Gene-Culture Coevolution and the Emergence of Altruistic Behavior in Humans

Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 313-329

  Gintis, Herbert ^a,e   Bowles, Samuel ^a,b,f   Boyd, Robert ^c   Fehr, Ernst ^d,g  

^a SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^e CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

^f UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^g MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85144376359     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203888155-27     Document Type: Chapter

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