Beyond epistemology: Relativism and engagement in the politics of science

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 393-418

  Jasanoff, Sheila ^a,b  

^a Department of Science Policy and Law ^*

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030528985     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631296026002008     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. See, for example, Brian Martin, 'The Critique of Science Goes Academic', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1993), 247-59. Bloor conceived of the sociology of science as being like other sciences in promoting 'a conception of the natural world as morally empty and neutral': David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 10. The 'scientific' status of the sociology of science is understood differently now under the influence of interpretive approaches from cultural theory and continental philosophy, as we see in part below.
2. See, for example, Brian Martin, 'The Critique of Science Goes Academic', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1993), 247-59. Bloor conceived of the sociology of science as being like other sciences in promoting 'a conception of the natural world as morally empty and neutral': David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 10. The 'scientific' status of the sociology of science is understood differently now under the influence of interpretive approaches from cultural theory and continental philosophy, as we see in part below.
3. I use the terms 'SSK', 'science studies' and 'science and technology studies' more or less interchangeably throughout this paper. Whereas 'science studies' is just a convenient shorthand for the more inclusive term 'science and technology studies', SSK is not precisely co-extensive with the other two. SSK, in my usage, refers to a particular approach to the study of scientific knowledge that traces its genealogy to the work of David Bloor and Barry Barnes at Edinburgh, and to earlier authors such as Ludwik Fleck. Science studies, by contrast, encompasses for me the entire range of work that ties the epistemological critique of science to wider historical, sociological, political or cultural contexts.
4. The SCOT programme was most authoritatively laid out in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
5. Bloor, op. cit. note 1, 3.
6. These issues are explored in Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
7. These issues are explored in Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
8. Harry Collins, 'Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 1981), 3-10.
9. See, for example, Michel Callon, 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay', in John Law (ed.), Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 196-233. While this is not the place to make this argument in detail, I would like to note that Callon, Latour and others arrive at their notion of 'symmetry' by reducing the class of possible actors into two types: actors and actants, humans and non-humans. See, in particular, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). This simplification is achieved in part by switching off other possible criteria of demarcation (for example, those used in law, science, philosophy), such as sentient versus non-sentient, self-replicative versus non-self-replicative, moral versus amoral. Using such criteria, one could reasonably divide the world of actants into more refined categories, distinguishing sea scallops, let us say, from speed bumps (Latour's 'sleeping policemen': see B. Latour, 'Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts', in W. Bijker and J. Law (eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992], 225-58). Latour's ideas of 'mediation' and 'genealogy' between the people-world and the thing-world may begin to offer a way out of this problem: see B. Latour, On Technical Mediation - Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy', Common Knowledge, Vol. 3 (1994), 29-64, especially 38-40.
10. See, for example, Michel Callon, 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay', in John Law (ed.), Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 196-233. While this is not the place to make this argument in detail, I would like to note that Callon, Latour and others arrive at their notion of 'symmetry' by reducing the class of possible actors into two types: actors and actants, humans and non-humans. See, in particular, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). This simplification is achieved in part by switching off other possible criteria of demarcation (for example, those used in law, science, philosophy), such as sentient versus non-sentient, self-replicative versus non-self-replicative, moral versus amoral. Using such criteria, one could reasonably divide the world of actants into more refined categories, distinguishing sea scallops, let us say, from speed bumps (Latour's 'sleeping policemen': see B. Latour, 'Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts', in W. Bijker and J. Law (eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992], 225-58). Latour's ideas of 'mediation' and 'genealogy' between the people-world and the thing-world may begin to offer a way out of this problem: see B. Latour, On Technical Mediation - Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy', Common Knowledge, Vol. 3 (1994), 29-64, especially 38-40.
