Anchoring devices in science for policy: The case of consensus around climate sensitivity

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 291-323

  Van Der Sluijs, Jeroen ^b   Van Eijndhoven, Josée ^a,b   Shackley, Simon ^c   Wynne, Brian ^c  

^a Rathenau Institute KNAW   (Netherlands)

^b UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032368111     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631298028002004     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. Edward A. Parson, 'Integrated Assessment and Environmental Policy Making, in Pursuit of Usefulness', Energy Policy, Vol. 23, Nos 4-5 (April/May 1995), 463-75.
2. US National Academy of Sciences, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment (Washington, DC: Climate Research Board, NAS, 1979).
3. US National Academy of Sciences, Changing Climate, Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee (Washington, DC: Board on Atmospheric Sciences & Climate, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Resources, National Research Council, 1983).
4. Bert Bolin, Bo R. Döös, Jill Jäger and Richard A. Warrick (eds), The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change and Ecosystems (Chichester, Hants.: John Wiley & Sons, SCOPE Report No. 29, 1986). (SCOPE is the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of the International Council of Scientific Unions [ICSU].)
5. Its full title was 'The World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security'.
6. John T. Houghton, Geoff J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (eds), Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7. John T. Houghton, Bruce A. Callander and Sheila K. Varney (eds), Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Houghton, L. Gylvan Meira Filho, James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, Callander, Erik Haites, Nigel Harris and Kathy Maskell (eds), Climate Change 1994: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change and an Evaluation of the IPCC IS'92 Emission Scenarios (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. John T. Houghton, Bruce A. Callander and Sheila K. Varney (eds), Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Houghton, L. Gylvan Meira Filho, James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, Callander, Erik Haites, Nigel Harris and Kathy Maskell (eds), Climate Change 1994: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change and an Evaluation of the IPCC IS'92 Emission Scenarios (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
9. J.T. Houghton, L.G. Meira Filho, B.A. Callander, N. Harris, Arie Kattenberg and K. Maskell (eds), Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
10. For a scientific history of the greenhouse problem, see the comprehensive article on this subject which we have drawn upon here: David G. Victor and William C. Clark, 'The Greenhouse Effect in the US: A History of Science up to 1985' (contribution I-2 to the Project on Social Learning in the Management of Global Environmental Risks, Science, Technology & Public Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1991).
11. David Collingridge and Colin Reeve, Science Speaks to Power: The Role of Experts in Policy-Making (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). Political disagreement often gives rise to articulation of scientific uncertainties: see, for example, Arie Rip, 'Risicocontroverses en de Verwevenheid van Wetenschap en Politick', Kennis en Methode (1992), No. 1, 63-80; also see Brian L. Campbell, 'Uncertainty as Symbolic Action in Disputes Among Experts', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 3 (August 1985), 429-53.
12. David Collingridge and Colin Reeve, Science Speaks to Power: The Role of Experts in Policy-Making (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). Political disagreement often gives rise to articulation of scientific uncertainties: see, for example, Arie Rip, 'Risicocontroverses en de Verwevenheid van Wetenschap en Politick', Kennis en Methode (1992), No. 1, 63-80; also see Brian L. Campbell, 'Uncertainty as Symbolic Action in Disputes Among Experts', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 3 (August 1985), 429-53.
13. David Collingridge and Colin Reeve, Science Speaks to Power: The Role of Experts in Policy-Making (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). Political disagreement often gives rise to articulation of scientific uncertainties: see, for example, Arie Rip, 'Risicocontroverses en de Verwevenheid van Wetenschap en Politick', Kennis en Methode (1992), No. 1, 63-80; also see Brian L. Campbell, 'Uncertainty as Symbolic Action in Disputes Among Experts', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 3 (August 1985), 429-53.
14. For example: Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, 'Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of Scientific Advice', Part 1, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 3 (1993), 140-59, Part 2, ibid., Vol. 4 (1994), 185-200; David M. Hart and David G. Victor, 'Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for Climate Change Research, 1957-74', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1993), 643-80.
15. For example: Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, 'Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of Scientific Advice', Part 1, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 3 (1993), 140-59, Part 2, ibid., Vol. 4 (1994), 185-200; David M. Hart and David G. Victor, 'Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for Climate Change Research, 1957-74', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1993), 643-80.
