Permanent injunctions in patent litigation after eBay: An empirical study

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 101, Issue 5, 2016, Pages 1949-2019

  Seaman, Christopher B ^a  

^a WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84994076512     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (395)

1. See eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 393-94 (2006) (holding that the Federal Circuit erred in "articulat[ing] a general rule, unique to patent disputes, that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged").
2. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) ("The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay represented a sea change in patent litigation. " (footnote omitted));
3. Ryan Davis, Top 15 High Court Patent Rulings of the Past 15 Years, LAW360 (July 1, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/674205/top-15-high-courtpatent-rulings-of-the-past-15-years (ranking eBay as the second most important patent law decision since 2000).
4. See Citing References for eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L. L. C., WESTLAWNEXT (last visited May 10, 2016);
5. see also Dennis Crouch, Most Cited Supreme Court Patent Decisions (2005-2015), PATENTLY-O (Mar. 11, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/supreme-court-cases.html (listing eBay as the second most cited U. S. Supreme Court patent case of the past decade).
6. For examples of significant eBay-related scholarship, see generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
7. A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 631 (2007);
8. Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421 (2007);
9. Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. V. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 543 (2008);
10. Eric R. Claeys, The Conceptual Relation Between IP Rights and Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825 (2015);
11. Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571 (2008);
12. Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B. J. 437 (2008);
13. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012);
14. John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007)
15. [hereinafter Golden, Patent Trolls];
16. John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010)
17. [hereinafter Golden, Principles];
18. Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677 (2015)
19. [hereinafter Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay];
20. Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1 (2014)
21. [hereinafter Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors];
22. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733 (2012);
23. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007);
24. and Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95 (2012).
25. see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 598-99 (2008) (discussing eBay's impact in real and personal property law);
26. Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 218 (2012) (examining "how much the eBay decision has guided, and should guide, copyright cases").
27. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 220 n. 21 (2011) ("This report uses the term 'patent assertion entity' [or PAE]... to refer to firms whose business model focuses on purchasing and asserting patents.");
28. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297, 328 (2010) (explaining that PAEs "are focused on the enforcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their patents, " and noting that PAEs "can be further divided into several types-large-portfolio companies, small-portfolio companies, and individuals");
29. see also James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 390 (2014) (defining a related concept, non-practicing entities ("NPEs"), as "individuals and firms who own patents but do not directly use their patented technology to produce goods or services, instead asserting their patents against companies that do produce goods and services").
30. See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Plager, J., concurring) ("Patent trolls are also known by a variety of other names: 'patent assertion entities' (PAEs), [and] 'nonpracticing entities' (NPEs).").
31. For an informative history of the term "patent troll" and its malleability, see Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 442-45 (2014).
32. See also Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 117 (2015) (conducting "the first empirical study of the use of the term 'patent troll' by U. S. media" and finding that "starting in 2006, the U. S. media surveyed used 'patent troll' far more than any other term, despite the efforts of scholars to devise alternative, more neutral-sounding terms").
33. Compare FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 229 (explaining that when a PAE "seeks to license broadly, denial of an injunction" may be appropriate)
34. and Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035-36 (2007) (contending that a "presumptive right to injunctive relief" should apply for patent holders who compete or exclusively license to a party that does, with other patentees being subject to a less favorable rule)
35. with Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2148 (contending that "a categorically discriminatory rule" against non-practicing patentees "is not needed")
36. and Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, REG. 58, 62 (2008) (criticizing eBay as creating a risk of "systematic under-compensation during the limited life of a patent[, which] is likely to reduce the level of innovation while increasing the administrative costs of running the entire system").
37. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 394 (2006);
38. see also MercExchange L. L. C. V. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E. D. Va. 2003) ("In the case at bar, the evidence of the plaintiff's willingness to license its patents, its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its comments to the media as to its intent with respect to enforcement of its patent rights, are sufficient to rebut the presumption that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.").
39. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) ("The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of 'entitlement.' Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more people... it must decide which side to favor.... Hence the fundamental thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.");
40. see also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 827-39 (1993) (describing in more detail the allocation and construction of legal entitlements).
41. See 35 U. S. C. § 261 (2012) (noting that patents and patent applications "shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing");
42. Isr. Bio-Eng'g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Under long established law, a patentee or his assignee may grant and convey to another: (1) the whole patent, (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right, or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States.").
43. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L. J. 1027, 1040-41 (1995) (explaining that with "relatively high damages, potential takers would be deterred from nonconsensual takings, and the entitlement would be transferred only by consensual agreement"). Some scholars have criticized the distinction between property rules and liability rules as having little relationship to the normative judgments embedded in private law remedies determinations.
44. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) ("[A] property rule is a legal entitlement that can only be infringed after bargaining with the entitlement holder.").
45. see also Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L. J. 2091, 2091 (1997) ("Because property rules give one person the sole and absolute power over the use and disposition of a given thing, it follows that its owner may hold out for as much as he pleases before selling the thing in question....").
46. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2004) ("Such 'property rules' would include injunctions...."). As my colleague Professor Doug Rendleman has explained, however, an enjoined party "can violate an injunction and convert the plaintiff's [property] right into a cause of action for compensatory contempt, money, " and monetary remedies are more characteristic of a liability rule.
47. DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 128 (2010);
48. see also John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than "Off Switches": Patent-Infringement Injunctions' Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1412-13 (2012) ("When any threat of being found in contempt is realistically limited to a threat of civil contempt... [the] risk of being found in contempt can essentially amount to no more than a risk of being subjected to heightened but still limited monetary sanctions.").
49. see also Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L. J. 1335, 1340 (1986) (asserting that because "liability rules neither confer nor respect a domain of lawful control, liability rules cannot, in this view, protect rights.... The very idea of a 'liability rule entitlement', that is of a right secured by a liability rule, is inconceivable").
50. See, e.g., 17 U. S. C. § 111 (2012) (compulsory licensing of secondary transmission of television programming by cable systems);
51. see also Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 259-63 (2009) (discussing in further detail compulsory licensing provisions in the Copyright Act);
52. Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N. C. L. REV. 87, 108-22 (2004) (detailing the compulsory licensing provisions' depth and scope).
53. see also Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One Experimental View of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J. L. & TECH. 138, 144 (2011) ("Under a liability rule, the owner of an entitlement is legally powerless to keep it exclusively for herself.").
54. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007) (arguing that liability rules are preferable to traditional property rights in markets where injunctive relief cannot be narrowly tailored);
55. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742, 1799-1806 (2007) (explaining how information costs help explain why copyright law relies more on liability rights and patent law relies more on property rights);
56. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1304-08 (2008) (arguing that liability rules limit incentives to conduct searches for the scope of property rights);
57. Ben Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 59, 61 (2008);
58. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 255 (1994) ("Remedies for infringement of a patent are, with limited exceptions, those appropriate for property. Injunctions, both permanent and temporary, are available against infringers on proof of validity and infringement.").
59. see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2 (6th ed. 2012) ("All justifications for intellectual property protection... must contend with a fundamental difference between ideas and tangible property. Tangible property... is composed of atoms, physical things that can occupy only one place at a given time. This means that possession of a physical thing is necessarily 'exclusive'.... Ideas, though, do not have this characteristic of excludability.").
60. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L. J. 1, 32-33 (2004).
61. For the leading critique of the idea that eliminating free riding is a primary goal of intellectual property law, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005).
62. See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 54 (2013) ("[T]he job of putting a value on patent rights is inherently difficult, particularly in industries in which the technology itself is rapidly evolving.");
63. Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2152 (explaining "[t]he difficulty of assessing [damages] has in fact been one of the principal rationales for granting permanent injunctions" in patent cases).
64. see also Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1711-15 (2010) (discussing the role of noninfringing alternatives in determining royalty rates for patent rights).
65. See Ian Ayres & J. M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L. J. 703, 706 n. 9 (1996) ("[L]egal scholars have interpreted Calabresi and Melamed to be saying that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs are low.");
66. See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
67. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008) (arguing that patents fail to provide clear notice of the scope of patent rights);
68. Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2014) ("Uncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant problem facing the patent system.");
69. see also Festo Corp. V. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U. S. 722, 731 (2002) ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application. ").
70. See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 468 (2012) ("The biggest risk of applying property rules in IP cases is holdup. ").
71. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 58 ("Under some circumstances, the grant or threat of a permanent injunction can lead an infringer to pay higher royalties than it would pay in a competitive market for a patented invention. ");
72. Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 549-50 (2015) ("[T]he patent holdup hypothesis asserts that patent holders charge licensing royalties to manufacturing firms that exceed the true economic contribution of the patented technology, thereby discouraging innovation by manufacturers and hurting consumers.");
73. Microsoft Corp. V. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012);
74. see also Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B. C. L. REV. 149, 153-54 (2007).
75. see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 26 (explaining that "[a]n injunction's ability to cause patent hold-up... can deter innovation by increasing costs and uncertainty for manufacturers" and "raise prices to consumers by depriving them of the benefit of competition among technologies").
76. See generally Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008);
77. Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2148-60;
78. J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008);
79. see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 109 (1990) ("Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with real property.").
80. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
81. An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
82. See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1082, 391-92 (1890) ("The acts of Congress, prior to 1819, made no provision for any suit in equity by the owner of a patent, nor for his enjoyment of any form of equitable relief in connection with his action for damages at common law.");
83. see also Elizabeth E. Millard, Note, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases: Should Courts Apply a Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C.?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 985, 992 (2008) (noting that "the earliest patent statutes provided only for remedies at law").
84. An Act to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States to Cases Arising Under the Law Relating To Patents, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82 (1819).
85. 35 U. S. C. § 283 (2012).
86. See, e.g., Festo Corp. V. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U. S. 722, 730 (2002) (explaining that the patent laws provide "a temporary monopoly... [which] is a property right");
87. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 642 (1999) (noting that patents "have long been considered a species of property");
88. Dawson Chem. Co. V. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting "the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude");
89. Hartford-Empire Co. V. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 415 (1945) (stating that it "has long been settled" that "a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and by government");
90. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U. S. (4 How.) 646, 674 (1846) (explaining that "[t]he law has thus impressed upon [a patent] all the qualities and characteristics of property").
91. The Patent Act provides that "patents shall have the attributes of personal property." 35 U. S. C. § 261 (2012).
92. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. at 643.
93. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 (1982);
94. see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing "the right to exclude" as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property");
95. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) ("[T]he right to exclude others is more than just 'one of the most essential' constituents of property-it is the sine qua non. ").
96. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852);
97. see also Herbert F. Schwartz, Note, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1041-42 (1964) ("By the middle of the nineteenth century, courts generally recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to... an injunction against future infringements for the life of the patent." (footnotes omitted)).
98. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. V. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 429 (1908).
99. See E. Paper Bag Co. V. Cont'l Paper Bag Co., 142 F. 479, 487 (C. C. D. Me. 1905) ("[Eastern] has never attempted to make any practical use of [the patent], either itself or through licenses, and apparently its proposed policy has been to avoid this.").
100. Cont'l Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. at 416.
101. (citing U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
102. 28 U. S. C. § 1295 (a) (1) (2012).
103. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The patent right is a right to exclude.... The essence of all property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is certainly not inconsequential.");
104. Carl Schenck, A. G. V. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of 'property.'").
105. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citation omitted);
106. see also Dawson Chem. Co. V. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting "the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude").
107. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. V. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
108. W. L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. V. Garlock, Inc. 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
109. MercExchange, L. L. C. V. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange II), 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
110. See Rite-Hite Corp. V. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest.");
111. City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (denying a permanent injunction that would have required closing Milwaukee's sewage treatment plan and dumping untreated sewage into Lake Michigan, thus endangering "the health and the lives of more than half a million people").
112. One notable example of a pre-eBay denial of a permanent injunction occurred in Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co., where the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of a permanent injunction when a patentee who did not manufacture a product using the patented technology sought to exclude a manufacturing infringer.
113. Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974).
114. For a detailed description of MercExchange and its founder, Thomas G. Woolston, who was also the inventor of the '265 patent, see Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors, supra note 4, at 23-30.
115. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 390 (2006).
116. MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698-99 (E. D. Va. 2003).
117. MercExchange II, 401 F.3d at 1333-35
118. (referring to MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 698-99).
119. MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 710-15.
120. For a summary of the parties' briefing on the issue of injunctive relief at the trial court level, see Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay, supra note 4, at 691-95.
121. MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
122. MercExchange II, 401 F.3d at 1326.
123. (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
124. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 546 U. S. 1029 (2005) (granting writ of certiorari).
125. See, e.g., Katie Hafner, Justices Will Hear Patent Case Against eBay, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/technology/27ebay.html (noting that the eBay appeal "has attracted an unusual amount of public attention in part because of recent attempts by large corporations to change patent law to lessen the threat posed by so-called nonpracticing patent holders");
126. see also Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Hears eBay Patent Case, USA TODAY, (Mar. 29, 2006, 9:47 PM), http://www.usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-03-29-ebay-case-X.htm.
127. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners, eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130)
128. 2006 WL 1785363;
129. Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, eBay, 547 U. S. 388 (No. 05-130)
130. 2006 WL 639164;
131. Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, 547 U. S. 388 (No. 05-130)
132. 2006 WL 639167;
133. Brief of American Intellectual Property Law Ass'n & Federal Circuit Bar Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, eBay, 547 U. S. 388 (No. 05-130)
134. 2006 WL 148639;
135. Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay, 547 U. S. 388 (No. 05-130)
136. 2006 WL 218988;
137. Brief of I. B. M. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, eBay, 547 U. S. 388 (No. 05-130)
138. 2006 WL 235006.
139. A summary of the amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court is available at Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay, supra note 4, at 691-95.
140. eBay, 547 U. S. at 390.
141. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 339 (4th ed. 2012) (concluding that "there was no 'traditional' four-part test" for permanent injunctions);
142. eBay, 547 U. S. at 391.
143. (quoting 35 U. S. C. § 154 (a) (1) (2006)).
144. (quoting 35 U. S. C. § 283 (2006)).
145. (citing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. V. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 422-430 (1908)).
146. (quoting MercExchange II, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
147. See James M. Fischer, The "Right" to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 20 (2007) ("The Court's decision in eBay, although presented as a unanimous decision... is sufficiently terse, pithy, and fractured by the two concurrences as to provide some support to practically any conclusion one wishes to draw from the decision. ");
148. Paul M. Mersino, Note, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay Auction Away a Patent Holder's Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 326 (2007) ("The generality in the [C]ourt's holding [in eBay] was compounded by the fact that, although it was technically unanimous, the two concurring opinions were highly divergent on exactly how the holding should be applied.").
149. eBay, 547 U. S. at 395 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (citation omitted).
150. MercExchange L. L. C. V. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E. D. Va. 2007).
151. MercExchange, L. L. C. V. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange IV), 660 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658-59 (E. D. Va. 2007).
152. Notice of Appeal, MercExchange, L. L. C. V. eBay, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-00736 (E. D. Va. Dec. 18, 2007), ECF No. 758. eBay's appeal was docketed as No. 2008-1139.
153. See Press Release, eBay Inc. and MercExchange, L. L. C. Reach Settlement Agreement, EBAY (Feb. 28, 2008), http://investor.ebayinc.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=296670.
154. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 217 (noting that eBay "created significant uncertainty concerning the circumstances under which courts would deny permanent injunctions");
155. F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 416, 425 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011) ("In the final analysis, the full impact of the eBay case remains an open question for debate.");
156. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 337 (2006) (asserting that "eBay raises more questions about the grant of permanent injunctions than it answers" and that "the opinion leaves patent holders to speculate whether fewer permanent injunctions against infringers will issue in a post-eBay world").
157. Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY (Nov. 2009), at 25.
158. Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases 9 fig.3 (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2629399.
159. Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases to 12-31-13, PATSTATS. ORG, http://patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2016)
160. [hereinafter PATSTATS. ORG]. After removing apparently duplicative entries, this database reports that permanent injunctions were granted in 174 cases and denied in 57 cases.
161. Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 787, 798 (2009) (finding that "an NPE's chance of getting an injunction [fell] precipitously" after eBay compared to "a patentee who directly competes in the marketplace");
162. Yixin H. Tang, Note, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 235, 246 (2006) (asserting that after eBay, "patent holders who did not practice their patents found themselves in a more difficult position").
163. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 256.
164. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396 (2006).
165. For examples of district court opinions citing Justice Kennedy's concurrence in denying an injunction to a non-practicing patentee, see Hynix Semiconductor Inc. V. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 966 (N. D. Cal. 2009);
166. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 600 (E. D. Tex. 2009);
167. Commonwealth Sci. and Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (E. D. Tex. 2007);
168. MPT, Inc. V. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419-20 (N. D. Ohio 2007);
169. and z4 Techs., Inc. V. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E. D. Tex. 2006).
170. See also Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of "Private Law" Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 520-22 & n. 13 (2014) (discussing Justice Kennedy's "influential concurrence").
171. ∗3 (E. D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011) ("The best case for obtaining a permanent injunction often occurs when the plaintiff and defendant are competing in the same market.");
172. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. V. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (D. Del. 2008) ("Courts awarding permanent injunctions typically do so under circumstances where plaintiff practices its invention and is a direct market competitor.");
173. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 259.
174. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
175. Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 71 (2009);
176. see also George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World, 4 N. Y. U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 559-60 (2008) (finding "the infringer was a direct horizontal competitor" to the patentee in 28 of 30 cases where a permanent injunction issued);
177. Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305, 318 (2007) ("The market competition requirement, more than merely correlating with results, appears to be dispositive in determining whether to grant an injunction. ").
178. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
179. Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2113;
180. see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 259 (finding permanent injunctions were granted only 25% of the time when patentee and infringer did not compete).
181. See Jay Dratler, Jr., eBay's Practical Effect: Two Differing Visions, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 35, 49 (2008) ("If the patent at issue already has been licensed to multiple parties on a nonexclusive basis, at a standard royalty rate, all four equitable factors ordinarily favor denying an injunction. " (emphasis omitted));
182. see also T. J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. V. Consol. Med. Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (concluding in a pre-eBay case that licensing the patent is "incompatible with the emphasis on the right to exclude that is the basis for the presumption" of irreparable harm).
183. see also Telcordia Techs., Inc. V. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727, 748 n. 10 (D. Del. 2009) (concluding that the patentee's "willingness to license its patents also suggests that its injury is compensable in monetary damages, which is inconsistent with the right to exclude");
184. ∗2 (E. D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007) (concluding that the patentee's "licens[ing] the [patent-in-suit] to others, and offer[ing] to license it to [the defendant] prior to filing suit... demonstrate[es] that money damages are adequate");
185. Andrei Iancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent Injunction Decisions: A Review of Post-eBay Case Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 395, 398 (2007) (noting "the predilection some courts have to deny an injunction upon a showing of a willingness to license").
186. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 259;
187. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. See Benjamin Petersen, Note, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 193, 198 (2008) ("[I]n five of the ten cases where courts denied an injunction, the court found that the patented invention is merely a small component of the infringing product. There were no instances where a court awarded an injunction after determining that the patent covers only a small component of the infringing product.");
189. cf. Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 76 (2016) (arguing that courts should not grant injunctions in patent cases involving infringing features for multicomponent devices if it will cause holdup).
190. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. V. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U. S. 806, 815 (1945) ("Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim by the chancellor.");
191. William R. Everding, Comment, "Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose": The Predicament Legitimate Small Entities Face Post eBay and the Essential Role of Willful Infringement in the Four-Factor Permanent Injunction Analysis, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189, 211-17 (2007) (contending that willful infringement is relevant in several factors of the eBay test).
192. MercExchange III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 (E. D. Va. 2007) (emphasis omitted);
193. ∗5 (W. D. Okla. July 27, 2006) (explaining that "the Court is unpersuaded that there is no need for an injunction" in light of, inter alia, "the finding of willful infringement").
194. See, e.g., Fractus, S. A., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 876 F. Supp. 2d 802, 828-30, 852-54 (E. D. Tex. 2012);
195. Creative Internet Advert. Corp. V. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849-52 (E. D. Tex. 2009);
196. ∗5-6 (W. D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006)
197. aff'd, 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
198. z4 Techs., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 438-44 (E. D. Tex. 2006).
199. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 257 (surveying 49 district court injunction decisions from eBay through December 2008);
200. See THE SAGE GLOSSARY OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 489 (Larry E. Sullivan ed. 2009) (explaining statistical power as "the probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis").
201. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 843-44 ("Many [empirical legal] studies are confined to a universe of written and published decisions. The focus on such decisions... reduces the generalizability of the findings.");
202. David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 681, 686 (2007) (noting that published "opinions might be unrepresentative of how trial courts resolve legal problems");
203. see also Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 982 (2008) ("If we accept that the law is what judges do, then we cannot evaluate the legal system by reference to only published decisions because they may not reflect what goes on in the majority of cases." (emphasis omitted)).
204. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Black et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (defining omitted variable bias as "[a] bias... of a coefficient in a linear regression caused by the omission of a relevant variable from the regression, when this variable is correlated with one or more of the variables included in the regression").
205. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L. J. 435, 438 (2004) (studying these and other patent characteristics and concluding "that valuable patents differ in substantial ways from ordinary patents");
206. Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 287 (2011) (finding that "patents that do end up in litigation differ markedly from patents that do not").
207. See Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 786-88 (2008) (explaining the importance of transparency regarding methodology, data collection, and analysis in empirical legal research).
208. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396-97 (2006).
209. Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights, 32 RES. POL'Y 1343, 1344-45 (2003) (finding that various patent characteristics are correlated with patent value);
210. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 129 (2001) ("[T]he frequency of legal disputes is strongly correlated with a variety of characteristics of innovations and their owners....");
211. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1521, 1551 (2005) ("The fact that certain patent characteristics do predict... likelihood of patent litigation suggests that they are useful predictors of value.").
212. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2002);
213. see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125 (2002) ("Empirical methods are those that employ means for the systematic observation of experience in pursuit of inductive ends.").
214. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008).
215. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 185 (1998);
216. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (2014);
217. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005);
218. Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011);
219. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007);
220. Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit's New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2013);
221. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2012).
222. Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases, PATSTATS. ORG, http://patstats.org/Injunction-rulings-post-eBay-to-5-26-2013.xls (last visited Mar. 11, 2016)
223. (hereinafter Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings). This document was updated to include injunction rulings up to Dec. 31, 2013.
224. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
225. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 272-78.
226. Five cases listed in the FTC's report were excluded for not satisfying the criteria for this study: Zen Designs Grp., Ltd. V. Clint, No. 08-CV-14309, 2009 WL 4050247 (E. D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2009) (default judgment entered against accused infringer);
227. Acticon Techs. V. Heisei Elecs. Co., No. 06-CV-4316 (KMK), 2008 WL 356872 (S. D. N. Y. Feb. 5, 2008) (default judgment entered against accused infringer);
228. Nichia Corp. V. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No. 06-0162 MMC, 2008 WL 346416 (N. D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (design patents);
229. U. S. Philips Corp. V. KXD Tech., Inc., No. CV 05-8953 ER (PLAx), 2007 WL 4984150 (C. D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (default judgment entered against accused infringer);
230. and Telequip Corp. V. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD), 2006 WL 2385425 (N. D. N. Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (default judgment entered against accused infringer).
231. See Trebro Mfg., Inc. V. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest."
232. (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008))).
233. But cf. M. A. Cunningham, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA J. L. & Tech. 213, 231 (1995) (finding that district courts granted preliminary injunctions in slightly over 61% of the time in district court cases between 1982 and 1993).
234. See 35 U. S. C. §§ 171-173 (2012) (statutory provisions governing design patents).
235. Two cases were counted as each having two separate decisions on permanent injunctive relief: Apple, Inc. V. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N. D. Ill. 2012) (district court denying permanent injunctions for both Motorola and Apple);
236. and O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. V. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32 (TJW), 2007 WL 869576 (E. D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007) (denying permanent injunction)
237. vacated, 521 F. 3d 1351
238. remanded to No. 2:04-CV-00032-CE, 2010 WL 8753254 (E. D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2010) (denying permanent injunction again after remand from the Federal Circuit).
239. see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2005) (explaining that "the overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment- to leave as little as possible to interpretation"). In addition, written coding instructions are desirable "because the scientific standard of replicability requires a written record of how categories were defined and applied."
240. See U. S. Courts, Individual Court Sites, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi-bin/links.pl (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
241. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, and David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 667-70 (2014) (defining each category).
242. These categories were modified from John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2009).
243. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
244. (codified as amended at 21 U. S. C. § 355 (j) (1984)
245. and 35 U. S. C. § 271 (e) (1984)) (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act).
246. For an overview of patent litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act, see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 10-1 to 10-11 (Peter S. Menell et al. eds., 2009).
247. See 35 U. S. C. §§ 120, 361-376 (2012);
248. 37 C. F. R. § 1.27 (a) (2010).
249. 35 U. S. C. § 41 (h) (2012);
250. 37 C. F. R. § 1.27 (b) (2010).
251. See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools 13, 41-42 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf.
252. See generally Bronwyn Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16 (2005).
253. But see 1David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (Pa. Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper 13-065, 2013), http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2351809 (questioning this assumption);
254. Alan C. Marco, The Dynamics of Patent Citations, 94 ECON. LETTERS 290, 294 (2007) (finding an unobserved heterogeneity in the rate of patent citations because forward citations to a patent may beget more forward citations).
255. See generally Patents, GOOGLE. COM, https://www.google.com/?tbm=pts&gws-rd=ssl (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (search "Patents" in the search field).
256. See William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L'oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49, 61-68 (1998) (noting that "[e]mpirical studies of judicial decisions suffer from significant limitations, " including sample size, time lag, selection bias, and unstated rationales, but "[d]espite these limitations, the study of judicial decisions has redeeming qualities");
257. David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1157, 1187 (2011) ("All projects involving empirical studies of legal decisions have limitations....").
258. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (alteration in original)
259. (quoting Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990)).
260. For the seminal article on the "selection effect, " see generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
261. But see Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339-40 (1990) (concluding that the refined Priest/Klein hypothesis "can be rejected as a description of all civil litigation" but that it may accurately describe products liability litigation).
262. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, AIPLA 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 (2015).
263. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Under some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate.").
264. See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 203 (2015) (reporting the results of an empirical study of ongoing royalty awards after eBay).
265. David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1073, 1105 (2010).
266. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David Schwartz, How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits? BERKELEY TECH. L. J. (forthcoming) (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 485, at 42 tbl.6a), http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2750128 (finding that operating companies won 30.6% of definitive patent rulings in cases filed in 2008 and 2009 compared to only 14.4% of NPEs, and this difference was statistically signficant).
267. see also Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 559 (2001) ("The judicial opinion is the judge's story justifying the judgment. The cynical legal realist might say that the facts the judge chooses to relate are inherently selective and a biased subset of the actual facts of the case.").
268. See, e.g., Order, O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. V. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32 (TJW) (E. D. Tex. July 2, 2010), ECF No. 662 (sealed decision on injunctive relief).
269. See generally Bernard Chao & Derigan Silver, A Case Study in Patent Litigation Transparency, 2014 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 83 (2014) (describing the problem of lack of transparency in patent litigation proceedings).
270. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motions, Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. A., LLC, No. 9:08-CV-00164 (E. D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2011), ECF No. 546 (injunction hearing transcript under seal);
271. Transcript of Post-Trial Motion Hearing, Finisar Corp. V. DirectTV Group Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00264 (E. D. Tex. July 6, 2006), ECF Nos. 318, 334 (transcript of court hearing unavailable on PACER).
272. See, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W. D. Wis. 2010) (denying permanent injunction)
273. rev'd and remanded to 717 F.3d 1336, 1344-46 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
274. Presidio Components Inc., v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S. D. Cal. 2010) (denying permanent injunction)
275. vacated and remanded in relevant part to 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding the district court clearly erred in concluding that no irreparable injury existed and remanding to district court);
276. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D. Del. 2010) (denying permanent injunction)
277. rev'd and remanded to 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
278. see also PATSTATS. ORG, supra note 133 (finding that permanent injunctions were granted 75% of the time between May 2006 and May 2013).
279. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
280. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 12 fig.7a (2014), http://www.pwc.com/en-US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigationstudy.pdf (listing consumer products as 17% of all patent cases, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals as 14% of all patent cases, computer hardware and electronics at 10% of all patent cases, medical devices as 9% of all patent cases, and software as 7% of all patent cases from 1995-2013).
281. See Order Denying Motion for Injunctive Relief, Valeant Int'l v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-20526 (S. D. Fla. July 9, 2012), ECF No. 198;
282. ∗3 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2010).
283. See 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b) (2012) (providing that a "patent infringement [action] may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business");
284. In re TC Heartland LLC, F.3d
285. 2016 WL 1709433 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2016)
286. (reaffirming that the patent venue statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1400
287. incorporated the definition of corporate residence in the general venue statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c));
288. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N. C. L. REV. 889, 889-90 (2001) ("[T]he patent jurisdiction and venue statutes allow plaintiffs to bring their patent suits in virtually any district in the country.");
289. see also Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 551 (1973) ("All too often, patent infringement suits begin with a battle over where the war is to be fought."). Pending legislation in Congress, if adopted, would significantly limit patentees' choice of venue.
290. Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U. S. District Courts:1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065, 1104 (2016) (explaining that "the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware have consciously adopted norms, practices, and procedures" that make these forums "better for patent plaintiffs and worse for patent defendants").
291. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q. J. 401 (2010).
292. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 268 (2016) ("Notably, the Eastern District of Texas is especially popular with patent assertion entities....");
293. Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 193, 214 (2007) (finding that patent trolls "have shown a clear preference for the Eastern District [of Texas] over other venues");
294. Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 29, 42-43 tbl.1 (2010) (listing the Eastern District of Texas as the top forum for infringement suits by non-practicing entities);
295. Fabio E. Marino & Teri H. P. Nguyen, Has Delaware Become the "New" Eastern District of Texas? The Unforeseen Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 527, 529-30 (2014) ("Recent survey data on new patent suit filings suggests that [non-practicing entities] have found a new 'forum of choice' in the District of Delaware....").
296. See Eric H. Weisblatt & Claire Frezza, Who to Sue and Where in ANDA Litigation: Personal Jurisdiction Post-Daimler, 69 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 351, 351 (2014) (noting that pharmaceutical patent holders in Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) litigation often sue in the District of New Jersey).
297. See eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.");
298. Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 129 (2010) (noting that NPEs "may reduce social welfare" or "have an efficiency-reducing effect").
299. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 9 ("Some argue that PAEs encourage innovation by compensating inventors....");
300. Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 636 (2007) ("Small companies and individuals have few good options for licensing their patents or developing their inventions without interference from infringers.");
301. James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L. J. 189, 190 (2006) (contending that PAEs "actually benefit society" by "act[ing] as a market intermediary in the patent market... provid[ing] liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets").
302. But see Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1583, 1588 (2009) (questioning arguments that allege that all PAEs are beneficial to economic activity).
303. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H. R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015);
304. PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015).
305. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 8 n. 5 ("Taken literally, the term NPE encompasses patent owners that primarily seek to develop and transfer technology, such as universities.... Patent assertion entities do not include this latter group. ");
306. see also Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 611, 612 (2008) ("Universities are non-practicing entities. They share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but they are not trolls.").
307. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 52, 63-64 (2009) (contending that some individual inventors "are legitimately patent trolls" but that "a significant number [are] certainly not").
308. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E. D. Tex. 2009);
309. Adept, Inc. V. Murex Sec., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M. D. Fla. 2007);
310. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E. D. Tex. 2007);
311. Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motions, Anascape, Ltd. V. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-cv-00158 (E. D. Tex. July 18, 2008), ECF No. 395.
312. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
313. 800 Adept, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
314. See, e.g., Complaint for Patent Infringement, 800 Adept, Inc. V. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., No. 5:07-CV-00057 (E. D. Tex. filed Apr. 10, 2007);
315. Complaint for Patent Infringement, 800 Adept, Inc. V. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 5:07-CV-00023 (E. D. Tex. filed Feb. 6, 2007).
316. 800 Adept, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
317. Adept, Inc. V. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
318. Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motions, supra note 244, at 124-25.
319. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 599 (E. D. Tex. 2009).
320. See i4i v. Microsoft, I4I, http://www.i4ilp. com (last visited Mar. 12, 2016);
321. see also i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
322. aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
323. Amgen, Inc. V. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 210 (D. Mass. 2008)
324. aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded by 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
325. See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. V. Interlace Med., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 79-80 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that "the balance of hardships weighs against a permanent injunction" because it would cause the loss of over $250 million in investment and over 150 employees would lose their jobs and that "the public interest weighs against granting a permanent injunction" because "at least some doctors and their patients will suffer a negative impact if [the infringer] is enjoined from selling its medical device");
326. ∗3 (N. D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (denying an injunction because the infringer demonstrated "substantial hardship... would occur if a permanent injunction is imposed" and "[t]he public interest would undoubtedly be harmed by an injunction" because it "would leave only one product" on the market and thus "would have eliminated an important alternative for patients");
327. ∗6 (W. D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2008) (holding that the patentee failed to show that either "the balance of hardships" or "the public interest" weighed in favor of granting an injunction).
328. See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 30, 86 (D. Conn. 2013) (holding that granting an injunction was contrary to the public interest because it "would pull many devices that are presently used in surgery off the market");
329. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. V. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1292 (M. D. Fla. 2010) (concluding that "an injunction will create consequential medical, practical and economic issues" for users' of defendants' product, and "[t]he deleterious effects of the injunction on the general public would simply be too great to permit");
330. ∗9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009) ("Given... the important role that [the defendant's] products play in aiding vascular surgeons who perform life-saving medical treatments, sound public policy does not favor removing [them] from the market.").
331. See Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F. 3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
332. Apple, Inc. V. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N. D. Ill. 2012);
333. Humanscale Corp. v CompX Int'l Inc., No. 3:09-CV-86, 2010 WL 3222411 (E. D. Va. Aug. 16, 2010).
334. See Apple, Inc. V. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153-57 (N. D. Cal. 2012)
335. aff'd in part, vacated in part by 735 F.3d 1352, 1359-68 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
336. ∗4 (N. D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015);
337. ∗12 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014).
338. See Smith Int'l, Inc. V. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[W]here validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established, as in this case, immediate irreparable harm is presumed." (citations omitted)).
339. See Polymer Techs., Inc. V. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming the denial of injunctive relief when the accused infringer "has or will soon cease the allegedly infringing activities").
340. See, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1344-46 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (infringing product gained 5% market share because the infringer was "competing in the marketplace using [plaintiff's] patented technology" and was able to "undercut[] prices").
341. see also MicroAire Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Arthrex, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 604, 635 (W. D. Va. 2010) ("The loss of goodwill is a well-recognized basis for finding irreparable harm....").
342. ∗2 (W. D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2012) (finding that irreparable harm exists because, inter alia, the infringer "will be unable to satisfy any judgment entered against it");
343. Symbol Techs., Inc. V. Janam Techs., LLC, 729 F. Supp. 2d 646, 665 (D. Del. 2010) ("In some instances, a defendant's inability to satisfy a money judgment has been deemed sufficient to establish irreparable injury." (citations omitted)).
344. ∗ 2 (D. Del. May 25, 2012).
345. ∗ 12 (E. D. Va. May 23, 2011).
346. See Smith & Nephew, Inc. V. Arthrex, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (D. Or. 2008).
347. ∗11 (D. N. J. Feb. 27, 2009).
348. Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 67, 80 (2007) ("Courts collapse the first two factors [of the eBay test], apparently viewing irreparable harm, if an injunction is not granted, and inadequate remedy at law, in the form of damages, as opposite sides of the same coin. ").
349. MercExchange III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E. D. Va. 2007).
350. ∗2-3 (N. D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012)
351. (quoting ECF No. 131 at 10).
352. See Accentra Inc. V. Staples, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1238 (C. D. Cal. 2011) (finding that the infringer did not challenge patentee's showing that its legal remedies are inadequate, but the district court concluded the patentee had failed to show irreparable harm and denied an injunction).
353. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 477-78 (2012).
354. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1179, 1200 (1999).
