Why do people cooperate as much as they do?

Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 219-265

  Woodward, James ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

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EID: 85012164016     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511812880.019     Document Type: Chapter

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