16. For example: Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, 'Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of Scientific Advice', Part 1, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 3 (1993), 140-59, Part 2, ibid., Vol. 4 (1994), 185-200; David M. Hart and David G. Victor, 'Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for Climate Change Research, 1957-74', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1993), 643-80.
17. The concept of 'policy windows' has its roots in Anthony Downs, 'Up and Down with Ecology - The Issue Attention Cycle', The Public Interest, Vol. 28 (1972), 38-50, and has been further defined by John W. Kingdon, in his Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Toronto & Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1984), Chapter 8, 173-204.
18. The concept of 'policy windows' has its roots in Anthony Downs, 'Up and Down with Ecology - The Issue Attention Cycle', The Public Interest, Vol. 28 (1972), 38-50, and has been further defined by John W. Kingdon, in his Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Toronto & Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1984), Chapter 8, 173-204.
19. Josée C.M. van Eijndhoven and Peter Groenewegen, 'The Construction of Expert Advice on Health Risks', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May 1991), 257-78.
20. Such connections and meanings are contingently constructed, as indeed Charles Rosenberg noted many years ago, in the context of diametrically opposite 19th-century and 1960s political connotations of hereditarian and 'environmental' scientific views of the causes of criminal behaviour: see C.E. Rosenberg, 'Science and American Social Thought', in D. Van Tassel and M.G. Hall (eds), Science and Society in the United States (New York: Dorsey; 1966), 137-84, excerpted as 'Scientific Theories and Social Thought', in Barry Barnes (ed.), Sociology of Science: Selected Readings (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin Books, 1972), 292-306.
21. Such connections and meanings are contingently constructed, as indeed Charles Rosenberg noted many years ago, in the context of diametrically opposite 19th-century and 1960s political connotations of hereditarian and 'environmental' scientific views of the causes of criminal behaviour: see C.E. Rosenberg, 'Science and American Social Thought', in D. Van Tassel and M.G. Hall (eds), Science and Society in the United States (New York: Dorsey; 1966), 137-84, excerpted as 'Scientific Theories and Social Thought', in Barry Barnes (ed.), Sociology of Science: Selected Readings (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin Books, 1972), 292-306.
22. See, for example, Michel Callon, John Law and Arie Rip (eds), Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology (London: Macmillan, 1986); Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Latour, Philippe Mauguin and Geneviève Teil, 'A Note on Socio-Technical Graphs', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 1992), 33-57.
23. See, for example, Michel Callon, John Law and Arie Rip (eds), Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology (London: Macmillan, 1986); Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Latour, Philippe Mauguin and Geneviève Teil, 'A Note on Socio-Technical Graphs', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 1992), 33-57.
24. See, for example, Michel Callon, John Law and Arie Rip (eds), Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology (London: Macmillan, 1986); Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Latour, Philippe Mauguin and Geneviève Teil, 'A Note on Socio-Technical Graphs', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 1992), 33-57.
25. Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, ("Translations" and Coherence: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 387-420.
26. Sheila S. Jasanoff, 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1987), 195-230; Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
27. Sheila S. Jasanoff, 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1987), 195-230; Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
28. See, for example, Tom M.L. Wigley, 'Climate Scenarios', in the collected papers of the European Workshop on Interrelated Bioclimatic and Land Use Changes (Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands, 17-21 October 1987), 52; or Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (eds), op. cit. note 6.
29. See, for example, Tom M.L. Wigley, 'Climate Scenarios', in the collected papers of the European Workshop on Interrelated Bioclimatic and Land Use Changes (Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands, 17-21 October 1987), 52; or Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (eds), op. cit. note 6.
30. Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (eds), op. cit. note 6, xxvi.
31. 'Radiative forcing' is defined as the net effect of a greenhouse gas on the average net radiation at the top of the troposphere, caused by a change in either solar or infrared radiation. It perturbs the balance between incoming and outgoing radiation. See Houghton et al., op. cit. note 8, 49.
32. Some recent models do include the anthropogenic sulphate aerosols.
33. Mike Schlesinger and John Mitchell, 'Climate Model Simulations of the Equilibrium Climate Response to Increased Carbon Dioxide', Review of Geophysics, Vol. 25 (1987), 760-98.
