's foreign policy, see Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder: Westview, 1991); and Sandra Mackey, The Iranians (New York: Penguin, 1996), 301-55.
112. Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 332; and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 613-21.
113. Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 332; and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 613-21.
114. Horowitz makes this point in his discussion of federalism in Nigeria, noting that the three largest groups there gained disproportionate influence due to their control of the regions as well as their influence at the center. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 604.
115. Ibid., 625.
116. After taking power in 1968, the Baath negotiated a short-lived peace agreement with the Kurds that soon ended in renewed fighting. Kurds were given a guarantee of full participation in all aspects of government and the military; the official use of Kurdish in the Kurdish area; development spending in the Kurdish area; more Kurdish input into education and formal recognition of the Kurdish nationality in the Constitution. The Baath, however, used the time of negotiations to consolidate their position domestically. Almost immediately, both sides charged the other with violating the accords. The central government criticized the Kurds for seeking secession, not autonomy. The Baath did not implement the education or language agreement and gave Kurds almost no say in decision making. The Baath imposed Arab dominance by shutting down local schools, replacing Kurdish administrators and police, and otherwise not respecting Kurdish culture. When fighting began again, it was far bloodier than before. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 326-32; Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI, 1987), 142 and 167.
117. After taking power in 1968, the Baath negotiated a short-lived peace agreement with the Kurds that soon ended in renewed fighting. Kurds were given a guarantee of full participation in all aspects of government and the military; the official use of Kurdish in the Kurdish area; development spending in the Kurdish area; more Kurdish input into education and formal recognition of the Kurdish nationality in the Constitution. The Baath, however, used the time of negotiations to consolidate their position domestically. Almost immediately, both sides charged the other with violating the accords. The central government criticized the Kurds for seeking secession, not autonomy. The Baath did not implement the education or language agreement and gave Kurds almost no say in decision making. The Baath imposed Arab dominance by shutting down local schools, replacing Kurdish administrators and police, and otherwise not respecting Kurdish culture. When fighting began again, it was far bloodier than before. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 326-32; Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI, 1987), 142 and 167.
118. Minority rights' guarantees, unfortunately, appear to be an issue scholars embrace with confident ignorance. Halperin, Scheffer, and Small, for example, make the argument for the acceptance of human rights as the key to international recognition of self-determination, ignoring the international community's dismal record on enforcing this issue. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 84-93. Similarly, Levine also notes the importance of minority rights' safeguards. Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 331. If the historical record is any indication, however, the international community will do little to enforce human rights standards. Time and time again outside powers have agitated for such recognition and have then not followed it up with force when later regimes have repudiated these policies. Again, the true question is not whether safeguards for minority rights arc important, but when - if ever - a minority can rely on international guarantees and what should be done when such guarantees are not likely to be fulfilled or forthcoming.
119. Minority rights' guarantees, unfortunately, appear to be an issue scholars embrace with confident ignorance. Halperin, Scheffer, and Small, for example, make the argument for the acceptance of human rights as the key to international recognition of self-determination, ignoring the international community's dismal record on enforcing this issue. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 84-93. Similarly, Levine also notes the importance of minority rights' safeguards. Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," 331. If the historical record is any indication, however, the international community will do little to enforce human rights standards. Time and time again outside powers have agitated for such recognition and have then not followed it up with force when later regimes have repudiated these policies. Again, the true question is not whether safeguards for minority rights arc important, but when - if ever - a minority can rely on international guarantees and what should be done when such guarantees are not likely to be fulfilled or forthcoming.
120. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 161. Scholarship on the question of population transfers and forced migration is in short supply. Studies on whether new settlers face discrimination from old settlers and how a successful population transfer can be carried out would be particularly useful.