Signaling

The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 168-194

  Gambetta, Diego ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Analytical sociology; Differential benefits; Differential costs; Honest signalers; Irrational behavior; Signal costs; Signaling theory; Signals; Signs; Thorstein Veblen

Indexed keywords

EID: 85061143458     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199215362.013.8     Document Type: Chapter

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