Auctions - What Can We Learn from Auction Theory for Slot Allocation?

Airport Slots: International Experiences and Options for Reform

Volumn , Issue , 2016, Pages 291-309

  Button, Kenneth ^a,b,c  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PORTO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85141587800     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315262963-29     Document Type: Chapter

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