34. W. Lawrence Gates, 'Climate Modelling', WMO Bulletin,Vol. 41, No. 4 (October 1992), 413-20.
35. Gordon A. McBean, 'Global Change Models - A Physical Perspective', Ambio, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 1994), 13-18.
36. Other GCM-modelling groups whose results are cited in the assessment reports are: Oregon State University (OSU), the Main Geophysical Observatory in Leningrad (MGO), Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organization, Australia (CSIRO) and the Japanese Meteorological Research Institute (MRI).
37. US NAS, op. cit. note 2, 2.
38. Robert E. Dickinson, 'How Will Climate Change? The Climate System and Modelling of Future Climate', in Bolin, Döös, Jäger & Warrick (eds), op. cit. note 4, 206-70, at 262.
39. Bolin, Döös, Jäger & Warrick (eds), op. cit. note 4, xxi.
40. Email message from Robert Dickinson (25 April 1995).
41. Interview with climate modeller (11 April 1993). In particular, according to some modellers, the skewed distribution of the estimates of climate sensitivity, due to the amplified positive feedbacks at the higher sensitivities, was not properly taken into account by Dickinson.
42. M. Bruce Beck, 'Understanding Uncertain Environmental Systems', in Johan Grasman and Gerrit van Straten (eds), Predictability and Nonlinear Modelling in Natural Sciences and Economics (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994), 294-311.
43. Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (eds), op. cit. note 6, 81.
44. Ibid., 138. The two works cited are, respectively, NAS'79 (op. cit. note 2) and Villach'85 (op. cit. note 4).
45. Ibid., 138. The two works cited are, respectively, NAS'79 (op. cit. note 2) and Villach'85 (op. cit. note 4).
46. Ibid., 138. The two works cited are, respectively, NAS'79 (op. cit. note 2) and Villach'85 (op. cit. note 4).
47. For this reason it was selected as the starting point for scenarios used in the study for the European Workshop on Interrelated Bioclimatic and Land Use Changes (October 1987), which was one of the follow-up conferences from Villach'85: see Wilfried Bach, 'Scenario Analysis', and Jaap Kwadijk, 'Central Discussion Paper', in the papers of the European Workshop, loc. cit. note 18.
48. For this reason it was selected as the starting point for scenarios used in the study for the European Workshop on Interrelated Bioclimatic and Land Use Changes (October 1987), which was one of the follow-up conferences from Villach'85: see Wilfried Bach, 'Scenario Analysis', and Jaap Kwadijk, 'Central Discussion Paper', in the papers of the European Workshop, loc. cit. note 18.
49. For this reason it was selected as the starting point for scenarios used in the study for the European Workshop on Interrelated Bioclimatic and Land Use Changes (October 1987), which was one of the follow-up conferences from Villach'85: see Wilfried Bach, 'Scenario Analysis', and Jaap Kwadijk, 'Central Discussion Paper', in the papers of the European Workshop, loc. cit. note 18.
50. W. Lawrence Gates, Ann Henderson-Sellers, George J. Boer, Chris K. Folland, A. Kitoh, Byrant J. McAvaney, F. Semazzi, N. Smith, Andrew J. Weaver and Q.-C. Zeng, 'Climate Models - Evaluation', in Houghton et al. (eds), op. cit. note 8, 229-84.
51. 2 and Climate: A Missing Feedback?', Nature,Vol. 341 (14 September 1989), 132-34.
52. W. Lawrence Gates, John F.B. Mitchell, G.J. Boer, Ulrich Cubasch and V.P. Meleshko, 'Climate Modelling, Climate Prediction and Model Validation', in Houghton, Callander & Varney (eds), op. cit. note 7, 97-134, at 116-17.
53. Houghton, Callander & Varney (eds), op. cit. note 7, 111, Table B2.
54. Gates et al., op. cit. note 37, 118.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Email message from W. Lawrence Gates (18 May 1994).
58. Fax message from Bert Bolin (17 August 1994).
59. Houghton et al. (eds), op. cit. note 8, 34.
60. Interview with an industrial scientist (24 June 1993). This same source claims that the modeller who came up with the 80% probability value did so by canvassing the opinions of eight modellers, five of whom replied. Four said that the sensitivity would fall into the 1.5°C-4.5°C range; one said not. Hence the 20%.
