Europe's uncommon foreign policy

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 74-100

  Gordon, Philip H ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041111233     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2539358     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. Then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke, cited in William Drozdiak, "Europe's Dallying Amid Crises Scares Its Critics," International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1996.
2. Cited in Lionel Barber and Bruce Clark, "US Polices Aegean 'While EU Sleeps,'" Financial Times, February 9, 1996.
3. This also seems to be the view of U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen, who has said that Bosnia "was principally a European problem to be solved. The Europeans did not move. It pointed out that the Europeans do not act in the absence of American leadership." Remarks reported by Barbara Starr, "Cohen Establishing His Doctrine as Clinton and Congress Look On," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 5, 1997, p. 19.
4. The most famous example of exaggerated aspirations for an autonomous European foreign policy were the comments by the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos that the EU's intervention in Yugoslavia was "the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States." See Joel Haveman, "EC Urges End to Yugoslav Violence, Threatens Aid Cut," Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1991, p. A11.
5. Here "integration" is defined as either the delegation of sovereignty to new central institutions or the sharing, or "pooling," of sovereignty in common institutions.
6. For a concise explanation and discussion of the literature on functionalism, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 473-482. The EEC, European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom - the "European Communities" (EC) - formally became the "European Union" with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. I use "Union" except when referring to a specific historical point.
7. The SEA strengthened community institutions and launched the "1992" program for completing the EC's single economic market. For the renewed interest in functionalism - but also the emphasis on states and governments - see Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 1-40; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, pp. 41-84.
8. The SEA strengthened community institutions and launched the "1992" program for completing the EC's single economic market. For the renewed interest in functionalism - but also the emphasis on states and governments - see Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 1-40; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, pp. 41-84.
9. French leaders (including Jean Monnet, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, François Miterrand, and Jacques Delors) have often explicitly supported the setting up of institutions - like the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Monetary System, or the Eurocorps - on the grounds that their very existence would propel the process of integration forward and keep the notion of "Europe" alive, whereas British leaders have tended to oppose institutions - including all of the above - unless their immediate utility could be demonstrated.
10. On the pressures toward integration and the process of "spillover," see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 243, 283-317; and Keohane and Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, pp. 18-22.
11. On the pressures toward integration and the process of "spillover," see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 243, 283-317; and Keohane and Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, pp. 18-22.
12. For details, see William Nicoll, "The Luxembourg Compromise," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1984), pp. 35-43.
13. See Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act." See also David R. Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences," in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 23-74.
14. See Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act." See also David R. Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences," in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 23-74.
15. The advantages of scale include (1) the added leverage that comes from a unified bargaining position; (2) the benefits that derive from avoiding EU states pursuing competing interests; and (3) the possibility of using Community prestige, means, institutions, and financing, which can enhance leverage and possibly facilitate more efficient implementation, for the pursuit of certain objectives. For a discussion of why common action might enhance leverage, see Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 3, 154.
16. See, for example, Philip Zelikow's sharp critique of CFSP, based on the (unstated) assumption that it is primarily about military crisis response (like the Gulf and Bosnia wars, the two cases he considers). The critique is trenchant if crisis response is the issue at hand; if long-term foreign orientation is the issue, the critique misses the mark. And contrast this with the view of Eberhard Rhein of the European Commission, who is listing the means available to a state for foreign policy - treaty policy, economic cooperation, and diplomatic measures - does not even mention military force. Not surprisingly, Rhein's judgment of CFSP is more positive than Zelikow's. See Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 9-10; and Eberhard Rhein, "Besser als ihr Ruf: die EU Aussenpolitik," Internationale Politik (Summer 1996), p. 55.