11. See, for example, Michel Callon, 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay', in John Law (ed.), Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 196-233. While this is not the place to make this argument in detail, I would like to note that Callon, Latour and others arrive at their notion of 'symmetry' by reducing the class of possible actors into two types: actors and actants, humans and non-humans. See, in particular, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). This simplification is achieved in part by switching off other possible criteria of demarcation (for example, those used in law, science, philosophy), such as sentient versus non-sentient, self-replicative versus non-self-replicative, moral versus amoral. Using such criteria, one could reasonably divide the world of actants into more refined categories, distinguishing sea scallops, let us say, from speed bumps (Latour's 'sleeping policemen': see B. Latour, 'Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts', in W. Bijker and J. Law (eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992], 225-58). Latour's ideas of 'mediation' and 'genealogy' between the people-world and the thing-world may begin to offer a way out of this problem: see B. Latour, On Technical Mediation - Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy', Common Knowledge, Vol. 3 (1994), 29-64, especially 38-40.
12. See, for example, Michel Callon, 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay', in John Law (ed.), Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 196-233. While this is not the place to make this argument in detail, I would like to note that Callon, Latour and others arrive at their notion of 'symmetry' by reducing the class of possible actors into two types: actors and actants, humans and non-humans. See, in particular, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). This simplification is achieved in part by switching off other possible criteria of demarcation (for example, those used in law, science, philosophy), such as sentient versus non-sentient, self-replicative versus non-self-replicative, moral versus amoral. Using such criteria, one could reasonably divide the world of actants into more refined categories, distinguishing sea scallops, let us say, from speed bumps (Latour's 'sleeping policemen': see B. Latour, 'Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts', in W. Bijker and J. Law (eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992], 225-58). Latour's ideas of 'mediation' and 'genealogy' between the people-world and the thing-world may begin to offer a way out of this problem: see B. Latour, On Technical Mediation - Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy', Common Knowledge, Vol. 3 (1994), 29-64, especially 38-40.
13. Pam Scott, Evelleen Richards and Brian Martin, 'Captives of Controversy: The Myth of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies,' Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), 474-94.
14. The latter issue, for instance, was addressed by Langdon Winner in his well-known example of the low overpasses designed for Westchester highways by Robert Moses to prevent buses from carrying poor city dwellers out to the wealthier suburbs: see L. Winner, 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?', in his The Whale and the Reactor (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 19-39.
15. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
16. B. Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
17. Donald MacKenzie. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
18. Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
19. Scott, Richards & Martin, op. cit. note 8; H.M. Collins, 'Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards and Martin', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 294-51; Martin, Richards & Scott, 'Who's a Captive? Who's a Victim? Response to Collins's Method Talk', ibid., 252-55; Collins, 'In Praise of Futile Gestures', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 229-44, this issue; Malcolm Ashmore, 'Ending Up on the Wrong Side', ibid., 305-22.
20. Scott, Richards & Martin, op. cit. note 8; H.M. Collins, 'Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards and Martin', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 294-51; Martin, Richards & Scott, 'Who's a Captive? Who's a Victim? Response to Collins's Method Talk', ibid., 252-55; Collins, 'In Praise of Futile Gestures', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 229-44, this issue; Malcolm Ashmore, 'Ending Up on the Wrong Side', ibid., 305-22.
21. Scott, Richards & Martin, op. cit. note 8; H.M. Collins, 'Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards and Martin', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 294-51; Martin, Richards & Scott, 'Who's a Captive? Who's a Victim? Response to Collins's Method Talk', ibid., 252-55; Collins, 'In Praise of Futile Gestures', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 229-44, this issue; Malcolm Ashmore, 'Ending Up on the Wrong Side', ibid., 305-22.
22. Scott, Richards & Martin, op. cit. note 8; H.M. Collins, 'Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards and Martin', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 294-51; Martin, Richards & Scott, 'Who's a Captive? Who's a Victim? Response to Collins's Method Talk', ibid., 252-55; Collins, 'In Praise of Futile Gestures', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 229-44, this issue; Malcolm Ashmore, 'Ending Up on the Wrong Side', ibid., 305-22.
23. Scott, Richards & Martin, op. cit. note 8; H.M. Collins, 'Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards and Martin', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 294-51; Martin, Richards & Scott, 'Who's a Captive? Who's a Victim? Response to Collins's Method Talk', ibid., 252-55; Collins, 'In Praise of Futile Gestures', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 229-44, this issue; Malcolm Ashmore, 'Ending Up on the Wrong Side', ibid., 305-22.