61. See, for instance, M. Granger Morgan and David W. Keith, 'Subjective Judgements by Climate Experts', Environmental Science and Technology, Vol. 29 (1995) 468A-76A, and James G. Titus and Vijay Narayanan, 'The Risk of Sea Level Rise; A Delphic Monte Carlo Analysis in which Twenty Researchers Specify Subjective Probability Distributions for Model Coefficients within their Respective Areas of Expertise', Climatic Change, Vol. 33 (1996), 151-212.
62. See, for instance, M. Granger Morgan and David W. Keith, 'Subjective Judgements by Climate Experts', Environmental Science and Technology, Vol. 29 (1995) 468A-76A, and James G. Titus and Vijay Narayanan, 'The Risk of Sea Level Rise; A Delphic Monte Carlo Analysis in which Twenty Researchers Specify Subjective Probability Distributions for Model Coefficients within their Respective Areas of Expertise', Climatic Change, Vol. 33 (1996), 151-212.
63. Bert Bolin, 'IPCC Statement to the First Session of the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change' (Berlin, 28 March 1995).
64. For example, as defined by Jeffrey T. Kiehl, in Kevin E. Trenberth (ed.), Climate System Modeling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 321.
65. Robert D. Cess and Gerald L. Potter, 'A Methodology for Understanding and Intercomparing Atmospheric Climate Feedback Processes in General Circulation Models', Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 93, Series D, No. 7 (1988), 8305-14.
66. Ibid., 8306.
67. We find increasingly that the scientific literature uses the IPCC's definition of climate sensitivity. The emergence and spread of the concept in the early 1980s seems to have been of importance to the current framing of the anthropogenic climate change discourse, and vice versa.
68. For instance, see Houghton et al. (eds), op. cit note 8, 423.
69. Houghton, Callander & Varney (eds), op. cit. note 7, 118.
70. 2 as a Proxy in Simulating the Greenhouse Effect of other Radiatively Active Gases', Nature,Vol. 350 (18 April 1991), 573-77.
71. For example, K.E. Taylor and Joyce E. Penner, 'Response of the Climate System to Atmospheric Aerosols and Greenhouse Gases', Nature, Vol. 369 (30 June 1994), 734-37.
72. See also Tom M.L. Wigley, 'Outlook Becoming Hazier', Nature, Vol. 369 (30 June 1994), 709-10.
73. For the quote, see note 40. The recent IPCC'94 report also uses a wider definition in the full scientific text: see Houghton et al. (eds) (1995), op. cit. note 7, 169-70.
74. In a personal communication (4 July 1994), Mike E. Schlesinger stressed the underdetermined character of the notion of climate sensitivity: 'The number of unknowns is much greater than the number of independent pieces of information we have'.
75. Dickinson, loc. cit. note 29.
76. More precisely, the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Berlin on 28 March 1995: see note 47.
77. For example, from IPCC 1990: 'climate sensitivity . . . is generally used as a benchmark to compare models': see Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (eds), op. cit. note 6, xxv.
78. Note that a translation of the 'best guess' into the 'best estimate' has taken place in such uses of climate sensitivity, implying greater certainty in the figure.
79. A remaining issue concerns the extent to which these sources of flexibility arise from linguistic imprecision - that is, the lack of any clear use of an unambiguous definition of climate sensitivity - rather than the lack of its existence. If scientists kept to more precise definitions of climate sensitivity, then it should in principle be possible to reduce the interpretive flexibility from changes in the connotations of the range, and in the definition of climate sensitivity (and, to a lesser extent, from changes in the types of uncertainty accounted for, and in the implications of the range). The fact that scientists have not sought more precision by tightening up their definitions, however, does not reflect any conscious desire on their part to maintain interpretive flexibility in order to facilitate boundary interactions. This would imply that the advisory scientists are exercising too much conscious and instrumental strategy. Rather, it reflects the hypothetical (hence pre-definitional) character of climate sensitivity from a climate research perspective. Linguistic precision may be rejected because it would commit scientists to the notion that climate sensitivity, in its wider formulation, is actually a 'proven' scientific concept. The IPCC can give the appearance of exercising linguistic precision because the narrow definition it uses is purely operational - as befits 'science for policy' perhaps, though as we have seen the IPCC trades heavily upon definitional flexibility.
