Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 113-130

  Gemes, Ken ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040065747     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/392538     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Carnap, R. (1962), Logical Foundation of Probability Theory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
2. Carnap, R. and C. Jeffrey (1971), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. I. Los Angeles: The University of California Press.
3. Earman, J. (1985), "Concepts of Projectibility and the Problems of Induction", Noûs XIX: 521-535.
4. _. (1992), Bayes or Bust. Cambridge: MIT Press.
5. Gemes, K. (1989), "A Refutation of Popperian Inductive Scepticism", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40: 183-184.
6. _. (1994), "A New Theory of Content", Journal of Philosophical Logic 23: 596-620.
7. Jeffreys, H. (1957), The Logic of Scientific Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Kyburg Jr., H. and H. Smokler (1964), Studies in Subjective Probability. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
9. Miller, D. (1990), "A Restoration of Popperian Inductive Scepticism", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41: 137-139.
10. Mura, A. (1990), "When Probabilistic Support is Inductive", Philosophy of Science 57: 278-289.
11. Popper, K. R. (1972), The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson; Sixth impression (revised).