24. See, in this connection, Latour, op. cit. note 11; Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Michael Dennis, ' "Our First Line of Defense": Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State', Isis, Vol. 85 (1994), 427-55.
25. See, in this connection, Latour, op. cit. note 11; Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Michael Dennis, ' "Our First Line of Defense": Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State', Isis, Vol. 85 (1994), 427-55.
26. See, in this connection, Latour, op. cit. note 11; Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Michael Dennis, ' "Our First Line of Defense": Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State', Isis, Vol. 85 (1994), 427-55.
27. Geertz, arguing that interpretive anthropology is a 'science', insists that better accounts can be distinguished from worse ones. He calls this evaluative process 'appraisal' rather than 'verification': Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), especially 16-28.
28. For a sampling of this literature, see Steve Woolgar, Science: The Very Idea (London: Tavistock, 1988); Woolgar and M. Ashmore, 'The Next Step: An Introduction to the Reflexive Project', in Woolgar (ed.), Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Sage Publications, 1988), 1-11.
29. For a sampling of this literature, see Steve Woolgar, Science: The Very Idea (London: Tavistock, 1988); Woolgar and M. Ashmore, 'The Next Step: An Introduction to the Reflexive Project', in Woolgar (ed.), Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Sage Publications, 1988), 1-11.
30. For a rejoinder, see H.M. Collins and Steven Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26.
31. B. Latour, 'The Politics of Explanation: An Alternative', in Woolgar (ed.), Knowledge and Reflexivity, op. cit. note 17, 155-76.
32. Scott, Richards & Martin, op. cit. note 8, 490.
33. Collins, 'In Praise . . .', op. cit. note 14.
34. Ashmore, op. cit. note 14.
35. Brian Wynne, 'SSK's Identity Parade: Signing-Up, Off-and-On', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 357-91, this issue.
36. On America's decision-making culture, see for example Ronald Brickman, S. Jasanoff and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Brendan Gillespie, Dave Eva and Ron Johnston, 'Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of Aldrin/Dieldrin', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 265-301; Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, 'The Estrogen Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?', ibid., Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1984), 1-26; Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Jasanoff, 'Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States', in Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello (eds), The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk (New York: Reidel, 1987), 359-97.
37. On America's decision-making culture, see for example Ronald Brickman, S. Jasanoff and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Brendan Gillespie, Dave Eva and Ron Johnston, 'Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of Aldrin/Dieldrin', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 265-301; Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, 'The Estrogen Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?', ibid., Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1984), 1-26; Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Jasanoff, 'Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States', in Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello (eds), The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk (New York: Reidel, 1987), 359-97.
38. On America's decision-making culture, see for example Ronald Brickman, S. Jasanoff and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Brendan Gillespie, Dave Eva and Ron Johnston, 'Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of Aldrin/Dieldrin', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 265-301; Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, 'The Estrogen Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?', ibid., Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1984), 1-26; Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Jasanoff, 'Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States', in Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello (eds), The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk (New York: Reidel, 1987), 359-97.
39. On America's decision-making culture, see for example Ronald Brickman, S. Jasanoff and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Brendan Gillespie, Dave Eva and Ron Johnston, 'Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of Aldrin/Dieldrin', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 265-301; Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, 'The Estrogen Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?', ibid., Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1984), 1-26; Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Jasanoff, 'Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States', in Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello (eds), The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk (New York: Reidel, 1987), 359-97.
40. On America's decision-making culture, see for example Ronald Brickman, S. Jasanoff and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Brendan Gillespie, Dave Eva and Ron Johnston, 'Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of Aldrin/Dieldrin', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 265-301; Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, 'The Estrogen Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?', ibid., Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1984), 1-26; Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Jasanoff, 'Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States', in Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello (eds), The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk (New York: Reidel, 1987), 359-97.
41. See, for example, Bruce Bimber and David H. Guston, 'Politics By the Same Means: Government and Science in the United States', in S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Petersen and T. Pinch (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 554-71.