17. See, for example, Philip Zelikow's sharp critique of CFSP, based on the (unstated) assumption that it is primarily about military crisis response (like the Gulf and Bosnia wars, the two cases he considers). The critique is trenchant if crisis response is the issue at hand; if long-term foreign orientation is the issue, the critique misses the mark. And contrast this with the view of Eberhard Rhein of the European Commission, who is listing the means available to a state for foreign policy - treaty policy, economic cooperation, and diplomatic measures - does not even mention military force. Not surprisingly, Rhein's judgment of CFSP is more positive than Zelikow's. See Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 9-10; and Eberhard Rhein, "Besser als ihr Ruf: die EU Aussenpolitik," Internationale Politik (Summer 1996), p. 55.
18. It might be worth noting that when the EU uses the word "common" in other functional areas ("common agricultural policy," "common currency," "common fisheries policy," etc.), it normally refers to policies that are under the authority of EU institutions (such as the European Commission and Parliament or a European Central Bank), which go beyond simple intergovernmental coordination and genuinely imply joint implementation and binding central decisions. The reason the United States (or any other state) has a true "CFSP" is not because its "member states" have the same interests and always agree on what to do, but because it has legitimate, centralized institutions with the authority to take binding decisions.
19. The EDC was a French plan devised in 1950 to create an integrated European army. It was rejected by France's own National Assembly in 1954. The Fouchet Plans, named after French President Charles de Gaulle's adviser Christian Fouchet, were de Gaulle's attempts to create a European political-military grouping distinct from the United States. The French National Assembly rejected the EDC largely because it was too integrated and too Atlanticist, and the Fouchet Plans were rejected by the Belgians and Dutch in 1962 because they were not integrated and not Atlanticist enough. This intra-European debate over integration and Atlanticism was one of the main reasons for the inability to agree on foreign policy cooperation for so long, and it still divides Europeans today.
20. For an excellent study of EPC written by an "insider," see Simon J. Nutall, European Political Co-operation (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1992).
21. See Délégation de l'Assemblée Nationale pour les Communautés Européennes, Pierre Lellouche, rapporteur, L'Europe et sa sécurité: bilan et avenir de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union Européenne (Paris: Assemblée Nationale, May 31, 1994), p. 14.
22. The Venice Declaration distiguished EU policy from U.S. policy by emphasizing the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization to have a role in the peace process. See Conseil Européen, "Déclaration du 17e Conseil Européen sur le dialogue euro-arabe, et la situation au Proche-Orient," Venice, June 12-13, 1980; and Christin Marschall, "The European Community and the Arab World, 1972-1991: From Economics to Politics," Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 56-80.
23. The Venice Declaration distiguished EU policy from U.S. policy by emphasizing the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization to have a role in the peace process. See Conseil Européen, "Déclaration du 17e Conseil Européen sur le dialogue euro-arabe, et la situation au Proche-Orient," Venice, June 12-13, 1980; and Christin Marschall, "The European Community and the Arab World, 1972-1991: From Economics to Politics," Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 56-80.
24. See Christopher Hill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model, or Flop?" in Reinhardt Rummel, ed., The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 33.
25. On the developments leading up to the CFSP agreement at the Maastricht summit of December 1991, see Mathais Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, Adelphi Paper No. 290 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1994), pp. 6-12; and James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union": European Integration and Its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), pp. 50-60.
26. On the developments leading up to the CFSP agreement at the Maastricht summit of December 1991, see Mathais Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, Adelphi Paper No. 290 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1994), pp. 6-12; and James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union": European Integration and Its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), pp. 50-60.
27. The treaty does allow for a form of "constructive abstention," whereby a state could abstain from a vote, allowing the decision to go ahead but without having to implement it. For the specifics of what was agreed at Amsterdam, see Intergovernmental Conference, Amsterdam European Council, An Effective and Coherent External Policy, chapter 12, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy," available from the European Union website.
28. See European Commission, Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Commission Report for the Reflection Croup (Brussels: EC, May 1995), p. 63. A recent French analysis has also admitted that CFSP "has not been able to play a determining role." See "Quelle identité politique extérieure?" in Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Ramsès: 1996 (Paris: Dunod, 1996), p. 320.
