Why they fight: Hypotheses on the causes of contemporary deadly conflict

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 1-50

  Byman, Daniel ^a   Van Evera, Stephen ^b  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002256657     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429350     Document Type: Article

References (150)

1. Kim R. Holmes, "The New World Disorder," The Heritage Lectures no. 42, 22 October 1992.
2. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Noonday Press, 1993), 5. Daniel Schorr likewise noted in 1994 that the cold war's end had spawned "conflict and misery more horrible than the theoretical visions of superpower collision. The danger now is not bombs but people, people in rage against each other and people fleeing from the rage" (Daniel Schorr, "End of Cold War Leads to Ethnic Strife," 6 September 1992, broadcast on National Public Radio).
3. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Noonday Press, 1993), 5. Daniel Schorr likewise noted in 1994 that the cold war's end had spawned "conflict and misery more horrible than the theoretical visions of superpower collision. The danger now is not bombs but people, people in rage against each other and people fleeing from the rage" (Daniel Schorr, "End of Cold War Leads to Ethnic Strife," 6 September 1992, broadcast on National Public Radio).
4. We use the terms "civil war," "civil violence" and "civil conflict" interchangeably in this paper. By these terms we include political conflicts with the following attributes: (1) at least 1,000 deaths during the total span of the conflict; (2) the people involved in the violence are geographically contiguous (to exclude European colonial wars); and (3) the people involved are concerned about living together in the same political unit. This definition includes organized civil wars and also communal riots, pogroms, ethnic cleansing, and other instances where bloodshed was high but only one side was responsible for the killings while the other side (or sides) suffered disproportionately. This definition resembles the definitions other scholars use for civil war but is broader than two commonly accepted definitions - those of Roy Licklider and of J. David Singer and McIvin Small. See Roy Licklider, "How Civil Wars End," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 9, and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), 210. Licklider defines civil war to include "large-scale violence among geographically contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after the conflict." For Licklider, however, civil war must also involve multiple sovereignty - a fact that distinguishes civil wars from other types of domestic violence. We do not, however, include multiple sovereignty in our definition. In their definition of civil war, Singer and Small are careful to exclude both "regional internal war" - a situation where subnational governments clash - and communal violence, where there is no government. Our definition of civil conflict would include both of these phenomena. Small and Singer also limit the cases they examine to wars where over 1,000 people died in one year, while we also examine cases where 1,000 people died during the total span of the conflict.
5. We use the terms "civil war," "civil violence" and "civil conflict" interchangeably in this paper. By these terms we include political conflicts with the following attributes: (1) at least 1,000 deaths during the total span of the conflict; (2) the people involved in the violence are geographically contiguous (to exclude European colonial wars); and (3) the people involved are concerned about living together in the same political unit. This definition includes organized civil wars and also communal riots, pogroms, ethnic cleansing, and other instances where bloodshed was high but only one side was responsible for the killings while the other side (or sides) suffered disproportionately. This definition resembles the definitions other scholars use for civil war but is broader than two commonly accepted definitions - those of Roy Licklider and of J. David Singer and McIvin Small. See Roy Licklider, "How Civil Wars End," in Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 9, and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), 210. Licklider defines civil war to include "large-scale violence among geographically contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after the conflict." For Licklider, however, civil war must also involve multiple sovereignty - a fact that distinguishes civil wars from other types of domestic violence. We do not, however, include multiple sovereignty in our definition. In their definition of civil war, Singer and Small are careful to exclude both "regional internal war" - a situation where subnational governments clash - and communal violence, where there is no government. Our definition of civil conflict would include both of these phenomena. Small and Singer also limit the cases they examine to wars where over 1,000 people died in one year, while we also examine cases where 1,000 people died during the total span of the conflict.
6. For works on the politics of empire, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Dell, 1966); Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) . For an examination of the relationship between the collapse of empires and war, see Jonathan Ladinsky, "After the Fall: The Collapse of Empires and the Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, forthcoming).
7. For works on the politics of empire, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Dell, 1966); Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) . For an examination of the relationship between the collapse of empires and war, see Jonathan Ladinsky, "After the Fall: The Collapse of Empires and the Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, forthcoming).
8. For works on the politics of empire, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Dell, 1966); Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) . For an examination of the relationship between the collapse of empires and war, see Jonathan Ladinsky, "After the Fall: The Collapse of Empires and the Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, forthcoming).
9. For works on the politics of empire, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Dell, 1966); Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) . For an examination of the relationship between the collapse of empires and war, see Jonathan Ladinsky, "After the Fall: The Collapse of Empires and the Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, forthcoming).
10. For works on the politics of empire, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Dell, 1966); Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) . For an examination of the relationship between the collapse of empires and war, see Jonathan Ladinsky, "After the Fall: The Collapse of Empires and the Causes of War" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, forthcoming).
11. The "reform trap" is similar to the "King's dilemma" analyzed definitively by Samuel Huntington. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 177-91. Huntington argues that a traditional leader seeking to modernize may inadvertently create instability that, in the end, causes the collapse of the traditional order.
