Bilateral monopoly, identical distributors, and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 586-602

  Ingene, Charles A ^a   Parry, Mark E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI KANSAS CITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Distribution channels; Game theory; Mathematical modeling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84991408208     PISSN: 00920703     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11747-006-0006-0     Document Type: Article

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