42. Carl Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Cranor served on California's Proposition 65 Scientific Advisory Panel from 1989 to 1992.
43. William Pease, 'When Scientists Become Policy Makers: Shaping Hazard Identification Under Proposition 65', Reproductive Toxicology, Vol. 5 (1991), 169-73; D.R. Mattison et al., 'In Reply', ibid., 175-78.
44. William Pease, 'When Scientists Become Policy Makers: Shaping Hazard Identification Under Proposition 65', Reproductive Toxicology, Vol. 5 (1991), 169-73; D.R. Mattison et al., 'In Reply', ibid., 175-78.
45. Pease, op. cit. note 26, 171.
46. Mattison et al., op. cit. note 26, 176-77.
47. The article in question was S. Jasanoff, 'American Exceptionalism and the Political Acknowledgment of Risk', Daedalus, Vol. 119, No. 4 (1990), 61-81. Besides misspelling my name and misquoting the text (cf. 'witch's brew' in place of 'witch's broth'), the ILSI authors evidently also misunderstood the point of the article. The important point for us here, however, was the rhetorical use to which they put it, and this is the issue I address here.
48. Mattison et al., op. cit. note 26 (my emphasis).
49. Jasanoff, op. cit. note 29, 72-73.
50. 125 L. Ed. 2d, 469 (1993).
51. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
52. 293 F. 1013, at 1014.
53. See, for example, Philip Hiall Dixon, 'Frye Standard of "General Acceptance" for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Rejected in Favor of Balancing Test', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 64 (1979), 875-85; Anon., 'Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence', George Washington Law Review, Vol. 48 (1980), 774-90; Mary W. Costley, 'Scientific Evidence - Fryed to a Crisp', South Texas Law Journal, Vol. 21 (1980), 62-79.
54. See, for example, Philip Hiall Dixon, 'Frye Standard of "General Acceptance" for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Rejected in Favor of Balancing Test', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 64 (1979), 875-85; Anon., 'Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence', George Washington Law Review, Vol. 48 (1980), 774-90; Mary W. Costley, 'Scientific Evidence - Fryed to a Crisp', South Texas Law Journal, Vol. 21 (1980), 62-79.
55. See, for example, Philip Hiall Dixon, 'Frye Standard of "General Acceptance" for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Rejected in Favor of Balancing Test', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 64 (1979), 875-85; Anon., 'Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence', George Washington Law Review, Vol. 48 (1980), 774-90; Mary W. Costley, 'Scientific Evidence - Fryed to a Crisp', South Texas Law Journal, Vol. 21 (1980), 62-79.
56. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405 (1977).
57. For some examples of such judicial demarcations, see S. Jasanoff, 'Judicial Reception of New Scientific Evidence', in Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Critical Perspectives on Nonacademic Science and Engineering (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1991), 215-38. See also, Jasanoff, op. cit. note 5.
58. For some examples of such judicial demarcations, see S. Jasanoff, 'Judicial Reception of New Scientific Evidence', in Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Critical Perspectives on Nonacademic Science and Engineering (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1991), 215-38. See also, Jasanoff, op. cit. note 5.
59. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2nd Cir. 1978).
60. S. Jasanoff, 'What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science', Jurimetrics, Vol. 32 (1992), 345-59; Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). The Commission also cited Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990).
61. S. Jasanoff, 'What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science', Jurimetrics, Vol. 32 (1992), 345-59; Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). The Commission also cited Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990).
62. S. Jasanoff, 'What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science', Jurimetrics, Vol. 32 (1992), 345-59; Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). The Commission also cited Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990).
63. 'Some philosophers and sociologists have gone so far as to assert that scientific "facts" are socially constructed hypotheses that contain value-laden choices' (Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1992, No. 92-102, 4; see also 14).
64. 125 L. Ed., at 483. The work the Court cited was Jasanoff, Fifth Branch, op. cit. note 39.