29. See European Commission, Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Commission Report for the Reflection Croup (Brussels: EC, May 1995), p. 63. A recent French analysis has also admitted that CFSP "has not been able to play a determining role." See "Quelle identité politique extérieure?" in Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Ramsès: 1996 (Paris: Dunod, 1996), p. 320.
30. On the common positions and joint actions, see European Commission, "List of Joint Actions Adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)," and "List of Common Positions Adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)," European Dialogue (Brussels: European Commission, 1997), pp. 18-20; and Barbara-Christine Ryba, "La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: Mode d'emploi et bilan d'une année d'application," Revue du marché commun de l'union européenne, No. 384 (January 1995), pp. 15-35.
31. On the common positions and joint actions, see European Commission, "List of Joint Actions Adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)," and "List of Common Positions Adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)," European Dialogue (Brussels: European Commission, 1997), pp. 18-20; and Barbara-Christine Ryba, "La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: Mode d'emploi et bilan d'une année d'application," Revue du marché commun de l'union européenne, No. 384 (January 1995), pp. 15-35.
32. See Rosemary Hollis, "Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?" International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), pp. 15-29; IISS, "Europe and the Middle East Peace Process," Strategic Comments, Vol. 2, No. 10 (December 1996); and Kenneth Stein, "Transatlantische Partnerschaft im Nahen Osten?" Internationalle Politik (9/1996), pp. 33-39.
33. See Rosemary Hollis, "Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?" International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), pp. 15-29; IISS, "Europe and the Middle East Peace Process," Strategic Comments, Vol. 2, No. 10 (December 1996); and Kenneth Stein, "Transatlantische Partnerschaft im Nahen Osten?" Internationalle Politik (9/1996), pp. 33-39.
34. See Rosemary Hollis, "Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?" International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), pp. 15-29; IISS, "Europe and the Middle East Peace Process," Strategic Comments, Vol. 2, No. 10 (December 1996); and Kenneth Stein, "Transatlantische Partnerschaft im Nahen Osten?" Internationalle Politik (9/1996), pp. 33-39.
35. See Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
36. Saddam Hussein refused to meet the "Troika" of current, past, and upcoming holders of the rotating EU presidency (who are supposed to represent the Union's foreign policy), and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz only agreed to do so if they came to Baghdad. The Soviets gave the EU little more respect, failing to tell the Troika about their own peace offer when the EU leaders were in Moscow. This episode was a demonstration not only of the EU's lack of credibility in a military crisis, but also of the shortcomings of the way EU foreign policy was represented, because the Troika at that time happened to consist of Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg - not exactly Europe's major military powers. On the EU and the Gulf crisis, see Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), p. 131.
37. See the proposal outlined by French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette and his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini in "Innover pour progresser," Le Monde, March 25, 1997.
38. See Intergovernmental Conference, Amsterdam European Council, An Effective and Coherent External Policy.
39. Indeed, in some cases, such as the enforcement of the Yugoslav arms embargo in the Adriatic during 1992-93, the WEU's efforts to stake out a role for itself actually diminished the efficiency of the operation by causing confusion between the WEU and NATO as to their respective roles, until the enforcement operations were combined in November 1993. The fault here was not all the WEU's, of course, because it was actually first to declare its mission in the Adriatic, with NATO following on immediately afterward. Interviews with WEU officials. Also see Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, pp. 30-31; and Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-42. On "identity" as a primary WEU mission, see Philip H. Gordon, "Does Western European Union Have a Role?" in Anne Deighton, ed., Western European Union, 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration (Oxford, U.K.: St. Antony's College, 1997), pp. 103-117. Some of the following section draws on and updates my chapter in the Deighton book.
40. Indeed, in some cases, such as the enforcement of the Yugoslav arms embargo in the Adriatic during 1992-93, the WEU's efforts to stake out a role for itself actually diminished the efficiency of the operation by causing confusion between the WEU and NATO as to their respective roles, until the enforcement operations were combined in November 1993. The fault here was not all the WEU's, of course, because it was actually first to declare its mission in the Adriatic, with NATO following on immediately afterward. Interviews with WEU officials. Also see Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, pp. 30-31; and Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-42. On "identity" as a primary WEU mission, see Philip H. Gordon, "Does Western European Union Have a Role?" in Anne Deighton, ed., Western European Union, 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration (Oxford, U.K.: St. Antony's College, 1997), pp. 103-117. Some of the following section draws on and updates my chapter in the Deighton book.
