Close calls: Managing risk and resilience in airline flight safety

Close Calls: Managing Risk and Resilience in Airline Flight Safety

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 1-224

  Macrae, Carl ^a  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85016596274     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9781137376121     Document Type: Book

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