12. We use the term "communal" in this essay to encompass ethnic, religious, tribal, and linguistic groups. A communal group is a group of people bound together by a belief of common heritage and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, perceived kinship ties, language, and history. Examples of communal groups are Turks (a common language, perceptions of a shared history) and Jews (belief in common ancestry reinforced by a common religion and history). Large tribal groups and clans that perceive themselves as having a common identity fall under this category as well.
13. We examine all the instances of widespread civil violence active after the end of the cold war. For the purposes of this article, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marks the end of the cold war. Any widespread civil violence that broke out after that point is examined in this study.
14. Our count was compiled primarily from descriptions in The Europa World Book series, the Economist , the New York Times, Jane's Intelligence Review, articles in academic journals such as Problems of Communism, Conflict Studies, and Current History, and selected works noted specifically in the text. We also drew on Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (August 1996): 353-70; Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945 (New York: Vintage, 1990); Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publicaitons, 1996); SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996).
15. Our count was compiled primarily from descriptions in The Europa World Book series, the Economist , the New York Times, Jane's Intelligence Review, articles in academic journals such as Problems of Communism, Conflict Studies, and Current History, and selected works noted specifically in the text. We also drew on Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (August 1996): 353-70; Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945 (New York: Vintage, 1990); Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publicaitons, 1996); SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996).
16. Our count was compiled primarily from descriptions in The Europa World Book series, the Economist , the New York Times, Jane's Intelligence Review, articles in academic journals such as Problems of Communism, Conflict Studies, and Current History, and selected works noted specifically in the text. We also drew on Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (August 1996): 353-70; Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945 (New York: Vintage, 1990); Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publicaitons, 1996); SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996).
17. Our count was compiled primarily from descriptions in The Europa World Book series, the Economist , the New York Times, Jane's Intelligence Review, articles in academic journals such as Problems of Communism, Conflict Studies, and Current History, and selected works noted specifically in the text. We also drew on Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (August 1996): 353-70; Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945 (New York: Vintage, 1990); Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publicaitons, 1996); SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996).
18. Our count was compiled primarily from descriptions in The Europa World Book series, the Economist , the New York Times, Jane's Intelligence Review, articles in academic journals such as Problems of Communism, Conflict Studies, and Current History, and selected works noted specifically in the text. We also drew on Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (August 1996): 353-70; Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945 (New York: Vintage, 1990); Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publicaitons, 1996); SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996).
19. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" table 2 on p. 354. Their war-count is higher than ours because they count war-dyads instead of states with wars and because they use a more inclusive definition of civil conflict than we do, including some minor wars involving fewer than 1,000 total deaths.
20. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 248.
21. Refugee flows are a crude measure of civil violence. One important measure of refugees - internally displaced refugees - is not listed here though a more complete account of refugee totals would include these individuals. Civil wars often generate massive refugee flows within a country's borders, as individuals flee areas of fighting for relatively safer regions. Historic data on such flows, however, are incomplete and probably would be misleading for comparison purposes, as flows in wealthier states that receive more media attention are more likely to be recorded. Moreover, refugees often remain in the country of refuge even after a civil war in their country of origin ends. Furthermore, many refugees flee for economic reasons, not because of civil violence. Refugee flow data also may be biased due to changes in the policies of receiving states, which may take fewer refugees even though the number of people wanting to flee remains unchanged. In general, however, there is a high correlation between internal wars, particularly ethnic conflicts, and refugee flows. See Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security 21, no. 1 (summer 1996): 5-42.
22. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
23. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
24. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
25. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
26. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
27. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
28. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
29. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
30. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "The End of International War?" 354. Wallensteen and Sollenberg also classify several wars as "intrastate with foreign intervention" and count them as follows: one in 1989, two in 1990, one in 1991, two in 1992, four in 1993, and none in 1994 and 1995 (ibid.). For other works noting the importance of internal conflict since the end of the cold war, see Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-77; Stephen R. David, "Internal War Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997): 552-76; Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence, Human Rights Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Good discussions of the interplay between international conflict and internal conflict can be found in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder Westview, 1994); and Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
31. The count of recent civil wars by Wayman, Singer, and Sarkees is lower than ours because they define civil war more restrictively than we do. See Frank Whelon Wayman, J. David Singer, and Meredith Sarkees, "Intra-State, and Extra-Systemic Wars, 1816-1995" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, Calif., April 1996), Table 1, 10.
32. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
33. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
34. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
35. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
36. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
37. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
38. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
39. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
40. Scholarly work on the causes of civil conflict is vast. Recent works include Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-75; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 108-38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41-75; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 103-24; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 5-39. Classic works of value on internal war include Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa" in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview, 1985).
41. For a complete treatment of the relationship between the collapse of empire and the outbreak of war, see Ladinsky, "After the Fall."
42. Thus Kim Holmes notes that "we have witnessed the collapse of the world's greatest land empire. As with the demise of other great empires in history - whether they be Spanish, French, Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, Germany, or British - war is the fruit of disorder" (Holmes, "The New World Disorder").