41. Indeed, in some cases, such as the enforcement of the Yugoslav arms embargo in the Adriatic during 1992-93, the WEU's efforts to stake out a role for itself actually diminished the efficiency of the operation by causing confusion between the WEU and NATO as to their respective roles, until the enforcement operations were combined in November 1993. The fault here was not all the WEU's, of course, because it was actually first to declare its mission in the Adriatic, with NATO following on immediately afterward. Interviews with WEU officials. Also see Jopp, The Strategic Implications of European Integration, pp. 30-31; and Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-42. On "identity" as a primary WEU mission, see Philip H. Gordon, "Does Western European Union Have a Role?" in Anne Deighton, ed., Western European Union, 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration (Oxford, U.K.: St. Antony's College, 1997), pp. 103-117. Some of the following section draws on and updates my chapter in the Deighton book.
42. Participation in such missions would still be voluntary, but now there was an explicit agreement that the WEU would plan for, and possibly undertake, missions that went well beyond its original common defense commitment. See the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992; and the discussion in Assembly of Western European Union, Sir Russell Johnson, rapporteur, Western European Union: Information Report (Brussels: March 14, 1995), pp. 33-36.
43. Participation in such missions would still be voluntary, but now there was an explicit agreement that the WEU would plan for, and possibly undertake, missions that went well beyond its original common defense commitment. See the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992; and the discussion in Assembly of Western European Union, Sir Russell Johnson, rapporteur, Western European Union: Information Report (Brussels: March 14, 1995), pp. 33-36.
44. See Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, "WEU Operational Development," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 15 (Spring 1997), pp. 70-74; and Assembly of Western European Union, Western European Union, pp. 47-55. On the satellite Center, see Assembly of Western European Union, WEU and Helios 2 (Brussels, WEU: May 14, 1996).
45. See Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, "WEU Operational Development," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 15 (Spring 1997), pp. 70-74; and Assembly of Western European Union, Western European Union, pp. 47-55. On the satellite Center, see Assembly of Western European Union, WEU and Helios 2 (Brussels, WEU: May 14, 1996).
46. See Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, "WEU Operational Development," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 15 (Spring 1997), pp. 70-74; and Assembly of Western European Union, Western European Union, pp. 47-55. On the satellite Center, see Assembly of Western European Union, WEU and Helios 2 (Brussels, WEU: May 14, 1996).
47. See Charles Barry, "Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1955), pp. 81-97. Also see various contributions in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
48. See Charles Barry, "Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1955), pp. 81-97. Also see various contributions in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
49. On Frnace's decision to pursue ESDI within NATO rather than independently, see Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 58-80.
50. See the Final Communiqué of the June 3, 1996, North Atlantic Council Berlin Ministerial Meeting.
51. See, for example, "NATO Acquires a European Identity," The Economist, June 8, 1996, pp. 43-44; Bruce Clark, "US Agrees to Give Europe More Say in NATO Operations," Financial Times, June 4, 1996; and Rick Atkinson, "NATO Gives Members Responses Flexibility," Washington Post, June 4, 1996.
52. See, for example, "NATO Acquires a European Identity," The Economist, June 8, 1996, pp. 43-44; Bruce Clark, "US Agrees to Give Europe More Say in NATO Operations," Financial Times, June 4, 1996; and Rick Atkinson, "NATO Gives Members Responses Flexibility," Washington Post, June 4, 1996.
53. See, for example, "NATO Acquires a European Identity," The Economist, June 8, 1996, pp. 43-44; Bruce Clark, "US Agrees to Give Europe More Say in NATO Operations," Financial Times, June 4, 1996; and Rick Atkinson, "NATO Gives Members Responses Flexibility," Washington Post, June 4, 1996.
