Chapter 25 Signalling

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 2, Issue , 1994, Pages 849-867

  Kreps, David M ^a   Sobel, Joel ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350118235     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80057-8     Document Type: Review

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