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Volumn 71, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 514-531

Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability

b ECARES (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030295561 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0131 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (6)

References (13)

1
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2
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- Regulation, asymmetric information and auditing
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- Baron, D.¹ Besanko, D.²

3
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- Monitoring of performance in organizational contracting: The case of defense procurement
- 3. D. Baron and D. Besanko, Monitoring of performance in organizational contracting: The case of defense procurement, Scand. J. Econ. 90 (1988), 329-356.
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- Baron, D.¹ Besanko, D.²

4
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- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices
- 4. R. Innes, Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices, J. Econ. Theory 52 (1990) 45-67.
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- Innes, R.¹

5
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- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
- 5. F. Khalil and J. Lawarrée, Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?, J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995), 139-157.
- (1995) J. Econ. Theory , vol.66 , pp. 139-157
- Khalil, F.¹ Lawarrée, J.²

6
- 0000804559
- Collusion in hierarchical agency
- 6. F. Kofman and J. Lawarrée, Collusion in hierarchical agency, Econometrica 61 (1993), 629-656.
- (1993) Econometrica , vol.61 , pp. 629-656
- Kofman, F.¹ Lawarrée, J.²

7
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- Using cost observation to regulate firms
- 7. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Using cost observation to regulate firms, J. Polit. Econ. 94 (1986), 614-640.
- (1986) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.94 , pp. 614-640
- Laffont, J.-J.¹ Tirole, J.²

8
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- M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA
- 8. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, "A Theory of Incentive in Procurement and Regulation," M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993.
- (1993) A Theory of Incentive in Procurement and Regulation
- Laffont, J.-J.¹ Tirole, J.²

9
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- Cost observation, auditing and limited liability
- 9. J. Lawarrée and M. Van Audenrode, Cost observation, auditing and limited liability, Econ. Letters 39 (1992), 419-423.
- (1992) Econ. Letters , vol.39 , pp. 419-423
- Lawarrée, J.¹ Van Audenrode, M.²

10
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- Input versus output incentive schemes
- 10. E. Maskin and J. Riley, Input versus output incentive schemes, J. Pub. Econ. 28 (1985), 1-23.
- (1985) J. Pub. Econ. , vol.28 , pp. 1-23
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11
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- Foundation Press, Wilsbury, NY
- 11. W. Prosser, J. W. Wade, and V. E. Schwartz, "Torts: Cases and Material," Foundation Press, Wilsbury, NY, 1988.
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- Prosser, W.¹ Wade, J.W.² Schwartz, V.E.³

12
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- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
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13
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- Information expropriation and moral hazard in optimal second-source auctions
- 13. L. Stole, Information expropriation and moral hazard in optimal second-source auctions, J. Pub. Econ. 54 (1994), 463-484.
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- Stole, L.¹

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