Market failure or market efficiency?. Evidence on airport slot usage

Research in Transportation Economics

Volumn 4, Issue C, 1996, Pages 1-32

  Kleit, Andrew N ^a   Kobayashi, Bruce H ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000172881     PISSN: 07398859     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0739-8859(96)80003-5     Document Type: Article

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