Executive Functions and Theory of Mind: Cognitive Complexity or Functional Dependence?

Developing Theories of Intention: Social Understanding and Self-Control

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 133-152

  Perner, Josef ^a   Stummer, Sandra ^a   Lang, Birgit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85162654472     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781003417927-9     Document Type: Chapter

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