65. Significant efforts to narrow Daubert's interpretive flexibility include the following: Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein and Peter W. Huber, 'Science and the Toxic Tort', Science, Vol. 261 (17 September 1993), 1509, 1614 (decision represents 'an approach that scientists themselves might choose'); Ron Simon, 'High Court Throws Out Rigid Rules Excluding Scientific Evidence Says Focus Must Be on Methods, Principles', Toxics Law Reporter, Vol. 8 (1993), 5-11 (case favours plaintiffs and leads to 'appreciation that science is a very fluid process' [ibid., 10]); Bert Black, Francisco Ayala and Carol Saffran Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge', University of Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 753-85 (case invites judges to be rigorous in adopting the methods of science, as described and elaborated by the authors).
66. Significant efforts to narrow Daubert's interpretive flexibility include the following: Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein and Peter W. Huber, 'Science and the Toxic Tort', Science, Vol. 261 (17 September 1993), 1509, 1614 (decision represents 'an approach that scientists themselves might choose'); Ron Simon, 'High Court Throws Out Rigid Rules Excluding Scientific Evidence Says Focus Must Be on Methods, Principles', Toxics Law Reporter, Vol. 8 (1993), 5-11 (case favours plaintiffs and leads to 'appreciation that science is a very fluid process' [ibid., 10]); Bert Black, Francisco Ayala and Carol Saffran Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge', University of Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 753-85 (case invites judges to be rigorous in adopting the methods of science, as described and elaborated by the authors).
67. Significant efforts to narrow Daubert's interpretive flexibility include the following: Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein and Peter W. Huber, 'Science and the Toxic Tort', Science, Vol. 261 (17 September 1993), 1509, 1614 (decision represents 'an approach that scientists themselves might choose'); Ron Simon, 'High Court Throws Out Rigid Rules Excluding Scientific Evidence Says Focus Must Be on Methods, Principles', Toxics Law Reporter, Vol. 8 (1993), 5-11 (case favours plaintiffs and leads to 'appreciation that science is a very fluid process' [ibid., 10]); Bert Black, Francisco Ayala and Carol Saffran Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge', University of Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 753-85 (case invites judges to be rigorous in adopting the methods of science, as described and elaborated by the authors).
68. J.L. Heilbron, 'The Affair of the Countess Gorlitz', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 138 (1994), 284-316, especially 310-12. For a criticism of the Court's eclectic approach from a legal perspective, see Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217.
69. J.L. Heilbron, 'The Affair of the Countess Gorlitz', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 138 (1994), 284-316, especially 310-12. For a criticism of the Court's eclectic approach from a legal perspective, see Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217.
70. For some American views on this topic, see, for example, Gerald Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994). In Britain, the charge against SSK has been led by the noted biologist Lewis Wolpert, in his The Unnatural Nature of Science: Why Science Does Not Make (Common) Sense (London: Faber & Faber, 1992).
71. For some American views on this topic, see, for example, Gerald Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994). In Britain, the charge against SSK has been led by the noted biologist Lewis Wolpert, in his The Unnatural Nature of Science: Why Science Does Not Make (Common) Sense (London: Faber & Faber, 1992).
72. For some American views on this topic, see, for example, Gerald Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994). In Britain, the charge against SSK has been led by the noted biologist Lewis Wolpert, in his The Unnatural Nature of Science: Why Science Does Not Make (Common) Sense (London: Faber & Faber, 1992).
73. S. Jasanoff, 'Cooperation for What?: A View from the Sociological/Cultural Study of Science Policy', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May 1995), 314-17, quote at 316.
74. Geertz, op. cit. note 16, 314.
75. Roger Friedland and Robert A. Alford, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions', in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 251.
76. Latour, op. cit. note 18, 175. One has only to turn to the writings of feminist epistemologists such as Sandra Harding or Donna Haraway for powerful illustrations of this point.
77. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, Washington, DC, 6 June 1986.
78. Thomas F. Gieryn and Anne E. Figert, 'Ingredients for a Theory of Science in Society: O-Rings, Ice Water, C-Clamp, Richard Feynman, and the Press', in Susan E. Cozzens and Gieryn (eds), Theories of Science in Society (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 67-97.