Manufacturer-optimal wholesale pricing when retailers compete

Marketing Letters

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 65-77

  Ingene, Charles A ^a,b   Parry, Mark E ^c  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Channels of distribution; Game theory; Pricing research

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347800318     PISSN: 09230645     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007920104849     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Ingene, C. and M. Parry. (1995a). "Channel Coordination When Retailers Compete," Marketing Science 14 (Fall), 360-377.
2. Ingene, C. and M. Parry. (1995b). "Coordination and Manufacturer Profit Maximization: The Multiple Retailer Channel," Journal of Retailing 71 (Summer), 129-151.
3. Jeuland, A. and S. Shugan. (1983). "Managing Channel Profits" Marketing Science 2 (Summer), 239-272.
4. Lafontaine, F. (1990). "An Empirical Look at Franchise Contracts as Signaling Devices," Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.
5. McGuire, T. and R. Staelin. (1983). "An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration," Marketing Science 2 (Spring), 161-192.
6. Moorthy, K. (1987). "Managing Channel Profits: Comment," Marketing Science 6 (Fall), 375-379.