43. Due to this illegitimacy problem, some parts of the Soviet empire resisted the empire's collapse.
44. See Barnett Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," Survival 35, no. 4 (winter 1993-1994): 71-91; and "Tajikistan: Islam wins," Economist, 21 October 1992, 32.
45. See Barnett Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," Survival 35, no. 4 (winter 1993-1994): 71-91; and "Tajikistan: Islam wins," Economist, 21 October 1992, 32.
46. For an analysis of minority tension in the Georgian quest for independence, see Darrell Slider, "The Politics of Georgia's Independence," Problems of Communism 40, no. 6 (November 1991): 63-79.
47. V. Solnar, "Hatred and fear on both banks of the Dniester," New Times International, no. 14 (April 1992): 8-9; and William Crowther, "Moldova after Independence," Current History 93, no. 585 (October 1994): 342-47. The Gagauzi, a Turkic-speaking, Orthodox Christian people from Bulgaria, also resisted incorporation into the new state and proclaimed their independence.
48. V. Solnar, "Hatred and fear on both banks of the Dniester," New Times International, no. 14 (April 1992): 8-9; and William Crowther, "Moldova after Independence," Current History 93, no. 585 (October 1994): 342-47. The Gagauzi, a Turkic-speaking, Orthodox Christian people from Bulgaria, also resisted incorporation into the new state and proclaimed their independence.
49. See Mark Saroyan, "The 'Karabakh Syndrome' and Azerbaijani Politics," Problems of Communism 39, no. 5 (September 1990): 14-29, for information on the origins of the conflict in Azerbaijan. For background on the conflict in Chechnya, see Christopher Panico, Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia's War in Chechnya, Conflict Studies no. 281 (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995).
50. See Mark Saroyan, "The 'Karabakh Syndrome' and Azerbaijani Politics," Problems of Communism 39, no. 5 (September 1990): 14-29, for information on the origins of the conflict in Azerbaijan. For background on the conflict in Chechnya, see Christopher Panico, Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia's War in Chechnya, Conflict Studies no. 281 (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995).
51. See Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," 75-78.
52. For an assessment of these divisions on conflict in Georgia, see "Georgia: Unholy Trinity," New Statesman and Society 5, no. 219, 11 September 1992, 19-20; and "Georgia: Tearing Apart," Economist, 3 October 1992, 55.
53. For an assessment of these divisions on conflict in Georgia, see "Georgia: Unholy Trinity," New Statesman and Society 5, no. 219, 11 September 1992, 19-20; and "Georgia: Tearing Apart," Economist, 3 October 1992, 55.
54. At the conference, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck "continually warned the representatives of the Great Powers that their principal business was to reach a settlement among themselves and not to worry unduly about the happiness of lesser breeds without the law" (Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], 112). For more on the European role in the creation of borders in Africa, see Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (New York: Avon, 1991).
55. At the conference, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck "continually warned the representatives of the Great Powers that their principal business was to reach a settlement among themselves and not to worry unduly about the happiness of lesser breeds without the law" (Gordon A. Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], 112). For more on the European role in the creation of borders in Africa, see Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (New York: Avon, 1991).
56. "Azerbaijan," Europa World Book 1994 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1993), 438-40.
57. For works noting the importance of the security dilemma, see Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict"; James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995); Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars"; and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1994).
58. For works noting the importance of the security dilemma, see Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict"; James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995); Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars"; and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1994).
59. For works noting the importance of the security dilemma, see Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict"; James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995); Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars"; and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1994).
60. For works noting the importance of the security dilemma, see Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict"; James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995); Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars"; and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1994).
61. Bruce D. Porter, "A Country Instead of a Cause: Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era," in Order and Disorder after the Cold War, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 7-8.
62. Although accurate information is scarce, it appears that local Russian forces - perhaps with encouragement from Moscow - aided Ossetian and Abkhaz separatists in their struggle against Georgian forces.
63. A good account of this process is David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modem Middle East (New York: Avon, 1990).
64. See Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan."
65. An illegitimate regime is one broadly believed by the public to have lost its right to rule because of its perceived failure to provide for the common good.
66. Defeat in a war can also cause a government to lose its legitimacy. The dearth of international war in the post-cold war period, however, has reduced the importance of this cause of regime legitimacy loss.
67. Peter W. Rodman, More Precious Than Peace (New York: Scribner's, 1994), 532-33. Rodman notes that Syria's dictator Hafez al-Asad was equated with Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucsescu and East Germany's Erich Honecker. Similarly, the collapse of Eastern European regimes strengthened African democratic forces and disheartened Africa's autocrats. See Copson, Africa's Wars in the 1990s, 167. For information on the impact of the spread of the liberal democratic model, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
68. Peter W. Rodman, More Precious Than Peace (New York: Scribner's, 1994), 532-33. Rodman notes that Syria's dictator Hafez al-Asad was equated with Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucsescu and East Germany's Erich Honecker. Similarly, the collapse of Eastern European regimes strengthened African democratic forces and disheartened Africa's autocrats. See Copson, Africa's Wars in the 1990s, 167. For information on the impact of the spread of the liberal democratic model, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
69. Peter W. Rodman, More Precious Than Peace (New York: Scribner's, 1994), 532-33. Rodman notes that Syria's dictator Hafez al-Asad was equated with Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucsescu and East Germany's Erich Honecker. Similarly, the collapse of Eastern European regimes strengthened African democratic forces and disheartened Africa's autocrats. See Copson, Africa's Wars in the 1990s, 167. For information on the impact of the spread of the liberal democratic model, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
70. George Joffe, "Yemen - The Reasons for Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review (August 1994): 369; John P. Entelis, "The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of Algeria," Problems of Communism 41, no. 3 (May 1992): 71-82.
