Keeping up with the Joneses: Competition and the evolution of collusion

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 223-238

  Dixon, Huw David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Aspirations; Average payoff; C7; D4; Evolution; L13; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009649778     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00117-7     Document Type: Article

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