Stockholder-manager conflicts and firm value

Financial Analysts Journal

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 14-30

  Byrd, John ^a   Parrino, Robert ^b   Pritsch, Gunnar ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c MCKINSEY AND COMPANY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011232464     PISSN: 0015198X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2469/faj.v54.n3.2177     Document Type: Review

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