71. George Joffe, "Yemen - The Reasons for Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review (August 1994): 369; John P. Entelis, "The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of Algeria," Problems of Communism 41, no. 3 (May 1992): 71-82.
72. Corruption often comes with a lack of accountability. In Pakistan and the Philippines, for example, widespread corruption has discredited governments and led to the growth of opposition movements. Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos stole with such abandon that he became one of Asia's most wealthy men before he was ousted in 1986. In 1996 Transparency International ranked Pakistan the second most corrupt country in the world after Nigeria. New York Times, 28 November 1996, C1.
73. In short, regime accountability often determines whether "voice" is expressed in ballots or bullets. The definitive description of this tradeoff remains Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
74. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 62-80; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, exp. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 27-63.
75. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 62-80; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, exp. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 27-63.
76. Regime responses to legitimacy loss are not limited to democratizing and hunkering down. Regimes at time promote economic reform to recover their legitimacy. Other, bloodier, alternatives include provoking an international conflict and blaming problems on minorities or other scapegoats at home.
77. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26-34. The fear of the FLN was not without some merit. For discussions of why Algeria's leaders were reluctant to surrender power and doubted the good faith of the Islamists, see " Shooting or voting for Islam," Economist, 28 August 1993, 39; and Claire Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis," Survival 36, no. 2 (summer 1994): 149-63. For an overview on the general question of the tension between democratic ideals and Islamic movements, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). The authors discuss Algeria on pages 151-72.
78. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26-34. The fear of the FLN was not without some merit. For discussions of why Algeria's leaders were reluctant to surrender power and doubted the good faith of the Islamists, see " Shooting or voting for Islam," Economist, 28 August 1993, 39; and Claire Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis," Survival 36, no. 2 (summer 1994): 149-63. For an overview on the general question of the tension between democratic ideals and Islamic movements, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). The authors discuss Algeria on pages 151-72.
79. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26-34. The fear of the FLN was not without some merit. For discussions of why Algeria's leaders were reluctant to surrender power and doubted the good faith of the Islamists, see " Shooting or voting for Islam," Economist, 28 August 1993, 39; and Claire Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis," Survival 36, no. 2 (summer 1994): 149-63. For an overview on the general question of the tension between democratic ideals and Islamic movements, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). The authors discuss Algeria on pages 151-72.
80. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26-34. The fear of the FLN was not without some merit. For discussions of why Algeria's leaders were reluctant to surrender power and doubted the good faith of the Islamists, see " Shooting or voting for Islam," Economist, 28 August 1993, 39; and Claire Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis," Survival 36, no. 2 (summer 1994): 149-63. For an overview on the general question of the tension between democratic ideals and Islamic movements, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). The authors discuss Algeria on pages 151-72.
81. Discussion of majority tyranny traces back to James Madison, "The Same Subject Continued..." (Federalist no. 10), The Federalist Papers, intro. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 77-84. Madison discusses the risks that arise when "a majority is included in a faction" (80) and the dangers of tyranny by "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" (77). Discussing remedies are Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), 491-509; Kenneth D. McRae, "Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management," in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 93-106; Jurg Steiner, "Power-Sharing: Another Swiss 'Export Product'?" in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 107-14; and Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 34-45, 58-63.
82. Discussion of majority tyranny traces back to James Madison, "The Same Subject Continued..." (Federalist no. 10), The Federalist Papers, intro. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 77-84. Madison discusses the risks that arise when "a majority is included in a faction" (80) and the dangers of tyranny by "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" (77). Discussing remedies are Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in
83. Discussion of majority tyranny traces back to James Madison, "The Same Subject Continued..." (Federalist no. 10), The Federalist Papers, intro. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 77-84. Madison discusses the risks that arise when "a majority is included in a faction" (80) and the dangers of tyranny by "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" (77). Discussing remedies are Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), 491-509; Kenneth D. McRae, "Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management," in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 93-106; Jurg Steiner, "Power-Sharing: Another Swiss 'Export Product'?" in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 107-14; and Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 34-45, 58-63.
84. Discussion of majority tyranny traces back to James Madison, "The Same Subject Continued..." (Federalist no. 10), The Federalist Papers, intro. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 77-84. Madison discusses the risks that arise when "a majority is included in a faction" (80) and the dangers of tyranny by "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" (77). Discussing remedies are Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), 491-509; Kenneth D. McRae, "Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management," in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 93-106; Jurg Steiner, "Power-Sharing: Another Swiss 'Export Product'?" in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 107-14; and Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 34-45, 58-63.
