Shareholders and the Atom of Property: Fission or Fusion?

Business & Society

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 49-75

  Ryan, Lori Verstegen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84992786314     PISSN: 00076503     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/000765030003900105     Document Type: Article

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