Tests of Statistical Significance Made Sound

Educational and Psychological Measurement

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2017, Pages 489-506

  Haig, Brian D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

null hypothesis significance testing; philosophy of statistics; statistical pragmatism; tests of statistical significance; the error statistical perspective; the neo Fisherian perspective

Indexed keywords

EID: 85019217204     PISSN: 00131644     EISSN: 15523888     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0013164416667981     Document Type: Article

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