85. Discussion of majority tyranny traces back to James Madison, "The Same Subject Continued..." (Federalist no. 10), The Federalist Papers, intro. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 77-84. Madison discusses the risks that arise when "a majority is included in a faction" (80) and the dangers of tyranny by "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" (77). Discussing remedies are Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), 491-509; Kenneth D. McRae, "Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management," in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 93-106; Jurg Steiner, "Power-Sharing: Another Swiss 'Export Product'?" in Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking, 107-14; and Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 34-45, 58-63.
86. An account is Brogan, Fighting Never Stopped, 227-34.
87. Joffee, "Yemen - The Reasons for Conflict," 370-71.
88. The road to democracy contains other potential perils. In their work discussing the relationship between democratization and interstate war, Mansfield and Snyder note that the initial stage of democratization is extremely dangerous for several reasons. First, threatened elites from the autocratic regime often use chauvinistic rhetoric as they compete for allies among the populace. Second, social groups that might be losers in a mature democracy often manipulate information and otherwise distort the democratic process. Third, a lack of strong institutions - the checks and balances that places power in the hands of a responsible, well-informed voter - can further increase the chances of war. All these reasons why democratization can cause interstate war apply to internal conflict as well. Elites' chauvinistic rhetoric can be targeted at ethnic minorities, particularly if they are traditional enemies, as well as other countries. Beleaguered social groups often manipulate information and demonize their opponents, making power-sharing extremely difficult. The lack of strong institutions can allow a small number of individuals to take the steps necessary to bring about internal war. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 5-38.
89. On Sierra Leone, see Christopher Clapham "Recent History," Europa World Book Africa 1995 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1994), 803-7.
90. Angola's recent return to violence in 1992 illustrates the other side of this coin. There UNITA, the leading opposition group, expected to defeat the government in elections and returned to violence when it lost. For articles that note Savimbi's reluctance to accept the obvious verdict of the polls, see Alex Vines, Angola and Mozambique: Aftermath of Conflict, Conflict Studies 280 (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995); and Andrew Meldrum, "Lessons from Angola," Africa Report 38, no. 1 (January-February 1993): 22-24.
91. Angola's recent return to violence in 1992 illustrates the other side of this coin. There UNITA, the leading opposition group, expected to defeat the government in elections and returned to violence when it lost. For articles that note Savimbi's reluctance to accept the obvious verdict of the polls, see Alex Vines, Angola and Mozambique: Aftermath of Conflict, Conflict Studies 280 (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995); and Andrew Meldrum, "Lessons from Angola," Africa Report 38, no. 1 (January-February 1993): 22-24.
92. Such a tension is common in collapsed empires. As noted above, the governments of the successor states often lack legitimacy and thus face the choice of democratizing to try to gain popular support or hunkering down if they fear popular rejection. Furthermore, many former empires, including both the Yugoslav and the Soviet Empire, often contain hostile minorities. Thus, the polarization that makes democratization extremely difficult often is present.
93. A weak state is one that lacks financial, military, and institutional resources to implement its policies. For works that note the importance of the strength of the state, see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the Statt Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
94. A weak state is one that lacks financial, military, and institutional resources to implement its policies. For works that note the importance of the strength of the state, see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the Statt Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
95. A weak state is one that lacks financial, military, and institutional resources to implement its policies. For works that note the importance of the strength of the state, see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the Statt Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
96. One traditionally important cause of government weakness is defeat in an international war. In the post-cold war period, however, only the Iraqi case fits this pattern - an unsurprising development given the overall dearth of international conflict in this period. The Second World War era conflicts in Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Greece, however, are examples of how an international conflict can weaken (or remove) state governments, thus catalyzing groups for civil conflict.
97. Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 12.
98. For a discussion of the impact of the Gulf War on Iraqi Shi'a, see Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 273-81. For a detailed analysis of political Shi'ism in Iraq, see Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1992).
99. For a discussion of the impact of the Gulf War on Iraqi Shi'a, see Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 273-81. For a detailed analysis of political Shi'ism in Iraq, see Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1992).
100. If governments can win elites to their side and prevent them from encouraging conflict, fighting may be mitigated despite widespread hostility on the part of the population at large. Robert Dahl notes the importance of political activists in the stability of a system. See Democracy and Its Critics, 261.
101. Patrick Gilkes, "Somalia: Recent History," Europa World Book 1995 (London: Europa Publications, 1994), 820-26.
102. As Owen Harries noted at the end of the cold war, "Third World countries no longer have a ready-made, automatic way of linking themselves to the central issues of world politics - as counters in a game, as trophies to be won, or as reluctant neutrals to be seduced" (quoted in Peter Rodman, More Precious Than Peace, 528).
103. These estimates of arms deliveries were taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985), 45; World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1989), 120; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995), 153.
104. These estimates of arms deliveries were taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985), 45; World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1989), 120; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995), 153.
105. These estimates of arms deliveries were taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985), 45; World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1989), 120; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995), 153.
106. Copson, Africa's Wars and the Prospects for Peace, 158.
107. Raymond Bonner and Howard W. French, "Rebel Army Captured Zaire in T-Shirts and Tennis Shoes," New York Times, 19 May 1997, A1.
