Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 329-353

  Potters, Jan ^a   Van Winden, Frans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030304508     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02425261     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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