Agreeable Administrators? Analyzing the Public Positions of Cabinet Secretaries and Presidents

Presidential Studies Quarterly

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 228-247

  Bertelli, Anthony M ^a,c   Grose, Christian R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85044898216     PISSN: 03604918     EISSN: 17415705     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2007.02595.x     Document Type: Article

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