355. For a useful primer on odds ratios in logistic regression, see UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, FAQ: How Do I Interpret Odds Ratios in Logistic Regression?, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult-pkg/faq/general/odds-ratio.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
356. See UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, FAQ: What are Pseudo R-squareds?, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult-pkg/faq/general/Psuedo-RSquareds.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
357. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 599 (E. D. Tex. 2009) (finding that there was evidence of direct competition between patentee and defendant within the custom XML marketplace, but at the time of decision patentee's primary business appeared to be patent licensing and litigation);
358. Adept, Inc. V. Murex Sec, Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1337 (M. D. Fla. 2007) (finding that "800 Adept and the Murex-Targus Parties are competitors in the market for telephone call routing services").
359. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
360. eBay, 547 U. S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
361. See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 30, 86 (D. Conn. 2013) (finding it "an important consideration that a permanent injunction would pull many devices that are presently used in surgery off the market");
362. ∗4 (N. D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (finding that "the public benefit of having two products with different qualities in the transcervical hysteroscopic sterilization market militates strongly against an injunction");
363. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. V. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1292-93 (M. D. Fla. 2010) (concluding "that the public interest would be disserved if an injunction were to be entered" because "millions of innocent contact lens wearers will suffer real adverse consequences if sale of [the infringing contact lenses] is enjoined");
364. ∗5-6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding the public interest "weigh[s] heavily against imposing an injunction" because of "the public health consequences of enjoining Gore from producing or selling its infringing products");
365. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 7, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA v. Nuvasive, Inc., No. 08-CV-01512 (S. D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012), ECF No. 461 ("[I]t appears to the Court that the potential risk to patient health and safety is too great to justify enjoining NuVasive from continuing to sell its infringing products.").
366. See James Bessen, The Value of U. S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics, 37 RES. POL'Y 932, 939 (2008) ("A litigated patent is, all else equal, nearly six times more valuable");
367. See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L. J. 677, 690 (2011) (finding that "large patent plaintiffs are significantly more likely than small ones to win" in patent litigation).
368. see also Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2113-14 (asserting that "district courts' post-eBay practice may be in some tension with the Supreme Court's warning against the 'categorical denial of injunctive relief' to broad classes of patent holders");
369. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013) (referring to "bottom-feeder trolls" as patent owners that "rely on the high cost of patent litigation" to induce alleged infringers to enter into "quick, low-value settlements").
370. Robert P. Merges, Foundations and Principles Redux: A Reply to Professor Blankfein-Tabachnick, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1361, 1373 (2013) (same).
371. See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-13, 2013), http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2233041 (finding that PAEs initiated 62% of all patent litigation filed in 2012 based on data provided by RPX);
372. eBay Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 393 (2006);
373. eBay, 547 U. S. at 393.
374. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. V. MercExchange, L. L. C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 198 (2007) ("Nonpracticing entities can be small enterprises that have developed innovative technology but have been unable to generate the necessary capital or marketing expertise to compete successfully [in] the marketplace.");
375. see also Stuart J. H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1255, 1297 (2009) (finding that among surveyed startups who apply for patent protection, "the most important reason for patenting is to prevent others from copying the startup's products and services").
376. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2001) (explaining the activities associated with commercializing an invention, including developing a commercial embodiment, raising capital, securing production facilities and labor, creating distribution channels, and informing potential consumers about the product's availability and benefits);
377. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010) ("[T]he inventor must undertake costly and risky development and testing to transform the invention into a commercially viable product.").
378. David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources as Dual Sources of Advantage: Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 761, 762 (2013) (finding "that successful patent filings are... influential determinants of financing outcomes for new ventures" for semiconductor startups);
379. Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674-75 (2000) (finding that "venture capital is associated with a substantial increase in patenting" and suggesting several models to explain this relationship);
380. Celia Lerman, Patent Strategies of Technology Startups: An Empirical Study 26-27 (May 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2610433 (finding in empirical study of startups listed in CruchBase that "patents have a positive effect on funding" from investors and that "the number of patents matters").
381. See Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2117 ("By discouraging innovation, and the ownership of rights in innovation, by independent inventors, universities, technology start-ups, research-oriented spin-offs, and patent holding companies, a categorically discriminatory market for patent rights may slow, rather than promote, progress.");
382. see also Ted Sichelman & Stuart J. H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 112 (2010) (explaining that "patents provide substantial ex post incentives to commercialize inventions").
383. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001) (asserting that "only about 1.5% of patents are litigated at all, " but estimating that "the total number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty (as opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of [5%] of issued patents").
384. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1155, 1156 (2002).
385. see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 59-62 (2009) (advancing a similar argument).
386. see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 tbl.1 (1986) (finding in a cross-section survey of firms that 65% percent of pharmaceutical innovations would not have been introduced without patent protection).
387. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166-67, 167 fig.2 (2003) (finding that the total cost per FDA approved new drug exceeds $800 million);
388. see also JOSEPH A. DIMASI, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: NEW ESTIMATES OF R&D COSTS (2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts-CSDD-briefing-on-RD-cost-study-Nov-18,-2014..pdf (finding in updated study that estimated average pre-tax industry costs per new prescription drug approval exceeds $2.5 billion).
389. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 608 (E. D. Tex. 2009);
390. Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Anascape Ltd. V. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 9:06-CV-158 (E. D. Tex. July 23, 2008), ECF No. 384;
391. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607-08 (E. D. Tex. 2007).
392. See Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2 (a)
393. (proposed amendment to 35 U. S. C. § 1400 (b));
394. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H. R. 9, 114th Cong. § 281B (g) (2015)
395. (proposed amendment to 35 U. S. C. § 1400 (b)), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9/text.