The EU-US conflict over sanctions policy: Confronting the hegemon

European Foreign Affairs Review

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 139-163

  Falke, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85009719333     PISSN: 13846299     EISSN: 18758223     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1009835932156     Document Type: Article

References (52)

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4. For the continued usefulness of realism as an approach to understanding change in international politics see R. Jervis, 'Realism in the Study of World Politics' (1998) 52 International Organisation, pp. 971-990.
5. E. Rhein, 'The European Union on its Way to Becoming a World Power' (1997) 3 EFA Rev., pp. 325-340.
6. See K. Deutsch, The Politics of Freer Trade in Europe (St. Martin's, Münster and New York 1999), pp. 33-42.
7. Brian Crowe, 'Some Reflections on the Common Foreign and Security Policy' (1998) 3 EFA Rev., pp. 319-324 at 320.
8. Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment' (Winter 1990/91) 70 Foreign Affairs, pp. 23-33;
9. Samuel Huntington, 'The Lonely Superpower' (1999) 78 Foreign Affairs, pp. 35-49 at p. 36 and
10. Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War' (1997) 21 International Security, pp. 44-98.
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12. Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise' (1993) 17 International Security, pp. 5-51.
13. Ibid., pp. 10-18. J. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Basic Books, New York 1990).
14. P. Gordon, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy' (1997/98) 22 International Security, pp. 74-100 at pp. 87-88;
15. C. Masala, 'Der Weg der EU von Maaastricht nach Amsterdam. Weiterentwicklung oder Stagnation' (1999) 9 Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, pp. 899-921 at p. 913.
16. U. Schmalz, 'The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union's Foreign Policy Dualism' (1998) 3 EFA Rev., pp. 421-442 at pp. 424-426.
17. In 1998, the USA spent 3.6 per cent of its gross domestic product on defence, compared with 2.3 per cent by WEU nations, Gordon n. 13 above, p. 93.
18. C. Barry, 'Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice' (1995) 37 Survival, pp. 81-97.
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20. For this see Lothar Rühl, 'Conditions and Options for Autonomous 'Common European Policy on Security and Defence' in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam Perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999 (Bonn: ZEI Discussion Papers, 1999).
21. See K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw Hills, New York 1979), p. 125.
22. R. Haass (ed.), Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe, and Problem Countries (Brookings, Washington D.C. 1999), p. 38.
23. B. Sumner, 'Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996', (1997) 46 Catholic Law Review, pp. 907-961 at pp. 919-920.
24. For the political motivation see K. Gerke, 'Die Unilaterale Versuchung: Die Sanktionen der USA gegen die Handelspartner Kubas, Irans und Libyens und ihre Auswirkungen auf das Welthandelssystem' (HSFK Report 2, Frankfurt 1997), pp. 13-15.
25. A. Lowenfeld, 'Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act' (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law, pp. 419-434 at p. 427.
26. Quoted in (2 March, 1996) 54 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, p. 565.
27. E. Frost, 'Vom Umgang mit Schurkenstaaten. US-Sanktionen und die transatlantischen Beziehungen' (1997) 4 Internationale Politik, pp. 1-6.
28. Other countries affected were Canada and Mexico, both parties of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which raised the issue of compatibility, particularly of Title IV with this agreement. J. L. Snyder and S. Agostino, 'New US Legislation to Deter Investment in Cuba' (1996) 30 Journal of World Trade, pp. 37-44 at p. 43.
29. European Commission, DG I, 'Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment' (1998), , 28 October 1998, p. 1.
30. This article follows arguments by Werner Meng. W. Meng, 'Wirtschaftssanktionen und staatliche Jurisdiktion - Grauzonen im Völkerrecht' (1997) 57 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 269-327 at pp. 300-306;
31. Snyder and Agostini, n. 38 above, pp. 41-43. The issue of WTO/GATT incompatibility was also raised during the congressional debate on Helms-Burton. See also Gerke, n. 29 above, p. 20.
32. See E. Drew, Showdown. The Struggle between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House (Simon & Schuster, New York 1996), for evidence that divided government under the Republican Congress is characterized by a damaging institutional rivalry. This was also confirmed by the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton and its political aftermath.
33. P. Rudolf, Amerikanische Sanktionspolitik und transatlantische Beziehungen: Konflikte und Gestaltungsaufgaben (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - AP 3087, 1998), p. 23.
34. S. Lisio, 'Helms-Burton and the Point of Diminishing Returns' (1996) 72 International Affairs, pp. 691-711.
35. G. Sick, 'Rethinking Dual Containment' (1998) 40 Survival, pp. 5-32.
36. B. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics. The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York 1986).
37. It can be argued that one of the unique features of that process is the separate institutionalization of the domestic base through the separation of power which grants Congress an independent role. For the problems associated with this see J. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (2nd edn, Brookings, Washington D.C. 1993).
38. R. Hass, 'Sanction Madness' (November/December 1997) Foreign Affairs, pp. 74-85 at
39. For an overview see the R. Blackwill and M. Stürmer (eds), Allies Divided. Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle-East (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1997) and P. Rudolf, 'Critical Engagement: the European Union and Iran' in Haass, n. 24 above, pp. 71-101.
40. R. Rosencrance, The Rise of the Trading State (Basic Books, New York 1986).
41. On critical dialogue, see P. Rudolf, 'Rouge Regime or Regional Power. Transatlantic Conflict over Policy towards Iran', in M. Dembinski and K. Gerke (eds), Cooperation or Conflict. Transatlantic Relations in Transition (Campus/St. Martins, Frankfurt and New York 1998), pp. 137-155 at pp. 147-153.
42. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of 22 November 1996, OJ 1996 L 309. Canada passed a similar law. W. Meng, 'Extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion', n. 40 above, p. 423.
43. Article 6 of CR 2271/96. For an interpretation see W. Meng, ibid., p. 425.
44. T. Stein, Die Gemeinsame Auflen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Union unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sanktionsproblematik, Graz: Schriftenreihe des Forschungsintitut für Europarecht der (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, 1993), pp. 38-39.
45. Meng, 'Wirtschaftssanktionen', n. 40 above, pp. 306-314.
46. B. Hoffmann, 'Helms-Burton und kein Ende. Auswirkungen und Perspektiven für Kuba, die USA und Europa' (1996) 13 Lateinamerika, pp. 35-50 at p. 44.
47. Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 1998, n. 74 above, p. 4.
48. USIS Washington File, 'Eizenstat to House Trade Panel on Sanctions Legislation' EUR414 3 June 1999, Rudolf, n. 47 above, pp. 16-21. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 'Altering US Sanctions Policy' (Washington (no date)), <-csis.org/pubs/altsancsexec.html>.
49. See R. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-level Games' (1988) 42 International Organisation, pp. 427-460.
50. O. Perez, 'Reconstructing Science: The Hormone Conflict between the EU and United States' (1998) 3 EFA Rev., pp. 563-588 at pp. 564-566 and
51. S. Peers, 'Banana Split: WTO Law and Preferential Agreements in EC Legal Order' (1999) 2 EFA Rev., pp. 195-214 at pp. 195-199.
52. Examples are the leg-hold trap policy and the EU data-protection directive. For a brief overview of the leghold trap policy and regulation see G. van Calster, 'The EU, Environment and Unilateralism: Passing the Buck' (2000) 1 EFA Rev., pp. 9-34.