108. Swadesh Rana, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, UNIDIR Research Paper no. 34, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (1995).
109. In Bangladesh the Chittagong Hills peoples have faced constant attempts at hegemony by the Bengali majority. Bangladesh's first President Mujibur Rahman once declared, "Forget your ethnic identity; be Bengalis." See "Bangladesh: Chittagong Chatter," Economist, 14 November 1992, 38. A Bangladeshi army commander in the area had similarly noted, "We want the Soil but not the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts." Richard A. Gray: "Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh," RSR: Reference Services Review 22, no. 4 (winter 1994): 59-80. For works that address the tragedy in Rwanda and the role of a supremacist racial ideology, see Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no. 591 (1995): 156-61; James Fenton, "The Rwanda Crisis," New York Review of Books 43, no. 3, 15 February 1996, 7-9; and Robert Block, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," New York Review of Books 31, no. 17, 20 October 1994, 3-8. For an interesting analysis of Hindu fundamentalism in India, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Hindu Fundamentalism and the Structural Stability of India," in Martin E. Marry and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
110. In Bangladesh the Chittagong Hills peoples have faced constant attempts at hegemony by the Bengali majority. Bangladesh's first President Mujibur Rahman once declared, "Forget your ethnic identity; be Bengalis." See "Bangladesh: Chittagong Chatter," Economist, 14 November 1992, 38. A Bangladeshi army commander in the area had similarly noted, "We want the Soil but not the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts." Richard A. Gray: "Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh," RSR: Reference Services Review 22, no. 4 (winter 1994): 59-80. For works that address the tragedy in Rwanda and the role of a supremacist racial ideology, see Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no. 591 (1995): 156-61; James Fenton, "The Rwanda Crisis," New York Review of Books 43, no. 3, 15 February 1996, 7-9; and Robert Block, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," New York Review of Books 31, no. 17, 20 October 1994, 3-8. For an interesting analysis of Hindu fundamentalism in India, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Hindu Fundamentalism and the Structural Stability of India," in Martin E. Marry and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
111. In Bangladesh the Chittagong Hills peoples have faced constant attempts at hegemony by the Bengali majority. Bangladesh's first President Mujibur Rahman once declared, "Forget your ethnic identity; be Bengalis." See "Bangladesh: Chittagong Chatter," Economist, 14 November 1992, 38. A Bangladeshi army commander in the area had similarly noted, "We want the Soil but not the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts." Richard A. Gray: "Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh," RSR: Reference Services Review 22, no. 4 (winter 1994): 59-80. For works that address the tragedy in Rwanda and the role of a supremacist racial ideology, see Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no. 591 (1995): 156-61; James Fenton, "The Rwanda Crisis," New York Review of Books 43, no. 3, 15 February 1996, 7-9; and Robert Block, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," New York Review of Books 31, no. 17, 20 October 1994, 3-8. For an interesting analysis of Hindu fundamentalism in India, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Hindu Fundamentalism and the Structural Stability of India," in Martin E. Marry and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
112. In Bangladesh the Chittagong Hills peoples have faced constant attempts at hegemony by the Bengali majority. Bangladesh's first President Mujibur Rahman once declared, "Forget your ethnic identity; be Bengalis." See "Bangladesh: Chittagong Chatter," Economist, 14 November 1992, 38. A Bangladeshi army commander in the area had similarly noted, "We want the Soil but not the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts." Richard A. Gray: "Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh," RSR: Reference Services Review 22, no. 4 (winter 1994): 59-80. For works that address the tragedy in Rwanda and the role of a supremacist racial ideology, see Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no. 591 (1995): 156-61; James Fenton, "The Rwanda Crisis," New York Review of Books 43, no. 3, 15 February 1996, 7-9; and Robert Block, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," New York Review of Books 31, no. 17, 20 October 1994, 3-8. For an interesting analysis of Hindu fundamentalism in India, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Hindu Fundamentalism and the Structural Stability of India," in Martin E. Marry and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
113. In Bangladesh the Chittagong Hills peoples have faced constant attempts at hegemony by the Bengali majority. Bangladesh's first President Mujibur Rahman once declared, "Forget your ethnic identity; be Bengalis." See "Bangladesh: Chittagong Chatter," Economist, 14 November 1992, 38. A Bangladeshi army commander in the area had similarly noted, "We want the Soil but not the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts." Richard A. Gray: "Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh," RSR: Reference Services Review 22, no. 4 (winter 1994): 59-80. For works that address the tragedy in Rwanda and the role of a supremacist racial ideology, see Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no. 591 (1995): 156-61; James Fenton, "The Rwanda Crisis," New York Review of Books 43, no. 3, 15 February 1996, 7-9; and Robert Block, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," New York Review of Books 31, no. 17, 20 October 1994, 3-8. For an interesting analysis of Hindu fundamentalism in India, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Hindu Fundamentalism and the Structural Stability of India," in Martin E. Marry and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
114. In Bangladesh the Chittagong Hills peoples have faced constant attempts at hegemony by the Bengali majority. Bangladesh's first President Mujibur Rahman once declared, "Forget your ethnic identity; be Bengalis." See "Bangladesh: Chittagong Chatter," Economist, 14 November 1992, 38. A Bangladeshi army commander in the area had similarly noted, "We want the Soil but not the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts." Richard A. Gray: "Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh," RSR: Reference Services Review 22, no. 4 (winter 1994): 59-80. For works that address the tragedy in Rwanda and the role of a supremacist racial ideology, see Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no. 591 (1995): 156-61; James Fenton, "The Rwanda Crisis," New York Review of Books 43, no. 3, 15 February 1996, 7-9; and Robert Block, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," New York Review of Books 31, no. 17, 20 October 1994, 3-8. For an interesting analysis of Hindu fundamentalism in India, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Hindu Fundamentalism and the Structural Stability of India," in Martin E. Marry and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
115. For example, Ismet Inonu, president from 1938 to 1950, was said to be a Kurd as was Admiral Fehmi Koruturk, who also became president. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 405-6.
116. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 153-54. Whether group members are willing to change their identity depends heavily on the emotional strength and malleability of this identity in the first place - factors that vary from culture to culture. Past suffering and discrimination increases emotional ties to the identity. The weight of many deaths is yet another attachment that individuals will form to their communal identity. A strong culture, particularly a written record, reduces the malleability of the identity by reducing the flexibility of its symbols. Obviously, even a written text can have many meanings, but it is open to far fewer interpretations than an oral tradition. Identity is not always fixed. In Nigeria the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of elites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Walker Connor proposes a reasonable middle ground: that identities are social constructs but are solid ones, reinforced by both culture and psychology, making them extremely hard to change. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
117. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 153-54. Whether group members are willing to change their identity depends heavily on the emotional strength and malleability of this identity in the first place - factors that vary from culture to culture. Past suffering and discrimination increases emotional ties to the identity. The weight of many deaths is yet another attachment that individuals will form to their communal identity. A strong culture, particularly a written record, reduces the malleability of the identity by reducing the flexibility of its symbols. Obviously, even a written text can have many meanings, but it is open to far fewer interpretations than an oral tradition. Identity is not always fixed. In Nigeria the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of elites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Walker Connor proposes a reasonable middle ground: that identities are social constructs but are solid ones, reinforced by both culture and psychology, making them extremely hard to change. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
118. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 153-54. Whether group members are willing to change their identity depends heavily on the emotional strength and malleability of this identity in the first place - factors that vary from culture to culture. Past suffering and discrimination increases emotional ties to the identity. The weight of many deaths is yet another attachment that individuals will form to their communal identity. A strong culture, particularly a written record, reduces the malleability of the identity by reducing the flexibility of its symbols. Obviously, even a written text can have many meanings, but it is open to far fewer interpretations than an oral tradition. Identity is not always fixed. In Nigeria the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of elites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Walker Connor proposes a reasonable middle ground: that identities are social constructs but are solid ones, reinforced by both culture and psychology, making them extremely hard to change. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
119. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 153-54. Whether group members are willing to change their identity depends heavily on the emotional strength and malleability of this identity in the first place - factors that vary from culture to culture. Past suffering and discrimination increases emotional ties to the identity. The weight of many deaths is yet another attachment that individuals will form to their communal identity. A strong culture, particularly a written record, reduces the malleability of the identity by reducing the flexibility of its symbols. Obviously, even a written text can have many meanings, but it is open to far fewer interpretations than an oral tradition. Identity is not always fixed. In Nigeria the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of elites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Walker Connor proposes a reasonable middle ground: that identities are social constructs but are solid ones, reinforced by both culture and psychology, making them extremely hard to change. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
120. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 153-54. Whether group members are willing to change their identity depends heavily on the emotional strength and malleability of this identity in the first place - factors that vary from culture to culture. Past suffering and discrimination increases emotional ties to the identity. The weight of many deaths is yet another attachment that individuals will form to their communal identity. A strong culture, particularly a written record, reduces the malleability of the identity by reducing the flexibility of its symbols. Obviously, even a written text can have many meanings, but it is open to far fewer interpretations than an oral tradition. Identity is not always fixed. In Nigeria the colonial power, by recognizing certain identities as salient, reinforced them and gave a certain set of elites political power. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 285-316. Other scholars who endorse the view that ethnic identity can be manipulated include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Walker Connor proposes a reasonable middle ground: that identities are social constructs but are solid ones, reinforced by both culture and psychology, making them extremely hard to change. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
121. Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Athlone, 1993), 160.
122. A revolutionary ideology is one that seeks to impose a new social order and concept of society on a nation or on the entire world.