80. For example, the Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE), developed at the (Dutch) National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM), and the Atmospheric Stabilization Framework (ASF), developed at the (United States) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
81. Star & Griesemer, op. cit. note 16.
82. For example, President Bush's science adviser, Allan Bromley, used the UKMO's 1989 model calculations (which produced a climate sensitivity of 1.9°K by inclusion of water phase change in the representation of clouds) as a reason for questioning the robustness of the scientific basis for human-induced climate change. According to an article in Science: 'Asked by Gore whether the scientific evidence is inadequate to justify curbs on greenhouse emissions, Bromley responded that recent adjustments to climatic models by British climate modeller John Mitchell have made him uneasy about the reliability of predictions . . . "That such simple and obvious changes in [Mitchell's] model can make major changes in predictions underscores my own feeling . . . that we have a substantial distance to go yet"': see Marjorie Sun, 'Global Warming Becomes Hot Issue for Bromley', Science, Vol. 246 (3 November 1989), 569. This article prompted a British official to write to a colleague in government: 'It is rather frustrating to see John [Mitchell] 's results being used in this way . . . John places no more confidence in the 1.9°K result than the 5.2°K result' (letter dated 15 November 1989). This sort of experience of how the latest results of model simulations are widely received by influential policy-makers such as Bromley may be quite important in how modellers and other advisors have come to represent the consensus view of the climate sensitivity.
83. Paul N. Edwards, 'Global Comprehensive Models in Politics and Policy Making', Climatic Change, Vol. 34 (1996), 1-16.
84. See also: Yaron Ezrahi, 'Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice', Minerva, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1980), 111-31; and Arie Rip, 'Expert Advice and Pragmatic Rationality', in Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson (eds), The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiries into Contemporary Societies (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 363-79. Similar ideas were expressed in a lecture by Willem J. Kakebeeke (Assistant Director General for the Environment at the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment) at the 280th Scientific Meeting of RIVM (the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection, Bilthoven, 24 March 1994).
85. See also: Yaron Ezrahi, 'Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice', Minerva, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1980), 111-31; and Arie Rip, 'Expert Advice and Pragmatic Rationality', in Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson (eds), The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiries into Contemporary Societies (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 363-79. Similar ideas were expressed in a lecture by Willem J. Kakebeeke (Assistant Director General for the Environment at the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment) at the 280th Scientific Meeting of RIVM (the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection, Bilthoven, 24 March 1994).
86. John Lanchbery and David Victor, 'The Role of Science in the Global Climate Negotiations', in Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds), Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 29-40.
87. There is even circumstantial evidence to suggest that modellers were dissuaded from staking out claims based on intuitive and tacit judgements, because of fears that some industrial scientists might criticize the absence of robust methodology.
88. KNMI (Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute) memorandum DM-88-12 (De Bilt, July 1988).
89. We emphasize that it would be misleading to stress the role of policy too much, for three reasons: first, there is a lack of supporting empirical direct evidence; second, there exist alternative interpretations of the IPCC from that presented above (for example, regarding the IPCC as making rather bold claims, as in the somewhat controversial 1995 report); and third, it is questionable whether relatively minor changes in the temperature range might have had significant destabilizing effects upon climate policy-making and the international negotiations. We thank Stephen Schneider for discussions on these issues.
90. Brian Wynne, 'Carving out Science (and Politics) in the Regulatory Jungle', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, No. 4 (November 1992), 745-58.
91. See, for example, Dorothy Nelkin, 'The Political Impact of Technical Expertise', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1975), 35-54.
92. Karin Knorr-Cetina, 'How Superorganisms Change: Consensus Formation and the Social Ontology of High-Energy Physics Experiments', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 1 (February 1995), 119-47.
93. Benedict Anderson's account of colonial authorities' construction and use of maps and censuses shows that the abstract assumptions about societies built into those constructs (for example, ethnic distinctions, political borders, and the like) eventually began to order them materially, as routine administrative functions began to reflect and consolidate them in the identities and relationships of their subjects. In imagining into being a global policy community, practitioners of global climate science may likewise reshape the world in the image of their scientific tools and analyses, though the significant sources of resistance are diverse and quite unknown: see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: New Left Books, 1981, revised and extended 1991).