54. Full WEU member troop-strength, not including reserves, is 1.79 million. The total for all of NATO's European members, including Turkey, is 2.46 million. See IISS, The Military Balance 1997-98 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 46-73.
55. For a good analysis of European NATO members' logistical deficiencies, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3(Autumn 1997), pp. 5-15.
56. For figures on defense spending and comparisons with earlier years, see IISS, The Military Balance, 1997-98, 293. See also Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, "As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink," Washington Post, July 29, 1996, p. A1.
57. For figures on defense spending and comparisons with earlier years, see IISS, The Military Balance, 1997-98, 293. See also Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, "As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink," Washington Post, July 29, 1996, p. A1.
58. French defense reform plans are discussed in Jacques Isnard, "Le budget militaire sera réduit de 100 milliards de francs en cinq ans," Le Monde, February 24, 1996, pp. 6-9. Also see Stanley R. Sloan, "French Defense Policy: Gaullism Meets the Post-Cold War World," Arms Control Today (April 1997), pp. 3-8.
59. French defense reform plans are discussed in Jacques Isnard, "Le budget militaire sera réduit de 100 milliards de francs en cinq ans," Le Monde, February 24, 1996, pp. 6-9. Also see Stanley R. Sloan, "French Defense Policy: Gaullism Meets the Post-Cold War World," Arms Control Today (April 1997), pp. 3-8.
60. Despite many past agreements, uncertainty remains as to whether the Germans will be able to go ahead with the satellite cooperation with France because of cuts in the defense budget. See Giovanni de Briganti, "Germans May Drop Helios," Defense News, June 24-30, 1996, pp. 1, 76.
61. According to a 1993 study done at the RAND corporation, equipping a European intervention force of around 50,000 troops would require extra equipment costing $18-$49 billion over twenty-five years (depending on the amount of capability deemed necessary) as well as satellite intelligence systems that would cost between $9 billion and $25 billion over the same period. See M.B. Berman and G.M. Carter, The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993). Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon calculates that it would cost around $50 billion for NATO's European members to develop about one-half the strategic lift capability of the United States. See O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO," pp. 10-11.
62. According to a 1993 study done at the RAND corporation, equipping a European intervention force of around 50,000 troops would require extra equipment costing $18-$49 billion over twenty-five years (depending on the amount of capability deemed necessary) as well as satellite intelligence systems that would cost between $9 billion and $25 billion over the same period. See M.B. Berman and G.M. Carter, The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993). Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon calculates that it would cost around $50 billion for NATO's European members to develop about one-half the strategic lift capability of the United States. See O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO," pp. 10-11.
63. The repeated them of nearly all European leaders since NATO intervened militarily in Bosnia in late 1995 has been "in together (with the Americans), out together." When EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek suggested in early May 1996 that perhaps European troops could stay on in Bosnia without the United States, he was quickly repudiated by French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette. See Agence France-Presse, "EU Commissioner Slammed for Bosnia Comments," May 7, 1996.
64. During the Yugoslavia wars, the closest the United States came to driving the Europeans to consider a truly independent military capability was in November 1994, when Congress forced the administration to cease its implementation of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia, leading even some British officials to question whether they could still rely on the United States or whether the European defense option would have to be pursued. When U.S.-European cooperation improved during the course of 1995, however, the British and other Atlanticist Europeans were all to happy to stick with NATO. Interviews with British and German officials, 1994-95.
65. For a good recent argument to this effect, see Charles Grant, Strength in Numbers: Europe's Foreign and Defence Policy (London: Centre for European Reform, 1996), pp. 19-20.
66. For an argument that monetary union will increase pressures for more common foreign and security policy, see Pierre Jacquet, "European Integration at a Crossroads," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 1996-97), p. 92.
67. As Alain Lamassoure, former French Minister for European Affairs, has put it, "doing things intergovernmentally with 30 members is like reinventing the CSCE or the League of Nations." Agence Europe, March 30, 1995, p. 3.