123. One source estimates that the Soviet regime murdered nearly 62 million people and that the Chinese communist regime was responsible for over 35 million deaths, figures so staggering as to almost defy comprehension. Rummel, Death by Government, 79-110. For more on the killing in Stalinist Russia, see Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
124. One source estimates that the Soviet regime murdered nearly 62 million people and that the Chinese communist regime was responsible for over 35 million deaths, figures so staggering as to almost defy comprehension. Rummel, Death by Government, 79-110. For more on the killing in Stalinist Russia, see Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
125. Many religious groups have agendas that are more communal than ideological. Hamas, for example, organizes itself with a religious idiom, but its primary goals - the establishment of a Muslim-dominated Palestinian state to replace Israel - reflects a strong communal component as well as a new vision of society. Other Islamic groups, such as Hizballah in Lebanon and Shi'a movements in Iraq, share this communal emphasis.
126. Accounts of the war in El Salvador include William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and the Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); and Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: Westview, 1994). Accounts on Guatemala include Sheldon H. Davis, "State Violence and Agrarian Crisis in Guatemala: The Roots of the Indian-Peasant Revolt," in Trouble in our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, ed. Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 155-72; and Suzanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S. Power (Westview: Boulder, 1991). On the Philippines, see James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992).
127. Accounts of the war in El Salvador include William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and the Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); and Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: Westview, 1994). Accounts on Guatemala include Sheldon H. Davis, "State Violence and Agrarian Crisis in Guatemala: The Roots of the Indian-Peasant Revolt," in Trouble in our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, ed. Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 155-72; and Suzanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S. Power (Westview: Boulder, 1991). On the Philippines, see James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992).
128. Accounts of the war in El Salvador include William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and the Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); and Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: Westview, 1994). Accounts on Guatemala include Sheldon H. Davis, "State Violence and Agrarian Crisis in Guatemala: The Roots of the Indian-Peasant Revolt," in Trouble in our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, ed. Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 155-72; and Suzanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S. Power (Westview: Boulder, 1991). On the Philippines, see James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992).
129. Accounts of the war in El Salvador include William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and the Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); and Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: Westview, 1994). Accounts on Guatemala include Sheldon H. Davis, "State Violence and Agrarian Crisis in Guatemala: The Roots of the Indian-Peasant Revolt," in Trouble in our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, ed. Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 155-72; and Suzanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S. Power (Westview: Boulder, 1991). On the Philippines, see James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992).
130. Accounts of the war in El Salvador include William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and the Civil War in El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); and Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: Westview, 1994). Accounts on Guatemala include Sheldon H. Davis, "State Violence and Agrarian Crisis in Guatemala: The Roots of the Indian-Peasant Revolt," in Trouble in our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties, ed. Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 155-72; and Suzanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S. Power (Westview: Boulder, 1991). On the Philippines, see James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992).
131. On the 1996 El Salvador election, see Tommie Sue Montgomery, "El Salvador's Extraordinary Elections," LASA Forum 28, no. 1 (spring 1997): 4-8
132. The superpowers were not the only countries to use proxies to further their ends. China supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Israel and Syria aided factions in Lebanon, and Iran backed Shi'a groups around the world. The apartheid regime of South Africa was particularly active, supporting antigovernment groups in Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola as part of its effort to ensure white hegemony.
133. For an account of the war in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia, see Peter J. Schraeder, "Paramilitary Intervention," in Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Intervention Into the 1990s, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 131-51 at 137-49.
134. Accounts include Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 887-965; Brogan, Fighting Never Stopped, 117-29.
135. Accounts include Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 887-965; Brogan, Fighting Never Stopped, 117-29.
136. A synopsis is Timothy D. Sisk, "Angola," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations 1, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 79-81. A longer account is Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 502-37.
137. A synopsis is Timothy D. Sisk, "Angola," in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations 1, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 79-81. A longer account is Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 502-37.
138. An account is John McAuliff and Mary Byrne McDonnell, "The Cambodian Stalemate: America's Obstructionist Role in Indochina," World Policy Journal 7, no. 1 (winter 1989-90): 71-106.
139. See Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador; Brogan, Fighting Never Stopped, 414-25.
140. See Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador; Brogan, Fighting Never Stopped, 414-25.
141. An account is Brogan, Fighting Never Stopped, 27-38.
142. Further research on all seven of these causes is necessary for a complete understanding of their relationship to civil violence and to one another. Determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the operation of each cause is a first step. Work on how to make more nebulous causes such as "a lack of regime legitimacy" operationalizeable also would be useful.
143. For a superb assessment of why Islamic extremism may fade, see Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).
144. For a summary of the consociational approach, see Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, 34-40.
145. For a discussion, see ibid., 40-45, 58-63.
146. Making this argument is Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars ." An antipartition argument is Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). A comparison of both pro- and antipartition arguments can be found in Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 1-29.
147. Making this argument is Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars ." An antipartition argument is Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). A comparison of both pro- and antipartition arguments can be found in Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 1-29.
148. Making this argument is Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars ." An antipartition argument is Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). A comparison of both pro- and antipartition arguments can be found in Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 1-29.
149. We have argued that the Bosnian and Kurdish conflicts are best resolved by partition. See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, 18 December 1995; and Daniel L. Byman, "Let Iraq Collapse," The National Interest (fall 1996): 48-60.
150. We have argued that the Bosnian and Kurdish conflicts are best resolved by partition. See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," New Republic, 18 December 1995; and Daniel L. Byman, "Let Iraq Collapse," The National Interest (fall 1996): 48-60.